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ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to provide an empirical evaluation of whether
scholars are justified in calling for the end of the transition paradigm, the
dominant model of democratization study among Comparative Politics scholars.
My thesis argues that the predominant emphasis on elections and institutions
among transition theorists is largely ineffective in understanding democratic
transitions in the former Soviet Union. To test my thesis, I conduct qualitative
case studies of Ukraine and Russia that focus on the role of elections and
institutions in the transition process.
Under the transitions model, one would reasonably expect the transition
process in each country to be relatively similar, given the similar timing and
manner in which elections and institutions were implemented, coupled w ith
strong geographic, cultural, and historic commonalities. Instead, both cases have
experienced highly divergent paths of development w ith varied levels of success.
v
This comprehensive study sheds serious doubt on the ability of the transitions
model to accurately comprehend the dynamics of democratic development in the
former Soviet Union. Though many scholars have criticized certain assumptions
or components of the transitions model, few if any, have constructed a
comprehensive, empirical analysis of the transitions model on its own terms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Though America has long sought to protect democracy and encourage its spread,
the stakes in this pursuit have never been higher. With the end of the Cold War, America
ascended as a unipolar world power in contrast to the 2() lh century norm of bi-polar or
multi-polar international systems. Meanwhile, the pace of political, economic, social,
military, and technological integration reached unprecedented levels giving rise to new
and more destructive forms of resistance to American power, including well-organized
and widely dispersed international terrorist organizations. Despite these obstacles,
America has a unique opportunity to use its power and influence in a way that can realize
its historic aspirations to spread freedom and democracy. At the same time, this potential
has been put to the test with regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq that raised doubts
over America’s ability to foster nation building and indigenous desires for democratic
government. Now more than ever, America must clearly understand the dynamics of
democratic development, in order to effectively promote democracy around the world.
Past scholars have astutely observed that it would be tedious to chronicle a full
catalog of historic declarations that reflect the importance of promoting freedom and
democracy in American foreign policy making. 1 Still, it is important to understand how
the promotion of liberty and democracy has been a dominant concern of American
foreign policy since the Founding. America’s fundamental premise for revolt was a set of
universal principles that placed liberty at the core. The Founders understood the creation
of American government in a broad historical context that went beyond the immediate
interests of the Founders and the national interests of the new nation. The Founders were
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unsure if popular government could work, but if successful, the Founders were certain the
world would be better off. This is evident in the colonial writings of many founders, such
as John Adams, who argued that liberty held an unparalleled capacity for human
development even though rulers often impeded the natural desire for liberty as a means of
control.'
Despite universal conceptions of liberty and oppression, America’s independence
was fragile. George Washington famously stated in 1796 that America’s true policy was
to “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.” ' Though
early American foreign policy was isolationist in rhetoric, the Founders produced a long
term vision of America's future. This ambiguity is evident in one of the era’s most
ambiguous figures, Thomas Jefferson, who foresaw an “empire of liberty” in which our
rapid multiplication would “cover the whole northern, if not southern continent, with
people speaking the same language, governed by similar forms, and by similar laws.” 4
Conventional thinking toward democracy promotion began with Woodrow
Wilson who expanded the objectives of American foreign policy making beyond an
“empire of liberty” to a world of democracy. In contrast to past foreign policy doctrines,
Wilson felt American intervention abroad must have a moral rationale, rather than being
solely based on our interests or the interests of our allies. In this spirit Wilson made the
famous statement that “the world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be
planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.”
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Wilson stated after the war that
“the moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come,” but
the Senate failed to ratify the League of Nations, which undercut Wilson's vision for the
postwar world. Importantly, however, democracy remains a dominant theme of
American foreign policy to this day, though it is an open question whether democracy,
liberty, and freedom are interchangeable terms. Indeed, they may coexist only uneasily
and under special, not universal, conditions.
Franklin Roosevelt sought to build America into “the great arsenal of democracy”
to overcome “the threat to our democratic faith.
”
s
America fought Fascism politically,
with the Atlantic Charter, economically, with the Lend Lease Act, and militarily, in
response to the attack on Pearl Harbor. ' Roosevelt died a month before the war ended
and Harry Truman became President. The fragile peace of allied leaders soon
deteriorated. Once again, America assumed a hostile posture toward a contrasting
political ideology that did not share American values of freedom and democracy:
Communism.
The Truman Doctrine understood Communism as “the will of the minority
forcibly imposed on the majority,” which “relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”
10
In 1947,
Truman famously defined American policy for the next generation: “I believe it must be
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” 1
1
This meant that whenever
and wherever a popular government was threatened by Communism, the United States
would supply political, economic, and military support. 1 '
Throughout the Cold War, subsequent Presidents created various national
programs that focused on democracy promotion. Two examples include the Alliance for
Progress and National Endowment for Democracy. John F. Kennedy created the Alliance
for Progress in 1961 to further political development in Latin America around the belief
3
that “economic progress and social justice can be achieved by free men working within a
framework of democratic institutions.” 1 ' The goal of the Alliance was to transform the
continent so as to provide “an example to all the world that liberty and progress walk
hand in hand.” 14 Ronald Reagan created the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983
around the belief that “freedom is a universal aspiration that can be realized through the
development of democratic institutions, procedures, and values.” 1
^
In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, which from a Western perspective,
significantly discredited Communism as an effective political ideology. There was much
optimism surrounding the future of democracy around the world throughout the 1990’s.
As George II. W. Bush stated in 1991 the world can seize the opportunity “to fulfill the
long held promise of a new world order where brutality will go unrewarded and
aggression will meet collective resistance.”"’ This opportunity can only be realized under
American leadership because of America’s unique moral and military standing, which
“has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching world.” 1
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, fundamentally
transformed how Americans and our government approached national security. George
W. Bush adopted a preemptive military approach, in what the administration claimed was
a deliberate contrast to the reactive approach of the Clinton administration. This was
evident w ith America’s invasion of Afghanistan shortly after 9/1 1 to depose of the
Taliban. The search for a democratic world, articulated by the elder Bush, gave way to a
fight for a democratic world, implemented by the younger Bush.
In the Middle East, President Bush’s current approach to democracy promotion
focuses on the consequences of failure and the need to do whatever it takes to be
4
successful. This is evident in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the policy of using military
force to simultaneously initiate regime change and establish a popular government as a
model of democracy for the Middle East. Despite obstacles, the Bush administration
clearly stated that America must stay the course because if we do not, “failure in Iraq
would be a disaster for the United States.
”
1N
If policy changes are necessary, these should
take the shape of increased American military involvement to better enhance security and
the ability of Iraqi security forces to form a platform for popular government. As stated
by George W. Bush in his Second Inaugural Address, such an approach would
simultaneously promote American interests and world peace:
We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of
liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.
The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the
world ... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth
of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.
14
In contrast to the predominantly military approach to regime change pursued by
the Bush administration in Iraq, contemporary studies of comparative political
development focus on government structures. This second approach to democracy
promotion is called the transitions model and emphasizes the establishment of democratic
political structures, such as elections and institutions. It is named after a group of scholars
in comparative political scholarship who collectively understand democratic development
as a dynamic process in contrast to earlier understandings of democracy as something
attained all at once after the establishment of a number of prerequisites, such as economic
development or a civic culture.
Notable scholars in this group, such as Samuel Huntington and Guillermo
O’Donnell, emphasize the role of elections and institutions in successful transitions.
particularly the idea that the sooner they are established, the better. The Bush approach
and transition approach are not mutually exclusive and instead complement one another.
After overthrowing the Iraqi dictatorship with military force, American officials quickly
sought to establish democratic institutions and elections were lauded as significant
indicators of progress toward democratic governance.
As with Iraq, contemporary studies of comparative political development are in
need of a new direction. The predominant emphasis on elections and institutions does not
sufficiently capture how in many parts of the world these formal mechanisms are easily
controlled, manipulated, or eroded by undemocratic trends and behaviors to such an
extent that the effectiveness of the transitions approach is called into question. Elections
and institutions are certainly an important part of democracy building, but mainstream
scholarship over-emphasizes the establishment of such structures to the point that the
process of implementation is often dismissed or overlooked, while other equally
important factors, such as rule of law and independent media, are often ignored. The
consequences of institutional implementation and ignorance of necessary institutional
supports has led to variety of concepts to describe many countries that are stuck
somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism.
Past scholars have sought to create new categories of democracy to capture this
dynamic or called for the abandonment of the transitions paradigm without empirical
evaluation. This work seeks to take the transitions approach head on by evaluating the
effectiveness of elections and institutions in promoting democracy. Many scholars of
comparative political development accept the establishment of elections and institutions
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as the foundation of democracy promotion efforts, yet there is surprisingly little research
or discussion as to why that is and how it should come about. This is a serious concern.
To be fair to the transitions approach, the model should be tested with empirical rigor, in
its own words, in a region where many other variables, such as timing, geography,
history, culture, language, and religion are similar. To my knowledge, no critical
evaluation of this nature has yet taken place.
My research question asks: Have elections and institutions been highly effective in
promoting political and economic development in the former Soviet Union? My thesis
argues that the predominant emphasis on elections and institutions among transition
scholars is largely ineffective in understanding democratic transitions in the former
Soviet Union and thus, hinders efforts to promote democracy. If the emphasis on
elections and institutions of the transitions approach is justified, then democratic
development in Ukraine and Russia would be relatively successful and similar in each
case because elections and institutions were established and functioning early in the
transition process. If, on the other hand, development experiences in Ukraine and Russia
are ineffective and divergent than the emphasis on elections and institutions in the
transitions approach should be reconsidered.
In contrast to Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, the authoritarian rule of
Eastern Europe was undertaken by a single regime with remarkably similar character and
timing in terms of creation, implementation, consolidation, and collapse. Within the
region, two countries have shared a particularly close historical connection: Ukraine and
Russia. This connection dates back to the 9'
1
' century when Eastern Slavs settled to form
the powerful state of Kievan Rus along the Dnieper River in modem Kiev. Over the next
7
14 centuries, the development of Ukraine and Russia shared many social commonalities
including ethnicity, language, culture, and religion. Today, a flight from Moscow to Kiev
is considered domestic, while many Ukrainian citizens in Eastern and Southern Ukraine
still consider themselves an important partner, if not a part, of Russia. The numerous
historical, political, and social characteristics shared by Ukraine and Russia make these
two countries optimal cases to measure the degree and dynamics of democratic
development since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 . Both established elections and
institutions in a relatively similar manner at relatively the same time.
This work focuses on five transition scholars: Samuel Huntington, Guillermo
O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. In examining the seminal
works of these authors, two core perspectives emerge. First, all provide relatively similar
understandings of functioning democracy that center on the electoral process. Huntington
adopts Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy: a political system is democratic to
the extent the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic,
competitive elections with widespread voter eligibility."
11
O’Donnell and Schmitter state that “the establishment of certain rules of regular,
formalized political competition deserved priority attention by scholars and
practitioners.”"
1
The authors understand functioning democracy to be a political system
where government authority is derived from obligatory adherence to collective decision
making procedures and due process is enjoyed by all citizens."" Linz and Stepan offer a
multi-dimensional understanding of functioning democracy in which the public and
government accept democratic procedures and institutions as the sole means to govern
and resolve conflict. 2 ' All three of these perspectives place democratic elections.
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collective decision making, and related democratic rights and procedures at the forefront
of functioning democracy.
Second, all emphasize institutions in successfully consolidating democratic
transitions. Huntington states that “all democratic regimes the principal officers of
government are chosen through competitive elections in which the bulk of the population
can participate. Democratic systems thus have a common institutional core that
establishes their identity.”
-4
O’Donnell and Schmitter state that an important element in
transition cases is “the extent to which representative institutions- political parties, social
movements, interest associations, autonomous agencies, local governments- have
survived from the period prior to authoritarian rule.”
2>
“If there is one characteristic
common to all our cases,” O'Donnell and Schmitter explain, “it is the omnipresent fear,
during the transition, and often long after political democracy has been installed, that a
coup will be attempted and succeed.”
-1
' Linz and Stepan state that “consolidation requires
that habituation to the norms and procedures of democratic conflict regulation be
developed. A high degree ol institutional routinization is a key part of such a process.
”
-
All three of these perspectives emphasize establishing an institutional core as a form of
democratic identity, the preservation of past legacies of representative institutions, and
newly established avenues of institutional routinization in successfully consolidating
democratic governance.
Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Thomas Carothers are a few prominent
scholars who have begun to categorize and criticize aspects of transition theories. This
has been met with resistance by transition scholars. In “In Partial Defense of an
Evanescent Paradigm,” O’Donnell questions that such an approach even exists
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considering that transitions scholarship is a large and diverse body of work/ The fact
that O'Donnell does not actively consider himself a “transitologist” does not in itself
mean that either category is invalid, nor exempt from classification or criticism. The
transitions approach is large and diverse, but several prominent scholars within the
approach share certain basic core perspectives that justify the category.
O’Donnell may have forgotten about former coauthor Phillipe Schmitter who
clearly described the development of “transitology” with Terry Karl in 1994. Schmitter
and Karl state that the widespread political change in the third wave of democratization
was accompanied by “the gradual and unobtrusive development of two proto-sciences:
transitology and consolidology. The claim of these embryonic subdisciplines is that by
applying a universalistic set of assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses, they together can
explain and hopefully help to guide the way from an autocratic to a democratic
regime.” Niccolo Machiavelli is “the founder and patron saint of transitology” because
Machiavelli was the first great political theorist to “recognize the specific problematics
and dynamics of regime change,” gave to transitology its fundamental principle of
uncertainty, and “warned that the potential contribution of the discipline would always be
modest.” ’" Hence, according to prominent, self-proclaimed transitologists, transitology
was bom “with limited scientific pretension and marked practical concerns.’” 1 It is
exactly this lack of scientific concern that this work seeks to address.
O'Donnell defends the electoral emphasis of transition scholars on the grounds
that genuinely free and fair elections require certain fundamental political freedoms. In
turn, the combination of regular elections and relevant freedoms marks a significant
departure from authoritarian rule. ' This mistakenly assumes that all freedoms that
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guarantee a free and fair election process will produce a democratic electoral
environment. Free and fair elections regularly occur in countries that do not necessarily
have democratic electoral environments because of government restrictions on freedoms
such as press, speech, assembly, and expression. Are these countries still democracies?
Either way, elections can be deemed free and fair by international observers, yet still be
significantly tainted by limited freedoms, corruption, and violence.
This suggests that free and fair elections in themselves may have a more limited
role in democratic development than suggested by O'Donnell and other proponents of an
election-centered approach to transitions. Elections have certainly been a central pail of
American governance dating back to the Election of 1800, the first peaceful transition of
power between political parties in world history. In many other parts of the world,
however, elections have had little, no, or different meanings than commonly understood
in the Western tradition. 1 do not question that elections and institutions can play an
important role in development, but instead seek to create greater dialogue about exactly
what roles elections and institutions have played in the development process and what
other factors are necessary for effective development to be best understood.
1 conclude that scholars of comparative political development need to reorient
predominant understandings of transitions away from election-centered, institution-
centered models of democratic development toward a multifaceted approach that
incorporates the lessons of the last fifteen years of post Soviet development. . Essentially,
we must determine what should be more seriously considered aside from elections and
institutions in understanding how a country can move toward a functioning democracy. 1
label these considerations "environments" and develop seven that are w orth
consideration: I ) popular environment; 2) historical-cultural environment; 3)
international environment; 4) institutional environment; 5) legal environment; 6)
economic environment: 7) civil environment. Environments are chosen to distinguish
different aspects of democratic development that are static, yet must be sustainable to be
effective.
The following research is divided into four main sections. The first section
introduces the project and discusses the development of the transitions approach to
democracy promotion in comparative political scholarship. The second section provides a
detailed case study of Ukrainian development. The third section provides a detailed case
study of Russian development. The final section provides conclusions on how well the
case studies fit with the thesis statement and provides suggestions for where democratic
scholarship should go from here.
1 create ten indicators to measure the effectiveness of elections in promoting
democratic development. When effective, elections fundamentally promote the peaceful
and legitimate transition of power. Indicators of an effective electoral process include
holding frequent elections, high voter turnout, popular candidate selection, effective
oversight procedures to resolve electoral disputes, low levels of fraud, low levels of
violence, wide acceptance of results, low levels of media favoritism, ideological variance
among candidates, and candidates that represent stable and principled parties. These
indicators seek to cover informal and formal aspects of the electoral process.
I create five indicators to measure the effectiveness of democratic institutions in
promoting democratic development. When effective, democratic institutions
fundamentally promote stable and representative government. Indicators of effective
12
institutional operation include the establishment of a democratic constitution, low levels
of corruption, low levels of violence, wide acceptance of the political system, and a
meaningful role for the opposition. These indicators consider both formal and informal
aspects of institutional development and operation.
The former Soviet Union is fairly unique compared to other third-wave transitions
because post-Soviet transitions consist of three simultaneous transformations: political,
economic, and social. As a result, comprehensive studies of post-Soviet development
must address this multi-dimensional nature. In turn, 1 create five indicators to measure the
effectiveness of institutions in promoting capitalist development. When effective,
democratic institutions fundamentally promote stable and sustained economic growth.
Indicators of effective institutional operation include a rising gross domestic product, a
balanced budget, significant privatization of state owned industries, rising wages, and
rising foreign direct investment. These indicators focus on macroeconomic indicators
that measure basic health of a developing economy.
When all indicators are present in a respective category, the development process
is considered exceptional. Conversely, lower percentages correspond with lower levels of
effectiveness. If a percentage of effectiveness in a case study falls below 60%, the
category will be considered highly ineffective in promoting their respective objectives.
The scale of effectiveness is as follows:
• Scores between 60% and 69% will be considered ineffective.
• Scores between 70% and 79% will be considered moderately effective.
• Scores between 80% and 89% will be considered effective.
• Scores between 90% and 1 00% will be considered highly effective.
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These twenty indicators and the corresponding scale of effectiveness will shed
significant light on the effectiveness of elections and institutions in Ukraine and Russia
since the fall of the Soviet Union. Still, there are areas for improvement. First, the
transitions model is understood through five major transition theorists that combined to
form some of the most important works in the approach. This seeks to build on the works
ofBunce and McFaul, who have reflected a certain assertions of transition scholars in
light of post-Soviet development, and Carothers who called for the abandonment of the
transitions model, without clearly identifying the contours of the model and its
proponents. Future works can further develop this foundation for understanding the
transitions model by expanding the breadth and depth of what is presented. Second, the
case studies rely heavily on election and economic reports from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the World Bank because there were the most
frequent and detailed. Future works could incorporate comprehensive reports from other
NGO’s and systematically incorporate social indicators, such life expectancy and
population growth, into the study.
Scholars of democratic development are currently met with a certain level of
disdain in American society. Many resist the idea that America should be establishing
democracy by force in parts of the world that are unaccustomed to American occupation
and norms of popular government. Historically, however, the peaceful, as well as violent,
pursuit and promotion of political principles, such as liberty, and particular forms of
14
government, such as democracy, have been a major part of American foreign policy for
generations. The question that emerges is where to go from here.
Given America's unique position as the sole world superpower in an era of
globalization, the use of American power and prestige is uniquely important. In thinking
about the future of democratic development it becomes abundantly clear that the
consequences of failure are heightened. This is not because non-democracies, such as
Iraq, will necessarily become safe-havens for terrorists, but because information is
globally dispersed at unprecedented levels due to electronic media and the internet. In
turn, instant knowledge of American missteps and failures has never been so widespread,
nor so damaging to the basic national objectives of promoting free governments and
economies.
Now more than ever, scholars of comparative political development need to think
of new and effective ways to explain the myriad of development scenarios that have
emerged since Rustow developed the transitions approach that Huntington and others
pioneered for over thirty years. The predominant emphasis on elections and institutions
that has persisted throughout this time has silently become core perspectives of many
democracy proponents in and out of academia and government. If successful, this work
will create greater dialogue over the usefulness and effectiveness of these basic
perspectives in the hopes of forging new and better perspectives in this very important
and timely area of study.
15
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CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSITOLOGY AM) ITS CRITICS
The current body of scholarship that examines democratic development in
Comparative Politics is called “transitology.” This name was developed around the belief
that the study of democratic transitions is so important to the work of comparative
political scholarship that it needs a separate category with a distinct name. The focus of
scholarship on democratic development over the last three decades has centered upon the
notion of transition. The placement of transitions at the forefront of understanding
democratic development began in 1970 with Dankwart Rustow. Prior to Rustow,
scholarship on democratic development centered upon the notion that democracy
developed from certain prerequisites that enabled democracy to emerge. Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba ( 1963) argued that a civic culture was necessary for democracy to
develop. Civic culture was defined as a pluralistic culture that places communication and
persuasion at the heart of the political process. According to Almond and Verba,
democracy emerges in a civic culture because this culture promotes consensus in diverse
societies, while effectively balancing moderation with desires for change.
Seymour Lipset ( 1959) focused on the economies of developing nations, rather
than cultures, claiming that democracy could have multiple prerequisites, rather than just
one. Lipset argued that national unity and economic affluence were two preconditions of
democracy. Economic development allows democracy to emerge by creating a large
middle class that can influence the political values of economic elites, which promotes
w idespread acceptance of democratic norms, such as economic redistribution.
17
Walt Rostow ( 1960) was a prestigious economist who also believed that
economic development must occur before democratic development can occur. Rostow
constructed a model of democratic development based on five stages of economic
growth. In the first stage of Traditional Society, political organization is based on family
and clan relationships and subsistence agriculture dominates economic activity. In the
second stage. Preconditionsfor Takeoff emerge, such as a rise in the rate of investment
and the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors. Takeoff is
defined as an industrial revolution in which economic growth becomes a normal part of
social activity. Approximately 50 years after takeoff, there is a Drive to Maturity’ in
which the society masters modern technologies and the corresponding increase in quality
of life produces political moderation. In the final stage, called the Age ofHigh Mass
Consumption
,
citizens begin to manipulate the physical environment for economic
advantage and a large middle class develops.
Rostow argued that all democracies must pass through these five stages in
sequence. In turn, every society faces a similar set of choices in the process of economic
and political development, which relevant scholars termed “modernization.” Modern
nations were considered to have capitalist economies and democratic political systems.
Modernization scholars sought to both explain and promote democratic development by
better understanding what conditions were necessary for democracy to develop.
Modernization scholars incorporated many disciplines into understanding development
including Anthropology, Sociology, and Psychology.
The notion of democratic pre-requisites came under fire throughout the late
1960’s and early 1970’s from a new wave of graduate students and young scholars who
18
studied under modernization scholars. According to Howard Wiarda (2002), criticisms
included ethnocentrism, ignorance of how international events influenced domestic
politics, exclusion of class and power relations, misunderstanding of indigenous
institutions throughout the world, and misunderstanding of the role of timing and
sequence in democratic development. America’s involvement in Vietnam and an
increasing number of field studies led to more critical analysis of American policy and
scholarship on political development. In 1968, Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in
Changing Societies was the first major work in Comparative Politics to argue that rapid
economic growth and social mobilization can upset national traditions and create chaos,
just as easily as these factors can produce modernization. Consequently, the one-size-
fits-all understanding of democratic development, which sought to understand and
duplicate Western experiences on the rest of the world, was cast in serious doubt.
In 1970, Dankwart Rustow transformed predominant understandings of
democratic development away from prerequisites toward more dynamic understandings
of political change. Rustow argued that democratic development is a process that can
move forward, toward lasting democratic reform, as well as backward, toward repressive
government. Conceptually, Rustow understood a transition as a circular relationship
between democratic development and democratic regression, rather than a universally
linear progression from economic development to democratic development. In turn, the
democratic transitions need not be geographically, temporally, or socially uniform.
Huntington propelled Rustow's focus on transitions into a new body of theory
with the article “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” In the article, Huntington
claimed that scholars of prerequisites often confuse the correlation of democracy and
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other economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors with conclusions that these
factors necessarily produce democracy. Huntington also shared Rustow’s concern that
political factors had been overlooked in approaches that focus on prerequisites. At the
same time, Huntington did not want to completely abandon previous democratic
scholarship.
Huntington argued that “the emergence of democracy in a society is helped by a
number of factors” that “can be grouped into four broad categories- economic, social,
external, and cultural.” 1 These factors include: 1 ) higher levels of economic well-being;
2) the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income; 3) greater social pluralism,
including particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie; 4) a more market-orientated
economy; 5) greater societal influence from existing democratic states; and 6) a culture
that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise. 2 In contrast to earlier
scholars who focused on preconditions, Huntington argued that “with the possible
exception of a market economy, no single precondition is necessary to produce
(democratic) development.” ' Huntington claimed that the optimism of the 1950’s, which
looked favorably upon the prospects of democratic development around the world,
returned in the 1980’s with greater caution and less naivety.
4
Political developments in
Southwestern Europe produced significant democratic transformation, which gave hope
that similar developments would follow.
Huntington sought to examine the extent to which this new optimism was justified
and in doing so, provided several reasons as to why democratic transitions should be
studied in more detail. First, the correlation between democracy and individual liberty is
very high. Second, the more democracy prevails around the world, the more congenial
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the world environment will be to American interests and the future of American
democracy. Third, the increasing trend toward global interdependence will not allow a
part-democratic, part-authoritarian existence for long. Fourth, the extension or decline of
democracy has implications for other social values, such as economic growth, political
stability, and social justice, that Americans tend to believe are normatively desirable.
These arguments laid the foundation for normative perspectives of subsequent
comparative scholars who focus on democratic transitions.
Huntington created four phases to describe democratic development and adopted
Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy: a political system is democratic to the
extent the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic,
competitive elections with widespread voter eligibility. Huntington was most interested
in understanding the fate of democratic transitions over time. The first phase began in
1820 and witnessed democratic expansion in colonial America, Northern Europe,
Western Europe, and British dominions. Expansion peaked in 1920, which led to a
second phase of democratic retrenchment, where democratic trends were extinguished in
Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, Spain, Brazil, and Japan.
The third phase of democratic development was a short-lived boom of new'
democracies which began in 1942 and ended in 1953. During this phase, American
established democracy in West Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan, while former
colonies, such as India, Israel, and the Philippines, experienced significant democratic
advancements. According to Huntington, “the fourth period in the evolution of
democratic regimes," which lasted from 1953 to 1984, was different from the other three
in that there was no dominant trend of democratic extension or retrenchment. " Thus, the
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number of democratic regimes expanded in the 1950’s, shrunk in the mid to late 1960’s,
and then expanded again in the late 1970's and early 1980’s. After examining this record
of democratic development, Huntington concluded that optimism toward the prospects of
democratic development was justified, though the future of democratic expansion is
uncertain.
The Third Wave ( 1991 ) tightened up Huntington’s earlier “phases” of democratic
development with a more concise metaphor. Huntington chose to discuss democratic
development in terms of waves to capture the global pattern of democratic retrenchment,
which appears to follow each major phase of democratic expansion in world history.
According to Huntington, the world experienced three global waves of democratic
development. The first wave of democratic expansion ( 1 829-1929) was rooted in the
French and American Revolution and witnessed the gradual development of democratic
institutions in European countries throughout the 19
lh
century. The reverse wave ( 1922-
1942) shifted away from democracy and returned to traditional forms of authoritarian rule
or introduced mass based, brutal and pervasive forms of authoritarianism like Mussolini
in Italy.
The second wave of democratic expansion ( 1943-1962) was rooted in the
liberation of oppressed countries in World War II, furthered by allied occupation, and
promoted the development of democratic institutions in West Germany, Italy, Austria,
Japan, and Korea. The reverse wave ( 1958-1975) witnessed a second shift from
democracy toward authoritarianism, which largely took place in Latin America. The third
wave ( 1974-present) first manifested itself in Southern Europe, and then swept across
Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. As can be seen in figure 1 and figure 2, the
phases of democratic development constructed by Huntington in 1984 are similar, though
not identical, to the waves constructed by Huntington in 1991.
Figure 1:
Phases of Democratic Development
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Phase 1: Democratic Expansion
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Phase 2: Democratic Retrenchment
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Since Huntington’s book, many scholars have sought to prevent a reverse wave of
democratic retrenchment by better understanding the consolidation aspect of the
transition process/' Huntington defines a “wave of democratization” as “a group of
transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occurs within a specified
period and that significantly outnumbers transitions in the opposite direction in the same
period.” According to the Huntington, “between 1974 and 1990 more than thirty
countries in southern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe shifted from
authoritarian to democratic systems of government.
”
s
Huntington described this
development as a “global democratic revolution” and “the most important political trend
of the late twentieth century.”
4
Rather than focusing on the cause of the third wave.
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which is “complex and peculiar to that wave,” Huntington was most concerned with
“how third wave democratizations occurred: the ways in which political leaders and
publics in the 1970’s and 1980’s ended authoritarian systems and created democratic
„io
ones.
What should be the focus in studying democratic consolidations? For Huntington,
democratic identity is based on elections and institutions.
“All democratic regimes the principal officers of government are chosen through
competitive elections in which the bulk of the population can participate. Democratic
systems thus have a common institutional core that establishes their identity.
Authoritarian regimes- as the term is used in this study- are defined simply by the
absence of this institutional core.”"
In understanding how best to implement functioning elections and institutions,
transition scholars, such as Huntington, begin with classifying non-democratic systems.
According to Huntington, non-democratic regimes have historically taken many different
forms, which varied depending on the particular wave of democratization. In the first
wave, non-democratic regimes “were generally absolute monarchies, lingering feudal
aristocracies, and the successor states to continental empires.” 1- In the second wave, non-
democratic regimes were “fascist states, colonies, and personalistic military
dictatorships.”
1
’ In the third wave, non-democratic regimes are one-party systems,
military regimes, and personal dictatorships.
In the most recent wave, “one-party systems were created by revolution or Soviet
imposition.”
14
In these systems, access to power is controlled by “the party,” which holds
a monopoly of power and legitimates its rule through ideology. 1 One-party systems are
primarily communist countries. Military regimes “were created by coups d'etat replacing
democratic or civilian governments.”
16
In these regimes, the military exercised power by
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ruling as a junta in conjunction with sonic existing government leaders or distributing top
government positions among top generals. Military regimes are primarily found in Latin
America. Personal dictatorships are distinguishable by an individual leader who is the
source of authority, so that power is dependent on “access to, closeness to, dependence
on, and support from the leader .” 1 Examples include Spain under Francisco Franco, the
Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, India under Indira Ghandi, and Romania under
Nicole Ceausescu. Huntington concludes that “one-party systems, military regimes, and
personal dictatorships suppressed both competition and participation.”
After classifying non-democratic regimes, Huntington classified different types of
transitions. In doing so, Huntington compares the role of external forces to internal forces
on transition processes. According to Huntington, democratization in the second wave
was largely a product of foreign imposition and decolonization, w hereas democratization
in the third wave was “overwhelmingly indigenous .”
111
Huntington states that “for
analytical purposes it is useful to group the cases into three broad types ofprocesses .”
20
One type of transition is “transformation.” Transformation is “when elites in
power took the lead in bringing about democracy .” 21 A second type of transition is
“replacement.” Replacement is “when opposition groups took the lead in bringing about
democracy .” 22 A third type of transition is “transplacement.” Transplacement is “when
democratization resulted largely from joint action by government and opposition
,, 2 ^
groups.
The common theme in different types of transitions is negotiation. According to
Huntington, “almost all transitions, not just transplacement, involved some negotiation-
explicit or implicit, overt or covert - between government and opposition groups .""
4
In
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the third wave, “the crucial participants” in transition processes were “the standpatters,
liberal reformers, and democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic
moderates and revolutionary extremists in the opposition.” ^ Participants engaged in “the
three crucial interactions in democratization processes .”"
6
These crucial interactions
occurred “between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the
governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition .”27
After classifying non-democratic regimes, types of transitions, key players, and
transition processes, Huntington discussed the relationship between the nature of
authoritarian regimes and the nature of the transition process. Transitions from military
regimes were characterized by transformation and transplacement.
"
N Commonly, military
regimes instigated regime change in the face of public pressure, rarely defined
themselves as permanent leaders, and stated that once the political situation was corrected
power would be returned to political leaders. In doing so, military leaders demanded
guarantees upon relinquishing power: a promise of no legal consequences for their
actions and respect for the institutional autonomy of the military. As a result, the
transition process made it “relatively easy for military rulers to withdraw from power and
to resume professional military roles.”
29
At the same time, it was also “relatively easy for
military leaders to return to power when exigencies and their own interests warranted.”'"
Transformation and transplacement were also the common transition types for
one-party systems. '' In one-party systems the party and the state were interwoven. This
created institutional and ideological obstacles in transitions to democracy. Institutionally,
the regular armed forces had to be “depoliticized.” ’" Ideologically, “the ideology of the
party defined the identity of the state.” " This meant that “opposition to the party
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amounted to treason to the state.
-” 4 To democratize, “the monopolistic party places at
risk its control of government and becomes one more party competing in a multiparty
system.” ° When complete, the “former monopolistic party is in no better position than
any other political group to reinstate an authoritarian system .”'
6
According to Huntington, transitions from one-party systems are more difficult to
consolidate than transitions from military regimes because of the ideological obstacles, in
addition to the institutional obstacles. At the same time, transitions from one-party
systems are more likely to be permanent, if completed, because of the ideological change.
In transitions from personal dictatorships, dictators rarely give up power voluntarily and
seek to maintain political power as long as possible. As a result, replacement is the
typical transition process for transitions from personal dictatorships. Sometimes
replacement was the product of the violent overthrow of the dictator.
’ 7
Several important observations emerge in examining the w orks of Samuel
Huntington. Huntington was instrumental in facilitating scholarly focus on the transition
process of democratic development, in contrast to the predominant literature focused on
prerequisites, and placed the study of democratic transitions within a broad view of
historical development. In doing so, Huntington clearly articulated a normative position
for w hy greater study of democratic development is desirable that was adopted by many
scholars in the subsequent body of literature. Huntington’s approach became an important
model for understanding and promoting democratic development w ith an emphasis on
the two basic systematic components of functioning democracies, elections and
institutions.
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In 1986, for example, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter edited and co-
authored a seminal multi-set volume entitled Transitions From Authoritarian Rule.
According to the authors, the “eventual consolidation of political democracy constitutes
per se a desirable goal.” ' In turn, “the establishment of certain rules of regular,
formalized political competition deserved priority attention by scholars and
practitioners.”
34
O'Donnell and Schmitter seek “to capture the extraordinary uncertainty of the
transition, with its numerous surprises and difficult dilemmas.”
40
Given that transitional
regimes, especially those from authoritarian rule, are very different from established
political regimes so that “normal science methodology” is not appropriate. As a result,
scholars are unable to rely on “stable economic, social, cultural, and partisan categories to
identify, analyze, and evaluate the identities and strategies of those defending the status
quo and those struggling to reform or transform it.” 41
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, the uncertainty that permeates transitions
makes it “almost impossible to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions, and
other groups will take what role, opt for which issues, or support what alternative”
because “most- if not all- of those ‘standard’ actors are likely to be divided and hesitant
about their interests and ideals and, hence, incapable of coherent collective action.”42 As
a result, transitions from authoritarian rule “should be analyzed with distinctly political
concepts, however vaguely delineated and difficult to pin down they may be.” 4 The
authors argued that this is not “a denial of the long-run casual impact of ‘structural’
(including macroeconomic, world systematic and social class) factors.”44 Rather, the
approach recognizes “the high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where
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unexpected events {fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices,
confusion about motives and interests, plasticity, and even indefinition of political
identities, as well as the talents of specific individuals (virtu), are frequently decisive in
determining the outcomes.”
4 "
O’Donnell and Schmitter define “transition” as “the interval between one political
regime and another.”
4
" Transitions typically begin when authoritarian regimes face
“legitimation problems.” Between World War 1 and World War 11, for example,
authoritarian rulers sought to legitimate their regimes by portraying themselves as “as the
best possible modes of governance for their societies, especially when compared to
impotent and divided parliamentary democracies elsewhere in Europe and to the
prepotent and monolithic regime in the Soviet Union.” This was done by “mobilizing
imagery of Fascism and references to more traditional forms of corporatism.”48
After the demise of Fascism in 1945, legimitation was more challenging. As a result,
authoritarian regimes became “ideologically schizophrenic.”4 * In other words, such
regimes practiced dictatorship and repression, while promising democracy and freedom
sometime in the future. This creates situations where “the often haphazard attempts of
these regimes at institutionalizing themselves clash with the limits imposed by their own
discourse.’
00 As a result, the stamp of the regime “opens the ideological space within
which they can express what often becomes their fundamental demand: the removal of
the authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democratic one.”"
1
Once the authoritarian regime “opens,” two groups of political actors become
central to the transition process. Hard-liners “are those who contrary to the consensus of
this period of world history, believe that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible
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and desirable.’02 This is undertaken through outright rejection of democracy or “erecting
some facade behind which they can maintain inviolate the hierarchical and authoritarian
nature of their power.”''
1
According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, “the main core of the
hard-liners is formed by those who reject viscerally the "cancers’ and "disorders’ of
democracy and who believe they have a mission to eliminate all traces of such
pathologies from political life.” Ironically, this is the same view that O’Donnell,
Schmitter, and other transition scholars have toward authoritarianism, seeing it (rather
than democracy) as a ""cancer” or “disorder” that must be eliminated from political life.
Soft-liners “may be equally disposed to use repression and to tolerate the arbitrary
acts of the appropriate ministry or security agency,” but soft-liners are increasingly aware
that the regime they helped establish will have to make use of some form of electoral
legimitation in the near future.
4
Timing is very important in determining if legimitation
is feasible. Soft-liners believe that “the regime cannot wait too long before reintroducing
certain freedoms.”0 The more time that passes, the less likely moderate segments of the
domestic opposition and international public opinion will support the regime.
Transitional openings can take many forms. According to O'Donnell and
Schmitter, a military defeat has been the most frequent type of opening in recent decades.
A second type of opening is “occupation by a foreign power which was itself a political
democracy.” " Most recently, the most common form of opening in contemporary
politics is domestic, internal resistance.
Like Huntington, O’Donnell and Schmitter are heavily concerned with
institutions. According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, an important element in transition
cases is ""the extent to which representative institutions- political parties, social
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movements, interest associations, autonomous agencies, local governments- have
survived from the period prior to authoritarian rule.”" This reflects how democratic
development in the cases they examine, primarily from Latin America and Southern
Europe, was typically a cyclical process between military-controlled authoritarianism and
democratization. “If there is one characteristic common to all our cases,” O'Donnell and
Schmitter explain, “it is the omnipresent fear, during the transition, and often long after
political democracy has been installed, that a coup will be attempted and succeed.” 5 *
Thus, the primary challenge of democratization is “coaxing the military out of power and
inducing them to tolerate a transition toward democracy .”" 4
O'Donnell and Schmitter are “guardedly optimistic about the prospects for
controlling the behavior of those within the armed forces who are antagonistic to
democracy,” but acknowledge that “the success of the transition may depend even more
on whether some civilian, as well as military, leaders have the imagination, the courage,
and the willingness to come to interim agreements on rules and mutual guarantees.”
60
As
a result, “pacts” are central to stabilizing the vast uncertainty of transition processes.
O'Donnell and Schmitter define a pact as “an explicit, but not always publicly explicated
or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to
redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the
‘vital interests’ of those entering into it .”
61
Pacts are temporary solutions to avoid conflict
that may “pave the way for more permanent arrangements for the resolution of
conflicts .”
62 Some elements of pacts may become permanent, however, by being
incorporated into legislation or constitutions.
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O'Donnell and Schmitter observed that "modem pacts move the polity toward
democracy by undemocratic means.” Pacts are undemocratic because pacts are
typically negotiated by a small number of participants who represent oligarchic groups,
tend to reduce political competition, often seek to limit public accountability, control the
policy agenda, and deliberately undermine political equality. According to O'Donnell and
Schmitter, “the core of a pact” is “a negotiated compromise under which actors agree to
forgo or underutilize their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to
threaten each others’ corporate autonomies or vital interests.”64 This typically involves
abstaining from violence, prohibiting appeals from outsiders (military or masses), and
committing to use pacts in future conflict resolution. O’Donnell and Schmitter argued
that “the general scenario for negotiating a pact is fairly clear: it is a situation in which
conflicting or competing groups are interdependent, in that they can neither do without
each other, nor unilaterally impose their preferred solution on each other if they are to
satisfy their respective divergent issues.”
6
^ Pacts are not essential to all transitions, but
O’Donnell and Schmitter “are convinced that where they are a feature of the transition,
they are desirable- that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a
viable political democracy .” 66
O'Donnell and Schmitter understand transitions to democracy as chaotic and
uncertain experiences in contrast to Huntington, who understands the history of
democratic development as a wavelike experience, characterized by universal and regular
periods of expansion and retrenchment. O'Donnell and Schmitter describe democratic
transitions as multilayered chess games “with people challenging the rules on every
move, pushing and shoving to get to the board, shouting out advice and threats from the
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sidelines, trying to cheat whenever they can- but, nevertheless, becoming progressively
mesmerized by the drama they are participating in or watching, and gradually becoming
committed to playing more decorously and loyally to the rule they themselves have
elaborated.”" A transition is not “a linear or a rational process.'”" s As a result, “political
democracy is produced by stalemate and dissensus rather than prior unity and
consensus.”"" Or, put another way, transitions to democracy are highly contingent affairs
that are ill-suited to be described by social scientific models that aspire to universality.
Several important conclusions emerge in examining the work O’Donnell and
Schmitter. First, political actors are central to understanding transitions because
underlying economic, social and cultural factors cannot satisfactorily explain a process of
constant, widespread, and idiosyncratic change. Second, the interests of political actors
shape transitions. When faced with significant opposition, authoritarian leaders seek to
preserve their interests by negotiating pacts. Pacts are normatively desirable and
empirically effective in reducing violence and promoting democratic reform. Third, the
timing of transitions is important. The shorter and more unexpected a transition, the
greater the likelihood a popular upsurge will produce a lasting impact on the outcome of
the transition.
0
In Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s first major work. The Breakdown ofDemocratic
Regimes ( 1978), the authors conclude the top priority of future work on democratic
development is examining the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic
regimes, particularly the political dynamics of consolidation. Problems ofDemocratic
Transition and Consolidation ( 1996) was an effort to contribute to that research. Like
O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan understood democratic development as a
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multidimensional process, but provided a much more detailed understanding of the
transition process. Consolidated democracy is divided into behavioral, attitudinal, and
constitutional dimensions:
• “Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no
significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors
spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by
creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign
intervention to secede from the state." ''
• “Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority
of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a
society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is
quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.” 7-
• “Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental
and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state,
become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within
the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by new
democratic processes.” 7
'
According to Linz and Stepan, these three dimensions of consolidated democracy
are produced by five interacting arenas that “reinforce one another in order for such
consolidation to exist .”'
4
Linz and Stepan described these arenas as necessary and
supportive conditions of consolidated democracy. " First, “conditions must exist for the
development of a free and lively civil society .” 7 ’ Linz and Stepan define civil society as
an “arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals,
relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and
solidarities, and advance their interests.” Second, consolidated democracy requires “a
relatively autonomous and valued political society.”
s
Linz and Stepan define political
society as an “arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the
legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus.”
7
4
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Linz and Stepan emphasized how civil society and political society are
distinctive, yet complementary. This requires a third arena that provides “a working
consensus about procedures of governance, and constitutionalism and a rule of law .” 80
According to Linz and Stepan, constitutionalism and rule of law are virtually definitional
prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. The interaction between these three arenas is
described as follows:
Democratic consolidation requires parties, one of whose primary tasks is precisely
to aggregate and represent differences between democrats. Consolidation requires
that habituation to the norms and procedures of democratic conflict regulation be
developed. A high degree of institutional routinization is a key part of such a
process. Intermediation between the state and civil society and the structuring of
compromise are likewise legitimate and necessary tasks of political society. In
short, political society, informed, pressured, and periodically renewed by civil
society, must somehow achieve a workable agreement on the myriad ways in
8
1
which democratic power will be crafted and exercised.
The fourth arena necessary for democratic consolidation is a state apparatus. This
apparatus establishes rational and legal bureaucratic norms. The final arena necessary for
democratic consolidation is an economic society. Linz and Stepan argue there has never
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been and “cannot be a non-wartime consolidated democracy in a command economy.
At the same time, “there never will be a modern consolidated democracy in a pure market
economy.”
8
' Thus, an economic society “mediates between state and market.” 84
According to Linz and Stepan, “any way (they) analyze the problem, democratic
consolidation requires the institutionalization of a socially and politically regulated
market.” 88
Linz and Stepan use the tentative conclusions of O'Donnell and Schmitter to
develop a theory of democratic development that is much more comprehensive than their
predecessors. Like O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan stress the importance of
making citizens accustomed to the norms of democratic conflict resolution, such as
elections, and the key role that institutions play in that normalization process. Unlike
O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan incorporate economic considerations and
postcommunist cases in their model of democratic consolidation.
As the third wave of democratic development unexpectedly unfolded throughout
the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s scholars of democratic development faced a central
question: could theories of democratic transitions derived from the study of Southern
Europe and Latin America be applied to other regions? This led to a heated debate within
comparative political scholarship of democratic development. At the heart of this debate
were Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, who advocated incorporation of postcommunist
cases into previous models of democratic development, and Valerie Bunce, who
questioned how well past models of democratization tit with development experiences in
the former Soviet Union.
Bunce recognized that the predominant understandings of recent democratization
were heavily influenced by previous experiences in Latin American and Southern Europe
and was not surprised by this development because the third wave began in Southern
Europe and then moved to Latin America. These regions “contained a large number of
countries, virtually all of which had redemocratized over the course of a decade and a
half.”
s<>
According to Bunce, commonalities in history and culture, combined with
differences of timing and mode of transition, made for “instructive comparison” within
and between these two regions. Bunce also recognized that the breakdown of state
socialism in the Soviet Union provided an opportunity to geographically broaden the
discussion of recent democratization, but did not want to presume that post-communist
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democratization was pail of a larger global process. “If recent democratization is, indeed,
a global process,” Bunce argued, “then the terrain of these studies (Eastern Europe,
Central Asia) should better reflect that fact.”'ss In turn, Bunce sought to use the 27 cases
of postcommunist development in Eastern and Central Europe “to rethink our
understanding of recent democratization.”*
9
In rethinking democratization, Bunce took
direct aim at O’Donnell and Schmitter.
Bunce stated that analysis of democratization is premised on several core
assumptions, which come directly from O'Donnell and Schmitter:
• “that immediate influences are more important than historical
considerations in shaping transitional dynamics;”
• “that transitions are inherently quite uncertain;”
• “that the central dynamic in a transition is bargaining between
authoritarian leaders and leaders of the democratic opposition, with
outcomes a function of relative power;”
• “that the key issues on the table during the transition are breaking with
authoritarian rule, building democratic institutions, and eliciting the
cooperation of authoritarians.”
90
According to Bunce, “the postcommunist experience seems to challenge many of
these assumptions about transitional strategies.” 91 One such experience is the process of
mass mobilization. Contrary to the third core assumption stated above, mass mobilization
was often helpful to democratic transitions in the postcommunist context. The most
successful cases of postcommunist transition, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia, all began with mass mobilization, except for Hungary.
Bunce argued that political protest was valuable in several ways. First, popular
protests “signaled the breakdow n of the authoritarian order” and “created a widespread
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sense that there were alternatives.”
4-
Second, “popular protests pushed authoritarian
leaders ... to the bargaining table” and created “a large opposition united by its rejection
of the incumbent regime.”
9
' Third, political protests “gave opposition leaders a resource
advantage when bargaining with authoritarian elites.”
14
Finally, “mass mobilization
created a mandate for radical change that subsequently translated into a large victory for
the democratic forces in the first competitive elections” and later led to “far-reaching
economic and political reforms.” 9
^
Like mass mobilization, the role of uncertainty in the transition process differed
from the claims of O’Donnell and Schmitter. Bunce acknowledged that transitions in
postcommunist countries were highly uncertain, but asserts that managing uncertainty did
not necessarily promote democratic outcomes, even after elections were established. In
most competitive elections, for example. Communists were victorious. According to
Bunce, “the larger the victory, the more likely that authoritarian rule continued.”
96
“Even
ten years after the transition began,” Bunce explained, “only one-third of the
postcommunist regimes were ranked fully free.” This percentage is much less than
democratic development in Latin America and southern Europe. In turn, “these patterns
suggest that the uncertainty surrounding postcommunist political trajectories varied
significantly.
”
9S
This led Bunce to suggest that “the existence of a more certain political
environment in some countries calls into question both the necessity and the logic,
outlined earlier, of safeguarding the new democracy by forging compromises between
authoritarians and democrats.”
9
Bunce acknowledged that “many of the most successful transitions in the
postcommunist area included pacting;” however, “the transitions in the postcommunist
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region that combined pacting with demobilized publics- or what has been asserted to be
the preferred approach in the South- were precisely the transitions that were most likely
to continue authoritarian rule in the postcommunist region.” 100 Furthermore,
“compromises that were deemed so beneficial for the southern European and Latin
American transitions were rejected by opposition leaders in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia,
and the like.”
101
Instead, these regimes “were strongly positioned to favor an immediate
and sharp break with the authoritarian past.”
10 "
Another significant difference between what Bunce termed “East,” Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, and “South,” Latin America and Southern Europe, is the “very
different role of the military.” 10 ' Bunce explains how the consensus among Latin
American specialists was that the military is “the biggest threat to democracy today.” 104
In contrast, “there is a long tradition of civilian control over the military- a tradition that
goes far back in Russian history and that, following the Bolshevik Revolution and the
demilitarization after the Civil War, was maintained at home and then after World War II
was projected outward to the members of the Soviet bloc.” l<b Thus, “civil-military
relations, in short, constituted one area where the authoritarian past proved to be
beneficial, rather than a burden, for democratization after state socialism.”
100
By incorporating postcommunist transitions into contemporary scholarship on
democratic transitions, Bunce cast significant doubt on O’Donnell and Schimitter’s
understanding of global democratic development, specifically, experiences with mass
mobilization, uncertainty in the transition process, pacts, and civil-military relations. This
was not the first scholarly encounter between Phil lippe Schmitter and Valerie Bunce
however. In 1994, Phillipe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl articulated their thoughts on
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the future of “transitology” and “consol idology,” which instigated a series of scholarly
exchanges Bunce. In “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists,”
Schmitter and Karl argued that studies of democratic transitions should include cases
from the Soviet Union. In doing so, the authors explained what they mean by
“transitology” and “consolidology,” provided advice for “apprentices” and “neophytes”
w ho undertake either of these “proto-sciences,” and defended their position of
incorporating the former Soviet Union in theories of democratic transitions . 10
According to Schmitter and Karl, widespread political change in the third wave of
democratization was accompanied by “the gradual and unobtrusive development of two
proto-sciences: transitology and consolidology.
”
ll,s
“The claim of these embryonic
subdisciplines,” Schmitter and Karl explain, “is that by applying a universalistic set of
assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses, they together can explain and hopefully help to
guide the way from an autocratic to a democratic regime .” 109 Schmitter and Karl claim
that Niccolo Machiavelli is “the founder and patron saint of transitology” because
Machiavelli was the first great political theorist to “recognize the specific problematics
and dynamics of regime change,” gave to transitology its fundamental principle of
uncertainty, and “warned that the potential contribution of the discipline would always be
modest.” 110 Hence, transitology w as bom “with limited scientific pretension and marked
practical concerns .”
111
Unlike transitology, consolidology “has no such obvious a patron
saint” and “reflects a much more consistent preoccupation among students of politics
with the conditions underlying regime stability .” 1 12
Consolidologists seek to better understand political actors by adopting a primarily
retrospective viewpoint. In the consolidation process, “unpredictable and often
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courageous individuals take singular risks and make unprecedented choices, and adjust to
analyzing a much more settled form of 'bounded rationality’ that is both conditioned by
capitalist class relations, long-standing cultural and ethnic cleavages, persistent status
conflicts and international antagonisms, and staffed by increasingly professional
politicians tilling more predictable and less risky roles.” “Apprentice consolidologists”
must navigate around two special problems: “separating idiosyncratic and contingent
properties from eventual outcomes” and deciding “to what extent lessons taken from
these past experiences can be applied to the present dilemmas of neo-democracies.” 1 14
Despite these challenges, Schmitter and Karl asserted that both undertakings are
important components of comparative political scholarship and as such, should continue
to be pursued vigorously.
Why do transitologists and consolidologists want to incorporate postcommunist
cases into existing comparative theories of democratic development? Adding post-
communist cases to transition studies enable scholars of democratic transitions to
“manipulate equations” so that variables do not outnumber the cases and “test their
tentative conclusions in cultural and historical contexts quite different from those which
generated them in the first place.” 11 '"' The “initial working assumption” of Schmitter and
Karl “is that, provided the events or processes satisfy certain definitional requirements,
their occurrence in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union should be considered, at
least initially, analogous to events or processes happening elsewhere.” 1
16
In turn, “all
these cases of regime change- regardless of their geopolitical location or cultural context
should (at least hypothetically) be regarded as parts of a common process of diffusion and
causal interaction.”
1
1
Schmitter and Karl stressed that only after an effort of
41
incorporation, and not before, can conclusions be drawn as to whether or not “concepts
and hypothesis generated from the experiences of early comers should be regarded as
'overstretched' or 'underverified' when applied to latecomers.” Ils
Schmitter and Karl were not surprised by “specialists on the area” who stress the
“cultural, ideological, and national peculiarities of these cases- especially the distinctive
historical legacy bequeathed by totalitarian as opposed to authoritarian anciens
regimes .”
110
Schmitter and Karl claimed that these specialists were resistant to “acultural
extrapolation,” some of whom, “would bar all practicing transitologists from reducing
their countries (now more numerous, diverse, and autonomous in their behavior) to mere
pinpoints on a scatterplot or frequencies in a crosstabulation .”
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Valerie Bunce is one of
the specialists Schmitter and Karl alluded to.
The title of Bunce’s response asked “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?”
Bunce argued that Schmitter and Karl “cannot justify their comparisons of east and south
by simply stating that these cases meet 'certain definitional requirements' or by arguing
that we should compare first and worry about comparability second.” 121 The issue of
comparability is central to Bunce, particularly the justification that what is being
compared is similar to enough to merit comparison. The “burden of proof,” as Bunce puts
it, rests with self-described transitologists. According to Bunce, “all of this suggests . . .
that the debate about transitology is in fact a debate among comparativists about
comparative methodology .” 122 Thus, “to label critics area specialists, then, is to
misrepresent the concerns that have been voiced about comparative studies of
democratization, east and south.” 12
'
For Bunce the crux of the debate is not between transitologists and area scholars,
but whether differences between cases “constitute variations on a common process- that
is, transitions from dictatorship to democracy- or altogether different processes- that is,
democratization versus what could be termed postcommunism.” '" 4 According to Bunce,
“Schmitter and Karl take the first position and their critics the second.” 1 "^ “The
differences between postcommunism and the transitions in the south arcfar more
substantial than Schmitter and Karl's discussion seems to imply, ” including the nature of
authoritarian rule, mode of transition, international context of transition, and the
transitional agenda.
According to Bunce, state Socialism, the nature of authoritarian rule in
postcommunist cases differs from previous transition experiences “along virtually every
dimension that economists, sociologists, and political scientists recognize as
important.”
1
" As such, “there is no equivalent in the southern cases either to the
diffusion process we saw in Eastern Europe in 1989 or thus to the role of international
factors in ending the Communist Party's political monopoly.” ~ Most striking to Bunce,
however, was the transitional agenda. Democratization in the south could be reduced to
“a process involving interactions among a handful of political elites.” 1 “ * In sharp
contrast, “what is at stake in Eastern Europe is nothing less than the creation of the very
building blocks of the social order.”
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In responding to Bunce’s criticism, Karl and Schmitter claimed that Bunce
mischaracterized their attitudes toward area scholars as one of hostility, when in fact Karl
and Schmitter believed that they want to improve how area studies are conducted. Karl
and Schimmter “observed that the field of communist studies- and especially its subfield
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of Sovietology- has long suffered a partially self-imposed isolation from major social
science disciplines.” Karl and Schmitter fundamentally disagreed “with those scholars
steeped in this academic tradition who rely heavily (if not exclusively) on assumptions
about the allegedly unique legacy of "totalitarianism,’ "Marxism-Leninism Stalinism,’
"Soviet political culture,’ etc. as an excuse for eschewing all comparison with other world
regions- even though we fully agree that all countries and regions have some properties
which are unique.” 1,1 Thus, Karl and Schimitter were concerned that “Bunce and others
who a priori reject the application of theories generated elsewhere to "post-communist
transitions’” will continue the aforementioned and “unfortunate tradition of isolation .” 1 '
The second argument presented by Karl and Schmitter was that the "‘exclusive
concentration on intra-regional studies can restrict the ability of area specialists to
understand their own region or particular country.” 13
,
Karl and Schmitter stressed that
“just because area studies were bom in the untested notion that specific geocultural
regions were somehow "unique’ does not mean this comfortable assumption should
remain forever unexamined .” 1 4 The third and “most important” argument presented by
Karl and Schmitter was that “a narrow insistence on intra-regional studies and the
consequent exclusion of cross-regional comparisons could have a deleterious impact on
the development of theory.” 1 ' Postcommut cases are so essential to developing theories
on democratic transitions because they enable the “testing, verifying, modifying and/or
falsifying concepts and hypotheses that have been generated elsewhere.” 1
' h
Bunce’s final response to Karl and Schmitter explained why the author preferred
intra-regional comparisons of postcommunist transformations over cross-regional
comparisons. Bunce was “not convinced that we are safe in assuming that transitions
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from authoritarianism in the south produce the same outcome as the processes involved
in leaving state socialism.”
1
' As a result, “there will be too much variance- in
independent and dependent variables- to narrow down the field of explanation to a
reasonable number of plausible factors .” 1 , s
There are some inherent problems with carrying out comparative research with a
large number of cases. These problems include forcing “diverse countries into
predetermined categories that do not lit them” or creating categories with such ilexibility
that every case fits, making it difficult to accurately interpret the relationships
observed .
1,1
In turn, Bunce claimed that scholars had already “reaped most of the
benefits to be had from comparing a very large number of cases involving transitions
from authoritarian rule .”
140
This was evident in the differences that emerged between the
east and south, which have “exposed the limitations of the transitions approach as
developed by Phillipe C. Schimitter, Guillermo O’Donnell, Laurence Whitehead, Terry
Lynn Karl, and others .” 141 For these reasons, Bunce concluded that intra-regional
comparison “allow us to strike a useful balance between the benefits of comparison- that
is, the ability to control some factors while exploring variation- and the benefits of
working with good data and precise categories.” 14 '
Scholars on both sides of this debate make valid points. Karl and Schimitter are
justified in using postcommunist cases to test theories of democratic development derived
from development experiences in Southern Europe and Latin America. Transitions to
democracy from state socialism are in some ways very different than transitions from
other types of authoritarian rule, but not so different that interregional comparison is
completely futile. Transitions can vary both in the government that precedes the
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transition and the type of government which results from a transition. Including a specific
type of authoritarianism, state socialism, into comparative scholarship on transitions is
useful, because this inclusion complements, rather than distorts, the study of transitions.
At the same time, Bunce is justified in arguing that the benefit from this type of
research is inherently limited because experiences with authoritarianism were so different
in Eastern Europe compared to Latin America. Rather than advocating comparative
political scholarship be limited to intraregional comparison, however, I advocate the
creation of hypotheses that test the effectiveness of predominant models of comparative
democratic scholarship in capturing development experiences around the world. This
would enable scholars to empirically evaluate existing models, rather than debating
comparative methodology or questioning contrasting assumptions; both of which fail to
offer a path toward resolving the debate.
After the debate between Bunce, Schmitter, and Karl, critics of the predominant
focus on democratic transitions soon confronted a new question: should scholarship on
democratic transitions be modified or abandoned? As the third wave spread from Eastern
Europe to Africa, critics responded with varying degrees of skepticism toward the ability
of the transitions approach to capture new and different development experiences. Two
prominent critics of predominant understandings of democratic transitions were Michael
McFaul and Thomas Carothers. McFaul sought to use development experiences to refine
some predominant assumptions of transitions scholarship, while Carothers sought the
outright rejection of what he calls the transitions paradigm.
Like Bunce, McFaul is a scholar of Eastern Europe and Central Asia whose work
on democratic transitions illuminates several differences between postcommunist
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transition and other transitions in the third wave. McFaul acknowledged that “the
collapse of communism did not lead smoothly or quickly to the consolidation of liberal
democracy in Europe and the former Soviet Union.” Soon after independence, popular
democratic movements occurred in the Baltic States, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, eastern
Germany, and Western Czechoslovakia. “Quick and successful democratic
breakthroughs were the exception,” McFaul explained, but over time the “gravitational
force of the European Union” helped to pull non-democratic regimes toward democracy
in countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. 144 The farther from Western Europe
one travels, however, the weaker the democratic pull. Throughout most of Central Asia,
for example, full-blown dictatorships entrenched themselves and semi-autocracies spread
to other post-Soviet states, such as Russia.
Russian development experiences in the 1990’s were described by McFaul as a
“protracted transition.”
14
' McFaul argued that Russia did not fit Linz and Stepan's
criteria of consolidated democracy even “when Russia voters ratified a new constitution
and elected a new parliament.” 146 “Whether the end of the transition is seen as 1993,
1996, or the year 2000,” McFaul explained, “the process has been a long one, especially
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when compared to the more successful transitions in Eastern Europe.”
In fact, McFaul argued that “Russia experienced not one but three transitions.” I4S
The first transition began with liberalization measures initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev.
These measures led to new and independent political actors who desired more radical
political change. Gorbachev and other refonners within the Soviet regime unsuccessfully
tried to negotiate a transition agreement with moderates in Russia’s democratic
movement. In turn, “regime hard-liners tried to roll back reform by decreeing emergency
47
rule in August 1991, an action that Russia’s democratic forces succeeded in
defeating.”
144
The failed coup in 1991 “created propitious conditions for another attempt at
democratic transition.” 1 " Boris Yeltsin used this “unique window of opportunity to erect
new democratic institutions by negotiating a new set of political rules with their
communist opponents.” 1 1 McFaul argued that the construction of a new constitution and
subsequent elections could have helped to “legitimate a new democratic order,” but
Yeltsin “devoted very little time at all to designing new political institutions within
Russia, focusing instead on dismantling the Soviet Union and initiating economic
reform.”
152
Conflict between Yeltsin and parliament reached a violent crossroads in 1993,
which led to a third Russian transition. The uprising “represented a real blow to popular
support for Russian democracy” and the military was used to control the pro-Communist,
anti-Yeltsin MP's. Despite this breakdown of institutions, a majority of Russians
participated in subsequent elections, where a new constitution was rati tied. Furthermore,
major opposition parties, such as the Communist Party and Agrarian Party, participated in
these elections. Throughout the rest of the decade, elections were competitive and
became “the only game in town for winning political power,” while the constitution
“survived as the ultimate guide for resolving conflicts between the executive and
legislative branches.”
1
McFaul explained the prolonged and conflict-ridden nature of Russia's transition
as a product the contested agenda of change:
In transitions from authoritarian rule in Latin America and Southern Europe,
questions concerning the basic organization of the economy were generally off-
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limits. Transitions from communist rule, on the other hand, placed economic
questions squarely on the table, complicating the transition process. Multiethnic
states like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia also had to face a third issue- defining
state borders. Soviet and Russian leaders therefore faced a more complex
challenge in negotiating this triple transition than did their counterparts in Poland,
let alone Spain. It was the intensity of opposing views on this three-part agenda
that really prolonged the transition processes and fueled confrontation.” 1 ' 4
In contrast to O’Donnell and Schmitter, McFaul argued that stalemate played a
negative role in the Russian transition because “the relatively equal balance of power
fostered conflict,” rather than inducing compromise. The protracted nature of
democratic development in Russia created several outstanding obstacles that continue to
hinder progress. These obstacles include “superpresidentialism, an underdeveloped party
system, a disengaged civil society, the lack of an independent judiciary, and declining
popular support for democracy.” lN' Since 2000, however, “democracy gained new
dynamism in the region in unexpected ways and places.” I v Significant progress in
democratic development was made in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. These “cases of
democratic breakthrough resemble one another and differ from other democratic
transitions or revolutions in four critical respects.”
First, the impetus for regime change was a fraudulent national election, not
division between ruling elites, war, or economic crisis. Second, democratic challengers
solely relied on extra constitutional means “to defend the existing, democratic
constitution rather than to achieve a fundamental rew riting of the rules of the political
game.” 1 ’ Third, challengers and incumbents made “competing and simultaneous claims
to hold sovereign authority- one of the hallmarks of a revolutionary situation.”
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Fourth,
“all of these revolutionary situations ended without mass violence.”
161
Finally, few
analysts predicted democratic breakthroughs. According to McFaul, “identifying the
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common factors that contributed to success in these cases may be our best method of
predicting future democratic breakthroughs not only in this region but perhaps in others
as well."
162 McFaul states several factors for success:
1 ) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime;
2) an unpopular incumbent;
3) a united and organized opposition;
4) an ability quickly to drive home the point that voting results were falsified;
5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote;
6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands or more;
demonstrators to protest electoral fraud; and
7) divisions among the regime's coercive forces.
u”
Both Bunce and McFaul use postcommunist experiences to illuminate conceptual
problems with the focus of transition scholars. Bunce emphasizes methodological flaws
in the transitions approach and advocates intraregional comparison, rather than
interregional comparison, as undertaken by scholars of democratic transitions. McFaul,
emphasizes variations in the nature of transitions within the former Soviet Union and
between postcommunist cases and other third wave transitions. Both Bunce and McFaul
present their research as a way to improve and correct how predominant scholars of
democratic transitions conceptualize transition processes. A third major critic of
prominent scholars of democratic transitions, Thomas Carothers, argued for “the end of
transition paradigm,” rather than modification of methodological approaches or
predominant models. 164
Carothers observed that seven different regions converged in the last quarter of
the twentieth century to reshape the international political landscape:
1 ) the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid-
1970’s;
2) the replacement of military dictatorships by elected civilian governments
across Latin America from the late 1970s through the late 1980s;
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3) the decline of authoritarian rule in pails of East and South Asia stalling in the
mid- 1 980s;
4) the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s;
5) the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 1 5 post-Soviet
republics in 1991
;
6) the decline of one-party regimes in many pails of sub-Saharan Africa in the
first half of the 1990s; and
7) a weak but recognizable liberalizing trend in some Middle Eastern countries
in the 1990s.
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Carothers argued that “the causes, shape, and pace of these different trends varied
considerably,” but the “striking tide of political change was seized upon with enthusiasm
by the U.S. government and the broader U.S. foreign policy community” who regularly
referred to Huntington's third wave as “the worldwide democratic revolution.” 166
Carothers argued that third wave transitions in Southern Europe and Latin
America led democracy promoters to rapidly to embrace the analytic model of
democratic transition. This model was principally derived “from their own interpretation
of the patterns of democratic change taking place, but also to a lesser extent from the
early works of the emergent academic field of ‘transitology,’ above all the seminal work
of Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter.” 16 When the third wave spread to
Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa democracy promoters accepted the transitions
model “as a universal paradigm for understanding democratization.” 166 Carothers
concluded that the transitions paradigm “became ubiquitous in U.S. policy circles as a
way of talking about, thinking about, and designing interventions in processes of political
change around the world.” 166 The paradigm “stayed remarkably constant despite many
variations in those patterns of political change and a stream of increasingly diverse
scholarly views about the course and nature of democratic transitions.”
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Carothers acknowledged that the transitions paradigm “has been somewhat
useful” in understanding a period of significant political upheaval.
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Currently, however,
“it is increasingly clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model.” “ Carothers
expressed concern with how “many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners
persist in calling ‘transitional’ are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic
transitions that are under way, more than a few are not following the model.”
1
Carothers stated that “sticking with the paradigm beyond its useful life is retarding
evolution in the field of democratic assistance” and argued that “it is time to recognize
that the transitions paradigm has outlived its usefulness and to look for a better lens.” 174
In laying out the argument, Carothers defined the transitions paradigm and then
explained why the paradigm was no longer useful. Carothers used five core assumptions
to define the transitions paradigm. The first core assumption is that “any country moving
away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward
democracy.” This was particularly pronounced in the first half of 1990’s, when many
policy makers and aid practitioners labeled any former authoritarian country attempting
liberalization a democratic transition, up to 100 countries, Carothers estimates. The
second core assumption is that “democratization tends to unfold in a set sequence of
stages.”
1
" The first stage is called an “opening.” This is when political liberalization and
democratic ferment cracks the ruling dictatorial regime. The second stage is a
“breakthrough.” This is when the dictatorial regime collapses and a democratic
infrastructure is established with institutions and elections. The third stage is called
“consolidation.” This is the long process by which a democratic infrastructure makes a
democratic political process a normal pail of social interaction.
Carothers explained how the first two assumptions work in practice:
Democracy activists admit that it is not inevitable that transitional countries will
move steadily on this assumed path from opening and breakthrough to consolidation.
Transitional countries, they say, can and do go backward or stagnate as well as move
forward along the path. Yet even the deviations from the assumed sequence that they are
willing to acknowledge are defined in terms of the path itself. The options are all cast in
terms of the speed and direction with which countries move on the path, not in terms of
movement that does not conform with the path at all. And at least in the peak years of the
third wave, many democracy enthusiasts clearly believed that, while the success of the
dozens of new transitions was not assured, democratization was in some important sense
a natural process, one that was likely to flourish once the initial break-through occurred.
No small amount of democratic teleology is implicit in the transition paradigm, no matter
how much its adherents have denied it.
The third core assumption is that elections are deterministic. Carothers stated that
democracy promoters do not believe that elections equal democracy, but promoters
tended “to hold very high expectations for what the establishment of regular, genuine
elections will do for democratization.” ' This included the expectations that elections
would give post dictatorial governments democratic legitimacy and the expectation that
elections "broaden and deepen political participation and the democratic accountability of
the state to its citizens .”
1
1
Thus, democracy promoters assume that "elections will be not
just a foundation stone but a key generator over time of further democratic reforms.”
IMI
The fourth core assumption is that economics, political history, institutional
legacies, ethnicity, and culture are not major factors in democratic transitions. These
structural factors are completely overshadowed by a focus on political actors. This was
problematic for Carothers when “all that seemed to be necessary for democratization was
a decision by a country’s political elites to move toward democracy and an ability on the
part of those elites to fend off the contrary actions of remaining antidemocratic
forces.”
INI
The fifth core assumption is that “the democratic transitions making up the
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third wave are being built on coherent, functioning states.”
'
" In turn, “the creation ot
new electoral institutions, parliamentary reform, and judicial reform” are understood as
modifications in an existing state framework. Asa result, democracy promoters “did
not give significant attention to the challenge of society trying to democratize while it is
grappling with the reality of building a state from scratch or coping with an existent but
largely nonfunctional state.”
1x4 When the state was considered, democracy promoters
assumed that democracy-building and state-building activities would mutually reinforce
one another.
After conceptualizing the transitions paradigm, Carothers examined how
development experiences around the world lit with the five core assumptions of the
transitions paradigm. “Of the nearly 100 countries considered as ‘transitional’ in recent
years,” Carothers explains, “only a relatively small number- probably fewer than 20- are
clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have
made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamic of
democratization.”
ls
' Most of these success stories are from Central Europe and the
Baltics, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia, with some
from South America and East Asia, such as Chile, Uruguay, and Taiwan. By far,
Carothers argued, the majority of third wave countries “have not achieved relatively well-
functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever
democratic progress they have made,” though most made some progress in liberalization
efforts.
IS(
’ Thus, most transition countries “have entered a political gray zone.”
1 * 7
In this gray zone, countries “have some attributes of democratic political life,
including a limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil society, as
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well as regular elections and democratic constitutions.” Iss At the same time, countries
also “suffer from serious democratic deficits, often including poor representation of
citizens' interests, low levels of political participation beyond voting, frequent abuse of
the law by government officials, elections of uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of
public confidence in state institutions, and persistently poor institutional performance by
the state.”
1 M
The number countries between democracy and dictatorship led to a proliferation
of different terms that sought to capture this dynamic, including semi-democracy, formal
democracy, electoral democracy, pseudo-democracy and illiberal democracy. This led
Carothers to make the following conclusion:
Useful though these terms can be, especially when rooted in probing analysis such
as O'Donnell's work on ‘delegative democracy,' they share a significant liability: By
describing countries in the gray zone as types of democracies, analysts are in effect trying
to apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political evolution is calling
the paradigm in question. Most of the 'qualified democracy’ terms are used to
characterize countries as being stuck somewhere on the assumed democratization
sequence, usually at the start of the consolidation phase .
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In the gray zone, two broad political syndromes exist. The first is feekless
pluralism. In this syndrome, countries “have significant amounts of political freedom,
regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political
groupings,” but despite these features, “democracy remains shallow and troubled.” 191
Trouble stems from a general perception that elites are self-interested and corrupt,
coupled with a lack of political participation beyond elections. As a result the public is
“extremely unhappy about the political life of the country.” 19- This syndrome is most
commonly found in Latin America.
The second political syndrome in the gray zone is dominant-power politics. In this
syndrome, countries “have limited but still real political space, some political
contestation by opposition groups, and at least most of the basic institutional forms of
democracy.” 19 ' Still, “one political grouping- whether it is a movement, a party, an
extended family, or a single leader- dominates the system in such a way that there
appears to be little prospect of alternation of power in the foreseeable future .”
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In
contrast to feckless pluralism, a “key problem in dominant-power countries is the
blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party (or ruling political forces ).” 195
Elections are dubious, but not outright fraudulent. This syndrome is most commonly
found in sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East.
Given that most contemporary cases of transition did not fit with the transitions
paradigm, Carother’s concluded that “it is time for the democracy-promotion community
to discard the transitions paradigm.”
19
" As a result, it is no longer appropriate the make
any of the five core assumptions of the transitions paradigm. Carothers then presented
some suggestions for where to go from here. First, democracy promoters should begin
from some very different assumptions:
They should start by assuming that what is often thought of as an uneasy,
precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is
actually the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world
and the postcommunist world. It is not an exceptional category to be defined only in
terms of its not being one thing or the other; it is a state of normality for many societies,
for better or worse. The seemingly continual surprise and disappointment that Western
political analysts express over the very frequent falling short of democracy in
Transitional countries’ should be replaced with realistic expectations about the likely
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patterns of political life in these countries.
A second suggestion is that aid practitioners and policymakers rethink their
analytic approach and predominant assumptions. Instead of asking “How is the transition
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going?” scholars should ask “What is happening politically?” 1 ,s This “more open-ended”
approach helps to avoid “optimistic assumptions that often shunt the analysis down a
blind alley.”
IW
In turn, “democracy promoters need to focus in on the key political
patterns of each country in which they intervene, rather than trying to do a little of
everything according to a template of ideal institutional forms.” -"" Given the hopeful
vision and conceptual order of the transitions paradigm, Carothers recognizes it is hard to
let go of At the same time, the usefulness of the paradigm has been exhausted and needs
to be discarded.
A number of scholars directly responded to Carother’s piece in the Journal of
Democracy
,
including Guillermo O’Donnell. O’Donnell agreed with many of Carother’s
statements, but criticized how Carothers lumped together many works under the heading
of “transition paradigm,” when in fact transitions scholarship is “a large and uneven body
of work.” - O’Donnell then responded to each of Carother’s core assumptions.
O'Donnell claimed that his past work explicitly stated that transitions do not necessarily
lead to democracy and do not unfold in stages. If Transitions From Authoritarian Rule
was truly a seminal work, then O'Donnell contends that observers should takes seriously
the assumption that nothing in the transition process was predestined. “When Carothers
complains about 'democracy enthusiasts’ who hold the naive view that democratization is
inevitable,” O'Donnell agreed with him, but wondered who these people are. - " - In turn,
O'Donnell suggested that Carothers explicitly state who proposed and adopted the
transition paradigm.
57
O'Donnell and Carothers face greater substantive differences over the third core
assumption, which stated that elections are deterministic. O’Donnell emphasized his
agreement with the transitions paradigm on this particular point:
I do think that fair elections are extremely important. This is not because such
elections will necessarily lead to wonderful outcomes. It is because these elections, per se
and due to the political freedoms that must surround them if they are to be considered fair
(and consequently, if the resulting regime is to be democratic), mark a crucial departure
from the arbitrariness of authoritarian rule. When some fundamental political freedoms
are respected, this means greater progress in relation to authoritarian rules and gives us
ample reason to defend and promote fair elections.
In response to the fourth core assumption, O’Donnell explained why he
prioritized political factors in understanding the transition process. During the 1970’s,
predominant scholars believed that it took a long time for economic development and the
maturation of political culture to occur. O’Donnell claimed that scholars of Latin
America found this discouraging and engaged in “thoughtful wishing” by assuming that
“purposive political action could be effective and that good analysis might be helpful to
this end.”"
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O’Donnell did not question the fifth assumption that third wave transitions
develop within a coherent and functioning state.
As a whole, O’Donnell questioned the importance granted to his work and the
coherence granted the larger body of literature. O'Donnell disagreed with the criticism of
how transition scholars emphasize elections, but agreed that scholars have assumed a
functioning state, and justified the optimistic approach of early transitions scholars as an
understandable byproduct of the time period. O'Donnell embraced serious discussion of
transitions, but concluded that the transitions scholarship “rests on grounds far more solid
than the evanescent Transition paradigm’ that Carothers sketches.
”
2(b
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Like McFaul and Carothers, I am critical of assumptions made by predominant
scholars of democratic transitions, such as Samuel Huntington, Guillermo O’Donnell,
Phil 1 ipe Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, Terry Karl, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. My
research seeks to engage the debate between Carothers and O’Donnell over the
deterministic nature of elections in the transition process and broaden this electoral focus
to include other institutions. My research also seeks to engage the debate over whether
the predominant focus of transitions theory should be abandoned. 1 engage both debates
by creating a testable hypothesis that measures the effectiveness of democratic elections
and institutions in promoting democratic development. Like Bunce, I am skeptical that
useful and accurate generalizations and theories can be constructed from development
experiences in Latin America and Southern Europe, then applied to Eastern Europe,
Africa, and the Middle East. Without in-depth, empirical analysis, however, 1 am not
prepared to advocate the outright rejection of a predominant focus on democratic
transitions. This is the purpose of this project.
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY OF UKRAINE
Ukraine is a land that predominantly consists of rolling plains and exceptionally
fertile soil. Home to the earliest agricultural communities of Europe, Ukraine means
“borderland.” This fits the territory which occupied the border between protecting forests
and exposed steppe and currently lies on the edges of Asia and the Mediterranean. Given
its location on main trade routes between Europe and Asia, the traditional Ukrainian
villages have been exposed to competing cultures for centuries. Aside from Russia,
Ukraine is the largest country in Europe, in terms of area, with a current population
comparable to France. Ukraine is arguably among the richest countries in Europe in terms
of natural resources because of its large amounts of coal and iron ore. 1
Most contemporary accounts of Ukrainian history begin in the 7 lh century when
Eastern Slavs settled in small villages on the right bank of Dnieper River. Villages
gradually subdivided and expanded to form approximately fourteen tribal confederations
in present-day Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Little is known about the political
organization of this territory called Rus, but w ith no centralized authority, various tribes
were most likely led by patriarchs who made decisions based on communal consensus.
Though a ruling class emerged (kniazi), land and livestock was widely understood to be
communal property of extended families. As a result, disparities between property
holdings were minimal.
“
Historians debate which of the three East Slavic peoples were the original and
dominant in Rus. Some Ukrainian scholars acknowledge a shared origin among the
groups, but contend that subsequent development was unique. Others contend that
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Ukraine predates Russia. Russian textbooks state that Kiev is the “mother of all Russian
cities” and thus, the city is currently located “abroad” because of mere formality.
Nationalist Belorussian historians portray Rus as a loose federation with significant
autonomy for certain principalities. ’ Regardless of these scholarly divisions, a 11 three
groups of Eastern Slavic peoples clearly share historical and cultural roots that date back
several centuries to a time of great prestige and prosperity.
By the middle of the 1 l' h century Kievan Rus was “a mighty political
conglomerate well on the way to creating one of the most sophisticated societies and
flourishing economies in Europe at the time.” 4 Location was critical in the development
of the territory. Kiev was an important transit point between Varangian settlements to the
North and the Byzanstine Empire to the South. Early Kievan princes were relentless in
their pursuit of wealth. The conquests of Oleh, the first historically verifiable ruler Kiev,
were “a successful attempt to unite and control both Kiev and Novgorod, the main depots
of the ‘Greek’ trade route.”"
Kievan princes controlled “a commercial enterprise composed of loosely
affiliated towns whose garrisons collected tribute and maintained, in a rough soil of way,
public order.”" Still, political organization was minimal and distances between territories
were substantial. As a result, regionalism prohibited the formation of a unified political
establishment and thus interaction between rulers and the ruled was limited aside from
occasional payments of tribute ensured by the threat and exercise of brute force. With
the death of Sviatoslav in 972, Kievan Rus underwent “the first outbreak of what was to
become a chronic, debilitating political malady: internecine struggle among members of
the Riurikid dynasty for supreme power in the realm.”
66
Volodymyr the Great Christianized Rus in 988. Volodymyr sensed traditional
animism and paganism had ran its course and considered Christianity to be a more
sophisticated way to express spiritual, social, and political values. Both Islam and
Christianity were considered, the dominant religions of the lands Kiev wanted to generate
the tightest commercial contacts. Folklore suggests that Islam was nixed because its
prohibition of alcohol and the splendor of religious services in Byzanstine Christianity.
Christianity had roots in Kiev, evident in Prince Olha's conversion decades earlier.
Volodmyr demanded the hand of Anne in marriage, the sister of Byzanstine co-emperors,
after helping to quell a rebellion in 987. To make the best of what was viewed as a bad
situation, the Byzanstines demanded Volodymyr accept Christianity, which he did in 988.
Determined that subject should quickly convert, baptisms were held in mass and pagan
idols were destroyed, despite resistance. Importing an organizational structure straight
from Constantinople, the political prestige of the ruling empire was greatly enhanced
under Volodymyr. Kievan Rus was hence aligned with the Christian West rather than the
Islamic East.
The long tenure of laroslav the Wise ( 1036 to 1054) is considered the high point
of Kievan Rus. laroslav extended an already expansive territorial realm, married himself
and family members in other European dynasties, created over 400 churches in Kiev, and
codified a system of laws called Ruska pravada (Rus justice). Kievan Rus transformed
itself from isolated, forest bound tribes crossed with Scandinavian warrior-merchants to
an increasingly wealthy and urbanized society/ In less than a century, however, several
factors would diminish the influence of Kiev as the dominant center of Kiev and
ultimately lead to the end of the dynasty in 1 132.
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Like many medieval empires in Europe, Kievan Rus lacked the technical and
institutional means to keep power effectively consolidated among widespread territories.
Unity was achieved when males of the Riurikid dynasty agreed on power sharing, but
transitions of power were commonly characterized by fratricidal wars. Over time princely
clans developed deeper roots in patrimonial lands as “it became increasingly apparent to
them that their future was tied to their hereditary holdings and not to Kiev, which was
continually being contested. During the 12 ,h century principalities became increasingly
more autonomous and in doing so, developed independent political and economic
existences. This weakened the resources of Kiev, but did not diminish competition for
control of the city. Twenty-four princes ruled Kiev between 1 146 and 1246 on forty-
seven different occasions.
Meanwhile, the importance of trade between Varangians and Greeks declined as
“enterprising Italian merchants established direct links between Byzantium, Asia Minor,
and the Middle East on the one hand, and Western Europe on the other, thus bypassing
Kiev in the process.” 10 This development had a devastating impact on Kiev's economy as
did the pillaging of Constantinople by Crusaders and the beginning of a sharp period of
decline in Baghdad. With the loss of two major trading partners, tensions festered among
different economic classes in Kiev, which caused frequent upheavals.
The deathblow to Kiev ultimately came from outside intruders. The Mongols,
referred to as Tatars in Eastern Europe, were nomads along the northwestern borders of
China in the 12 lh century. United by Temujin, who deemed himself Jenghiz Khan or
Khan of Khans, the Mongols became a powerful military force that attacked sedentary
civilizations in the region. Though limited in number, at most 120,000 to 140,000
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warriors, Mongols were “extremely mobile, well organized, and superbly led.” 1
1
This
was evident in the conquering of China, Central Asia, and Iran. In 1237, the Mongol
army, led by Batu, the grandson of Jenghiz Khan, first approached the perimeters of
Kievan Rus and in 1240 took Kiev.
Though Prince Mykhailo tied, residents put up a strong resistance under a military
commander by the name of Dmytro who was dispatched by Danylo of Galicia. After a
“long and bitter siege,” the Mongols penetrated the city walls, fighting broke out from
street to street, house to house, and in early December of 1240, the city fell. The story of
Kievan Rus is important to understanding the common historical roots shared by
Ukrainians and Russians and appreciating the fact that Ukrainian ancestors were once
among the elite of European civilization, even though many Westerners today label
Ukraine as “backward” politically, economically, and socially. Afterwards, however,
Ukraine experienced centuries of foreign invasion and occupation, which has bred
contemporary concern for the protection of Ukrainian culture and identity, particularly in
the age of post-Soviet globalization.
After the Mongol invasion Kievan Rus was divided between Poland, Lithuania,
and Hungary, while Muscovy became a power in its own right. 1 " Territories around Kiev
maintained much of their legal autonomy until 1569. In doing so, much of the social
structure, including the Orthodox religion, remained in place. The Cossacks resisted
Polish rule, particularly the threat of enserfment, and established a quasi-state called the
Hetmanate after the Great Rebellion in 1648. 1 ' Today, Ukrainian Cossacks are revered
as a militant group of fierce warriors resistant to foreign domination and depicted in some
Ukrainian textbooks as the forefathers of democracy.
69
Western Ruthenian territories were absorbed by the Habsburg Empire in the
1770’s where “relatively tolerant Austrian rule, and the intensity of the local competition
with the Poles, allowed the west Ruthenians to develop a strong sense of district identity
by 1914, and during the course of the nineteenth century, to settle on the name of
‘Ukrainian.’”
14
The Ukrainian national movement developed under “semiclandestine
conditions during the latter phases of (Soviet) imperial rule, mainly after political
restraints were relaxed in the wake of the 1905 revolution.” 1 " The first Ukrainian political
groups include the Society of SS. Cyril and Methodius, which developed in the 1840's
and Hromada (community), which developed in the l<S60’s. With a small intelligentsia
and illiterate peasantry, efforts to establish independence in opportunities that arose after
1917 were unsuccessful.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ended attempts for Ukrainian
independence. The constitution of this newly created multi-republic federation formally
limited Soviet intervention in domestic affairs and protected the right ofmember states to
secede, while authority over foreign affairs, the military, commerce, and transportation
ultimately resided in Moscow. Essentially, however, Moscow exercised extensive
authority over all levels of government via the military, secret police, and Communist
Party apparatus. The Communist Party of Ukraine, for example, declared itself to be a
subordinate part of a single Russian Communist Party, subservient in all affairs.
At the same time, Ukraine did enjoy a brief period of cultural revival in the
1920’s, prior to Stalin's consolidation of power. This led to “brutal clampdown from
1929-30, a halt to further Ukrainianization in 1933, and worst of all, the Great Famine of
1932-3, in which an estimated five to seven million perished.”"’ Reform policies targeted
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kulaks (wealthy peasants) in efforts to redistribute wealth through progressive taxation,
seizing of property, and even deportation. Resistance to collectivization took the form of
revolts, cattle slaughters, and machinery destruction and was typically met with increased
delivery quotas. By the outbreak of World War 11, industrial production quadrupled,
industrial workers tripled, and urban residents grew to over one-third of the overall
population. Heavy industry was the primary focus of industrialization, with a regional
bias toward Eastern Ukraine, which is still the center of industry today.
The 1930’s also witnessed a series of purges throughout the USSR in which the
vast majority of Ukrainian dissidents were killed. As a result, there was no national
uprising in 1941, when the Germans invaded. Favorable sentiments toward shedding
Soviet occupation quickly faded with the brutal nature of Nazi rule. After the war, Uviv
and Kiev became the main hubs of a dissident movement that developed in the 1960's
among a new generation of cultural intelligentsia. In three waves of suppression ( 1965-
66, 1972-73, 1976-80), the KGB eliminated this movement. Demographically, 20 th
century occupation made Ukraine more homogenous as large Polish, German, and Jewish
minorities were deported or killed in the holocaust. At the same time, Russians grew' to
over 20% of the population by the fall of the Soviet Union. 17
In April of 1986, the worst nuclear accident in history occurred in Chernobyl. The
long-term impact of this disaster is still being felt today. That same year, Gorbachev
initiated a campaign of perestroika ( restructuring
)
and glasnost (openness). Ukraine
proceeded cautiously with the advent of these reforms, in contrast to mass movements
experienced in the Baltics and Transcaucasian Republics. The spontaneous creation of
unofficial groups began in 1987, mostly in Lviv and Kiev. A year later mass mobilization
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emerged in the public demonstrations and the establishment of national organizations.
National revival became widespread and overt in 1989. National leaders (re)emerged,
mostly cultural activists and dissidents of 1960’s. In the fall of 1989, the Ukrainian
language gained official status as the national language. Intellectual attention toward
history and religion resurfaced, in addition to new social movements centered upon
economic and environmental concents.
The first contested elections for the Supreme Soviet, the parliamentary body in
Soviet Ukraine, were held on March 4, 1990. This ended the Communist Party’s
monopoly of power. A strong democratic block formed by May, which was aided by
defections of Communist party members on various issues. Leadership positions rapidly
shifted and Leonid Kravchuk, the former secretary of ideology in the Communist Party of
Ukraine, was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Kravchuk was a pragmatic
transitional leader who navigated between the Communist majority and democratic
opposition.
On July 16 lh
,
1990 sovereignty was declared. Full independence of Ukraine was
declared on August 24, 1991 after the failed coup in Moscow in August of 1991 . During
the emergency session which established independence, MP’s brought a huge blue and
yellow banner into the chamber, the traditional colors of Ukraine, to symbolize their
break with the Soviet Union. The Rada passed a new citizenship law in October and state
boundary law in November. This laid the foundation for the transformation of Ukraine
from a union republic to an independent state. A national referendum on independence
was held on December I s ' along with the first presidential election. Ix Voter turnout was
72
84% and the referendum on independence passed with 90% support. Kravchuk was
elected the first president of independent Ukraine and took office December 5 lh .
Ukraine’s statement of independence actually consisted of two documents, a
Declaration of State Sovereignty and Law of Economic Independence of Ukraine. This
reflects the multifaceted nature of the transition process. These documents stated that the
Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), formerly called the Supreme Soviet, was the only
body that could speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people, and that the territory formerly
called the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was indivisible within its current
boundaries. Seeking to emphasize economic, as well as political independence,
independent Ukraine expressed its intentions to create independent price, customs, and
fiscal systems. Independent Ukraine claimed responsibility for its budget and reserved the
right to introduce its own currency. The country sought to promote national-cultural
development of the Ukrainian people, protect the right of cultural development for all
nationalities within the country, and create its own armed forces and domestic security
services.
Future foreign policy was to be neutral, without participation in military blocks,
while adhering to anti-nuclear principles of never accepting, making, or purchasing
nuclear weapons. The most pressing task facing the new government was deciding on
Ukraine’s relationship with former Soviet neighbors. On December 8, 1991 the
government leaders from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus signed the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) in Minsk. The treaty eliminated the political existence of the
Soviet Union and recognized that all spheres of common activity betw een the three
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nations would be conducted on the basis of equal rights. Later that month, 1 1 of the 1
5
former Soviet republics joined CIS on the same terms.
On June 28, 1996 a new democratic constitution was ratified, nearly five years
after independence. This gave Ukraine the dubious distinction of being the last former
Soviet republic to do so. The historic document was the product of intense negotiations
between Rada deputies, ending in an all-night, sixteen-hour session without breaks.
Ukraine was constituted as a “sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based
state.” The political system was a “republic” in which state power is “exercised on the
principles of its division into legislative, executive, and judicial power.” 10 The “main
duty of the state” is to “affirm and ensure human rights and freedoms.” 20 These
freedoms include the right to:
life, freedom, thought, speech, religion, association, assembly, petition
property, entrepreneurial activity, strike, rest, social protection, housing
sufficient standard of living, safe environment, free access to information,
marriage, education, expression, compensation for damages, to know rights, legal
assistance
According to the Constitution, the “will of the people is exercised through
^ 2 ]
elections.” Citizens at least 1 8 years of age are eligible to vote. Legislative power is
vested in the Rada. The Rada consists of 450 National Deputies who are elected by secret
ballot to four-year terms based on universal, equal, and direct suffrage. Deputies must be
citizens at least twenty-one years of age with the right to vote and residence in Ukraine
for five years prior to election. Rada elections are conducted the last Sunday of March in
the fourth year of the term. Deputies must take an oath that swears allegiance to Ukraine,
protection of the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and compliance with the
Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Deputies are not to be “held criminally liable, detained
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or arrested without the consent of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.” 2 " Regular sessions of
the Rada begin on the first Tuesday of February and on the first Tuesday of September
each year. Meetings are to be conducted openly, unless the majority of the Rada decide to
hold a closed session. According to the Constitution, the Rada has thirty-six enumerated
powers, which include making laws, approving the budget, declaring war, impeaching the
President, and making appointments, such as the members of the Central Electoral
Commission.
The President is the head of the state and “guarantor of state sovereignty and
territorial indivisibility of Ukraine, the observance of the Constitution of Ukraine and
human and citizens’ rights and freedoms.” 2 ' Presidents are elected by secret ballot for
five-year terms on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage. To be eligible for
election one must be a citizen who is at least 35 years old, have the right to vote, resided
in Ukraine ten years prior to Election Day, and have command of the state language
(Ukrainian). Presidents are limited to two consecutive terms. Once elected, the President
elect must take an oath administered by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court that
swears allegiance to Ukraine and pledges to protect the sovereignty of Ukraine and the
rights of citizens, as well as provide for the welfare of the Ukrainian people. According to
the Constitution, the President has 31 enumerated powers, which include signing bills
into laws, representing the state in international relations, commanding the armed forces,
and appointing diplomats, the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
The Cabinet of Ministers is the highest government body in the executive branch.
The Cabinet is composed of the “Prime Minister, First Vice Prime Minister, three Vice
Prime Ministers and the Ministers.”" 4 The Prime Minister is appointed by the President
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and approved by one-half of the Rada. The President, based on the submission of the
Prime Minister, also appoints other Cabinet members. The Cabinet has ten enumerated
powers including implementation of domestic and foreign policy of the State and the
execution of the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine.
In Ukraine, justice is “administered exclusively by the courts.” 2 ^ The
Constitutional Court and courts of general jurisdiction undertake judicial proceedings. To
become a judge on a general court, one must be at least twenty-five years of age, resided
in Ukraine for at least ten years, command the state language, have a legal education, and
have at least three years work experience in law. " Judges are prohibited from taking part
in any political activity, including membership in political parties and trade unions.
There are nine main principles that guide judicial proceedings:
1 ) Legality
2) Equality before the law
3) Ensuring that guilt is proved
4) Freedom to present and debate evidence
5) Prosecution undertaken by State representative
6) Ensuring right of accused to defend himself or herself
7) Public trial
8) Right to appeal
9) Court decisions are binding
The Supreme Court is the highest court of the courts of general jurisdiction. The
Constitutional Court is the “sole body of constitutional jurisdiction in Ukraine” and
“provides the official interpretation of the Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of
Ukraine.”" The Court consists of eighteen judges. The President, Rada, and Congress of
Judges, each appoints six judges. To become a judge on the Constitutional Court, one
must be at least 40 years of age, have resided in Ukraine for the last 20 years, command
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the state language, have a legal education, and have at least ten years work experience in
law. Court members are appointed for nine-year terms without the right to serve a “repeat
term.”
2
* The Chairman of the Court is elected by secret ballot to one three-year term at a
special meeting of Court members. The authority of the Court is twofold: 1 ) to determine
the constitutionality of the actions of the President, Cabinet, and Rada; and 2) to interpret
the meaning of the Constitution. -
Ukraine is a federal republic with both centralized and decentralized powers. The
Constitution defines local self-government as the right of a territorial community to
“independently resolve issues of local character within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws of Ukraine.’"" District and oblast councils are bodies of local government that
represent the interests of villages, settlements, and cities. Council members are elected by
secret ballot to four-year terms on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage.
Council members elect a chairman to their respective council, whether district or oblast,
to lead the executive staff of the council. The State participates in the creation of local
budgets and “financially supports local self-government.’” 1
Serhii Holovatyi, one of the principal authors of the Constitution, stated that by
adopting this Constitution Ukraine had “joined the league of European nations- nations
that have chosen democracy and freedom, and there is no going back.” " Holovatyi gave
up his seat in the Rada, as required in the new Constitution, to retain his duties as Justice
Minister. Other politicians were less inclined to follow the newly instituted constitutional
procedure. Rada Chairman, Oleksandr Moroz was a key player in efforts to force
politicians who held various political positions to choose one. Moroz took several
politicians to court, such as Anton Buteiko, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. A
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majority of Rada deputies took an oath of allegiance to uphold the Constitution on July
12
th
,
1996, but 63 deputies did not. 57 of these deputies were from the Communist
faction. Communists argued that the Constitution and corresponding oath of allegiance
were implemented after they were elected, which precluded deputies from being bound to
it during the current convocation.
The new Constitution constituted a significant step in solidifying democracy as
the formal political system in Ukraine. The major challenge since ratification has been
the application and adherence to the delineated powers and rights. Experience has shown
that formal political power in independent Ukraine has had less to do with constitutional
provisions and much more to do with the allocation of resources. Listing dozens of
freedoms that government may not infringe on makes sense, considering the generations
of foreign rule that repeatedly abused human rights, but constituting Ukraine in an
extensive set of ideas with which the country had little experience with has proved very
difficult to implement. The political process has yet to fulfill constitutional obligations,
creating apathy and cynicism for much of the first fifteen years since independence
The foundation for real political power in independent Ukraine was set by the
massive transformation from a Soviet-controlled command economy to a capitalist
economy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited an economy based in
heavy industry and dependent on outdated technology. Ukraine's primary challenge since
independence has been to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on industries like
steel, coal, and weaponry, which have become even less viable after traditional export
markets broke down. Significant restructuring, however, has been impeded by vested
bureaucratic and economic interests. These interests seek to maintain elements of central
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planning for personal benefit, creating a lack of consensus among political and business
elites regarding the direction and scope of economic reform. As a result, diversification
progressed gradually at best.
Oligarchy is essential to understanding post-Soviet economic development in the
Ukraine. The meaning of “oligarch” in the contemporary Ukrainian context is slightly
different than political-historical understandings of oligarchy as rule of the wealthy.
Ukrainian oligarchs are individuals that serve as the primary owners of major
conglomerates and have direct access and influence with the most powerful political
leaders. Oligarchic groups developed with the end of Communism, though several
members previously served as Communist officials. These groups largely formed along
regional lines and built their power within a system that enabled oligarchy, through a
powerful presidency at the head of government, and a competitive economic structure,
with no foundation of law.
Commodity trading was the main source of revenue for oligarchs in the first
decade after the fall of the Soviet Union. Commodities, like gas, coal, and steel, were
highly lucrative through the use of fraud and stealing additional profit from government
assistance. This practice took a variety of forms, often simultaneously. The state granted
regional monopolies to varying oligarchs for gas sales. Oligarchs would buy gas at state
controlled prices and resell the gas at much higher, market-driven prices. Many oligarchs
would refrain from actually paying for their purchases; some even gave these bills to the
state, as in the case of Russian gas imports. When oligarchs paid, sizeable discounts were
given through bailer deals, often reducing tax bills with deliveries in kind. Oligarchs also
79
benefited from many legal exemptions that allowed them to avoid paying taxes all
together and government subsides which helped finance their enterprises.
Regional oligarchic groups expanded and consolidated power in a variety of ways.
Oligarchs compromised the idea of divided government by simultaneously developing
close personal connections with the president and constituting large party factions in the
Rada. This enabled oligarchs to control significant government officials across many
offices in government. Oligarchic control over formal powers was most damaging to
democratic development in the law enforcement sector. Oligarchs owned media empires,
which enabled them to manifest extraordinary leverage over government and society
outside of formal government structures. Those involved changed yearly based on
standing with the president. Violent crime was common given the amount of money that
rested on just one gas contract. Gas oligarchs, such as Ahati Bragin and Yevhen Scherban
from Donetsk, traveled with armies of up to 150 bodyguards. Bragin (in 1995) and
Scherban (in 1996) were both murdered, most likely by competitors, though like many
mysterious murders, these cases remain unresolved.
Kravchuk’s flexible positions toward democratic reform enabled him to provide a
moderating and compromising presence among both conservatives and reformists.
Substantive political change was limited, though formal sovereignty and relations with
the West were established. Kravchuk faced significant pressure from Russia to retain
common military forces and currency within the CIS, but refused. Kravchuk’s prime
focus was nation building, though the president is most remembered for his economic
policy, described by some as “neglect.” ” Kravchuk failed to prevent corruption from
dominating Ukraine's privatization process. A small number of individuals made a
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fortune, while prosperity was elusive for most. Meanwhile, Ukraine's inflation rate
reached an astronomical 10,000%. The demise of the Black Sea Steamship Company
constituted a symbolic low of the Kravchuk era. The largest merchant fleet in the world
was secretly sold to foreign companies, mostly for fake debts.
In 1993, the Rada decided to hold a public referendum or vote of confidence in
itself and President Kravchuk. If either should not gain a majority of electoral support
new elections would be held. As the referendum date approached, however, the Rada
decided to forgo the referendum and hold new elections in March of 1994 for the Rada
and in June of 1994 for the president. These were the first democratically contested
parliamentary elections in Ukraine since November 1917 when elections were held for
the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.
4
Deputies had faced steady pressure to resign
and hold new elections since the 1990 elections were characterized by widespread
intimidation of opposition candidates and their supporters. The Rukh movement, for
example, had no access to mass media were unable to contest half of the 450
constituencies because of obstructionist efforts by the Communist Party.
To guide the new elections, the Rada passed a new electoral law on November 1 8,
1993. Every citizen 18 years old and over was able to vote for one of the 450 deputies in
the Rada via secret ballot. In contrast to other former Soviet republics, like Russia and
Poland, the electoral system was based entirely on single member constituencies.
Candidates were required to be Ukrainian citizens, at least 25 years old, who lived in
Ukraine for at least two years prior to the election. Candidates could be nominated by
three different sources: their constituency, their workplace, or their party. To be
nominated by one’s party was the most difficult. This was evident in the legal
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requirements. For example, prospective candidates had to generate a list of the first 100
members in the regional party convocation, including occupation, address, passport
number and signature. Requirements were similar in nature for other nomination
methods, but varied in degree. For example, the necessary list of supporting voters and
personal background information in a constituency was only ten.
Voting procedures required voters to cross out each candidate the voter did not
support on a paper ballot. If these procedures were not follow ed, the ballot was discarded.
This was reminiscent of the preceding Soviet voting process where voters would receive
a ballot with one name on it and then drop it the voting box without having to enter a
voting booth. The cross-out method proved to be cumbersome in a new voting context
w ith many candidates on a single ballot. To be elected, at least half of the registered votes
in the respective constituency must participate and the candidate must receive at least half
of the votes cast. A run off between the top candidates was necessary if the first threshold
was met, but not the second. Once again, at least half of the voters in a constituency must
participate in the run off for the results to be valid. If at least half of registered voters in a
constituency failed to participate in both elections, entirely new elections would be held.
The new electoral law faced criticism on many fronts. Center-right party leaders
w ere disappointed that the new law did nothing to stimulate the development of new
political parties. In responding to criticism, Ihor Tsyluyko, Secretary of the Central
Electoral Commission, explained that the demands placed on the registration process for
political parties was to ensure that proportional representation was not abused by many
parties who were quickly conceived just for the election. When proportional
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representation was removed from the law, party requirements sloppily remained in
place.'
0
Party development faced many obstacles in Ukraine, including the institutional
legacy of communism, the psychological legacy of communism, regional differentiation,
and burdensome electoral laws.
0
Scholars point to survey evidence compiled in the early
1990’s that showed parties were largely unpopular and largely unknown by the Ukrainian
>7
public. Some claimed that Ukrainians possessed a “party allergy.”' In 1992, for
example, only 9% of deputies in the Rada declared any type of party affiliation. At the
same time, political parties performed much stronger than anticipated in the 1993
elections. Party candidates constituted just 1 1% of the total number of registered
candidates, but won 40% of the total seats in the Rada. The success of party candidates in
the 1994 Rada elections was particularly impressive considering how relevant electoral
laws hindered party development. By the 1998 Rada elections, many obstacles to party
development were removed. The cumbersome 1993 Electoral Law was replaced with a
mixed system that coupled single-member districts with proportional representation.
At the same time, significant social cleavages were tied to specific regions, which
made it very difficult for genuinely national parties to develop. The three dominant
cleavages are ethnicity, language, and religion. The Russian minority in Ukraine consists
of about 1 1 million people, w ho primarily reside in the east and south. Ethnic Ukrainians
in these regions speak Russian, in line with Russification policies under Soviet rule,
while ethnic Ukrainians in the west speak Ukrainian. Given that western regions were
absorbed into the Soviet Union later than other regions, there now exists a more
nationally-orientated population compared to the country at large. Religiously, western
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Ukrainians largely belong to the Greek Catholic Uniate Church, whereas most Ukrainians
at large belong either to the Russian or Ukrainian Orthodox churches. s These cleavages
are evident in electoral politics. National democratic parties, such as Rukh and the
Ukrainian Republican Party, receive most of their support from western oblasts, whereas
leftist parties, such as the Communist Party and Socialist Party of Ukraine, receive most
of their support from eastern oblasts and rural central oblasts. Since independence, the
industrialized and heavily populated leftist parties of the east have been most successful
in parliamentary elections.
A second criticism of the 1993 electoral law was that turnout barriers were too
high to be realistically met. Critics of the party in power suggested these barriers were
deliberately put in place to obstruct a smooth electoral process and prolong the tenure of
incumbents in the meantime. A third criticism was that Central and District Electoral
Commissions had too much power. Commissions were appointed by leaders of the Rada
and oblast councils, respectively. Responsibilities included registering candidates,
printing campaign literature, organizing state-run media, counting ballots, validating
election procedures, interpreting electoral law, settling electoral disputes, and officially
releasing the results. In handling disputes, the Central Commission (CEC) could overrule
a District Commission (DEC). Only the Supreme Court could overrule the Central
Commission, but the Supreme Court was practically nonexistent in 1994 because the
Rada had not determined how to elect its members.
These criticisms illuminate several problems surrounding post-independence
electoral procedures in Ukraine. Former Communist elites had a significant impact on the
conduct of new democratically-contested elections. This had a negative impact on
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democracy building activities, such as the construction of a stable party system centered
upon the creation of stable electoral coalitions that could persist from one election to the
next. New electoral procedures concentrated power in electoral commissions who were
appointed by leaders from the party in power in the Rada. A lack of institutional
oversight emerged from the Rada’s failure to determine how members of the Supreme
Court should be chosen. As a result, the power to settle disputes resided with the same
commissions who were largely responsible for administering the elections. This runs
counter to the purpose of divided government in democratic systems, which seeks to
promote competition among self-interested individuals to ensure one group or component
of government does not abuse power.
5, 833 candidates registered for the election with an average of 13 candidates per
constituency. The highest number of candidates in one constituency was 3 1 in Kiev.
Voter groups nominated 63.3% of candidates. Work collectives nominated 26.7% of
candidates, while just 1 1% of candidates were nominated by political parties. ' 1 Half of
the previous seats were uncontested. This, coupled with the fact that the largest age
demographic elected was 41-50 (39%), suggests that a process of generational change
was underway. Candidates tended to be more educated than the rest of the population
with engineers, lawyers, economists, and educators being the most popular professions.
About 75% of candidates entered the race as independents. The lack of clear party labels
and high number of candidates made it very difficult for voters to make informed
choices.
Survey evidence indicates that the electorate had serious concerns. The Kiev
International Institute of Sociology found that economic crisis, relations with Russia, and
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crime, were the three most important issues facing the electorate. The next tier of issues
included the security of the Ukrainian state, status of the Russian language, nuclear
weapons in Ukraine, and the future of the Crimea and Black Sea Fleet. 4" Only a small
number of voters were able to gain a national perspective on the electoral process
however. These voters had the resources to extrapolate consistent themes from divergent
media outlets. Typical voters, on the other hand, tended to be saturated with regional
politics. National democrats dominated the west, whereas far left parties dominated the
east. Centrists were dispersed unevenly throughout the country.
Over 600 international election observers from 50 states and 12 international
organizations declared the election generally free and democratic. 41 Violations of
electoral law were reported to the Central Electoral Commission who promised to
investigate all allegations. Viktor Pohorilko, the deputy head of the Commission, claimed
that the most common violation reported was the promising and/or actual delivery of
certain material goods and services to voters, such as new roads, bus routes, and gas
supplies to villages.
4
" There were reports of violence, but these were not covered w idely
by the mass media. Alleged acts of violence involved over a dozen candidates and
included activities such as physical assault and destruction of homes and property.
Among the most prolific of these episodes was the disappearance of Mykhailo
Boychyshyn, a key leader in Rukh who sat on their electoral committee. Fellow Rukh
leaders claimed that Boychyshyn had been kidnapped because he had evidence against
high-level state officials that incriminated them in massive corruption. According to his
colleagues, this information was about to be made public. The fate of Boychyshyn still
remains a mystery.
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75.6% of eligible voters turned out for the first round of voting and each of the
450 constituencies that took part made the threshold of necessary voter turnout for the
results to be valid. This exceeded expectations. Still, candidates received over 50% of
votes in only 49 constituencies. As a result, a second round of voting was held in 400
constituencies. Most candidates elected in round one were from oblasts in the far west
( 19) and the far east ( 14). These candidates tended to include national political figures,
such as Ivan Plyushch, Speaker of the Rada.
Two-thirds of eligible voters turned out for the second round of voting. A
majority of eligible voters turned out in 380 of the 400 constituencies involved. In 289 of
participating constituencies one candidate earned a majority of votes. This meant that
new elections were necessary for a total of 1 12 constituencies. After round two, 338
deputies were elected, a constitutional quorum. Demographic trends favored men under
50 years. Only 12 women were elected (3.6%), about half the number who ran (7%). 75%
of newly elected deputies were between 25 and 50 years old.
4
136 were elected, the
largest electoral group with 40.2% of the vote. The Communist Party was by far the most
successful party with 86 deputies, 25.4% of the vote. Rukh was the largest National
Democratic Party with 25 deputies, 7.4% of the vote. The Interregional Bloc for Reforms
was the most successful centrist party, electing 15 deputies, 4.4% of the vote. Generally,
left orientated parties did the best, capturing approximately 36% of the seats. National
Democratic parties took about 14% of the seats, while Centrist parties assumed only
about 8% of the seats.
Soon after the Rada election, Kravchuk sought to postpone the previously
scheduled presidential election, in the belief that the election would “intensify
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destabilization processes, political polarization and the confrontation of political
forces.”
44
In the two months between the Rada and presidential elections, Kravchuk
feared that a “power vacuum” would emerge from the mix of a newly enacted electoral
law, a newly elected Rada, and a presidential campaign. 4 Left orientated parties, who did
very well in the Rada elections, did not favor postponing the elections. Though the
postponement effort received some support, particularly from National Democrats,
Kravchuk ultimately decided to go ahead with the elections and registered himself as a
candidate relatively late in the game.
Six candidates sought to unseat the incumbent. Like Kravchuk, Ivan Pluishch
(Parliamentary Speaker, 1990-1994) and Petro Talanchuk (Minister of Education, 1992-
1994) both held prominent government positions. In fact, Pluishch was the front runner
till Kravchuk formally joined the race. Moroz was the sole Socialist candidate.
Volodymyr Lanovyi, Valeriy Babych, and Leonid Kuchma were three liberal-democratic
candidates of different varieties. As the race quickly took shape, the main battle pitted
Kravchuk against Kuchma.
Kuchma served as Prime Minister from 1992 to 1993. As a presidential candidate
Kuchma’s political platform emphasized the creation of a new Constitution, the renewal
of beneficial ties to Russia, and the reduction of organized crime and corruption.
Kuchma’s economic platform emphasized a substantive transition from a command
economy to a market economy, which included de-monopolization and greater
privatization in all types of ownership. Unlike Kravchuk, Kuchma was heavily influenced
by the opinions of his advisers.
4f
’ Voters tended to gravitate toward Kuchma’s
decisiveness and consistent calls for a powerful presidency. As the campaign unfolded.
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Kuchma’s platform became increasingly muddled as he sought support from divergent
groups, such as Communists and pro-market reformers.
During the campaign, Kravchuk and Kuchma had few positive things to say about
one another. Kuchma tended to focus his criticisms on high-level political leaders that
surrounded Kravchuk, who he described as “simply incompetent.” 4 ' Kravchuk came to
power with the incredibly difficult task of building a state, nation, and economy.
Kravchuk’s rejection of force, avoidance of direct confrontation, and use of compromise
in resolving political disputes was portrayed as a sign of weakness and uncertainty by the
Kuchma campaign. Kuchma even went so far as to suggest that President Kravchuk
should voluntarily resign. Some scholars, such as Taras Kuzio, argue that “Kravchuk’s
greatest achievement may have been to make Kuchma possible.” As a whole, the 1994
elections were characterized by a lack of meaningful campaigning and harsh treatment of
independent election-monitoring groups from within Ukraine.
The first round of voting went in favor of Kravchuk who reportedly took 37.7%
of the vote over Kuchma’s 31.2%. The only other candidate to reach double digits was
Moroz with 13.4% of the vote. Candidates and observers voiced several concerns
regarding the administration of the first round. Foreign observers questioned suspicious
number of absentee voters in rural areas. The Kuchma campaign claimed that as many as
a half million votes, up to 10% in some districts, had been falsified in Kravchuk’s favor.
Other grievances included violation of voter secrecy, manipulation of voting procedures,
ballot-stuffing, and interference by local officials.
The second round was very close as well. Kuchma defeated Kravhchuk 52. 1% to
45%. Supporters of Pluishch and Talanchuk voted for Kravchuk, whereas supporters of
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Babych gravitated toward Kuchma. Lanovyi’s 9% was most likely divided between
businessmen who supported Kuchma, and liberals, who supported Kravchuk. 4 * Many of
Moroz-supporters backed Kuchma as the "lesser of two evils,” though rural supporters
favored Kravchuk. The results surprised many spectators as well. Some explained the
outcome as a sizeable negative vote against the incumbent, rather than a demonstration of
widespread support for the challenger. ° Others described the election a positive
development in Ukrainian democracy, but a negative development for the Ukrainian
independence movement.' 1 Given his desire to rekindle relations with Russia, a vote for
Kuchma was certainly not a vote for reform.
Not surprisingly, fraudulent activities resurfaced in round two. Voters in Kiev, for
example, were given ballots with Kravchuk's name already crossed out. American
election observers and election observers from the Kravchuk administration were banned
from some voting booths in Odessa and members of the electoral commission openly
campaigned for Kuchma in Kharkiv. Meanwhile, the Kuchma campaign claimed that
turnout was boosted in Lviv to aid Kravchuk. Given the surprising nature of the results
and multiple claims of fraudulent activity, Kuchma’s first task was heal sharp divisions
within the electorate that split the country between very different political identifies in the
far west and far east of the country.
The 1994 elections were the first exercise of democratic elections in independent
Ukraine. The electoral process created a constitutionally legitimate legislature. Formal
indicators, such as voter turnout and popular candidate selection, met or exceeded
traditional democratic norms in both the legislative and presidential elections. This
demonstrated that Ukrainians were very capable of certain democratic practices. At the
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same time, the presidential elections experienced a significant amount of voting
irregularities and fraud. To complicate matters more, mechanisms of electoral ov ersight,
particularly the central and district electoral commissions, were either incapable or
unmotivated to effectively resolve these disputes in a legitimate and transparent manner.
As a result, informal indicators, such as low levels of fraud and electoral oversight, did
not fit with norms of democratic governance. These trends would become all too
common in subsequent elections.
Looking back at Ukraine's history, it becomes clear that the country was not at an
ideal starting point for a democratic transition with the fall of the Soviet Union. In
contrast to many other Eastern European countries, Ukraine had no history of democracy
or dissent to speak of, nor did it have any democratic reformers who were part of the old
regime. As a result, democratic nation building was undertaken as a modest and restricted
process. Such a situation illuminates a problem with transition theorists who focus on the
establishment of elections and institutions in the transition process. Without a democratic
tradition or democratic leadership, the outcome of the transition can become quite
distorted for some time, as was the case with Ukraine. In turn, scholarship in comparative
political development would be better served by examining a country’s history with
democratic development, or lack of history, and evaluating whether this history will
promote or hinder a democratic transition. Ukraine was certainly was headed on a new
path that differed from its Communist occupation. This path, however, led toward a new
President who consolidated power in a system that was democratic in name only.
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Kuchma’s campaign centered upon fighting corruption, reforming the economy,
and expanding economic links with Russia. Though positioned as a reformer, Kuchma
previously served as the former manager of Ukraine’s largest arms factory and would
have been more accurately described as a technocrat. During his first year in office
Kuchma disrupted previously established networks of corruption, but only to enhance and
consolidate his position of power. Early oligarchs, like Yukhum Zviahilskiy from
Donetsk, were out of favor. Zviahilskiy, a former prime minister, was prosecuted for
stealing $25 million of state gasoline by depositing funds from government sales directly
into his personal bank account. Unfortunately, reform efforts constituted a mere
reshuffling of power positions, rather than significant systematic change. After just a year
of promoting market reforms, dominant oligarchs reconciled with Kuchma.
In contrast, Pavlo Lazarenko, a notorious oligarch, exemplified the prominent role
oligarchs play in Ukrainian politics, particularly after a falling out with the President.
Lazarenko partnered with Yulia Tymoshenko in the highly lucrative company United
Energy Systems of Ukraine. A former governor of Dnipropetrovsk, Lazarenko became
Prime Minister in 1996. Widely considered among the most corrupt of Ukrainian
politicians for his manipulation of the gas market, privatization, and agricultural
procurement, Lazarenko’s pow er soon rivaled that of Kuchma and he was ousted just a
year after taking office. Lazarenko had amassed a fortune from siphoning funds and
accepting bribes in exchange for government contracts as Prime Minister. The first
foreign government leader tried in the United States since Manuel Noriega, Lazarenko
was convicted of 29 counts of money laundering, fraud, and extortion in June of 2005.
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Kuchma sought Larzarenko’s extradition on charges ofmoney laundering and
involvement with three contract killings, including the murder of politician Yevhen
Scherban. Transparency International estimates that Larzarenko embezzled $1 14 to $200
million from 1996 to 1997, which ranked 8
lh
among world leaders of the last several
decades.
2
Lazarenko’s legal team maintained his innocence and claimed that Kuchma
withheld evidence that would have exonerated Lazemko. Lazernko’s political fallout
with Kuchma was significant in terms of building opposition because his fall from
political leadership transformed allies, like Yulia Tymoshenko, into clear opponents to
the President. Tymoshenko, also a former deputy prime minister, was arrested in
February of 2001, for giving $79 million in bribes to Lazarenko. Kuchma had fired
Tymoshenko a month earlier in connection to charges of illegally exporting large
amounts of Russian gas and hiding over $1 billion of the profits. After several weeks in
prison, Tymoshenko was released when Ukraine’s highest court annulled the arrest
warrants and dismissed the charges. The President’s public pursuit of Tymoshenko
transformed her from culprit to victim. Practically overnight, Tymoshenko became one of
the most popular politicians in Ukraine.
Lazerenko was the sixth prime minister in the first five years after independence.
In that time, there were also 1 1 vice first premiers and 28 vice premiers. This weakened
continuity of economic policy and damaged creditability in the eyes of foreign
investors. ' Before being dismissed, Lazerenko formed Hromada
,
the first purely
oligarchic political party, and one opposed to the president. In response, Kuchma
appointed a weak, but completely loyal prime minister, Valery Pustovoitenko, and sought
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to play the interests of oligarchs against each other to deflect direct opposition toward
him.
What is often lost in discussions of Ukrainian oligarchs like Lazarenko is that
corruption in Ukraine is not so much an external problem that infests the political system,
as often conceived in the West, but something woven into the fabric of Ukrainian society.
For decades of Soviet rule operating outside of the formal system was the means for a
better life for many Ukrainians, rather than morally reprehensible behavior solely
associated with violence and organized crime. This social dynamic reflects the
disjuncture between theories of Socialist governance and the realities of varying satellite
states. In theory, everyone would be sufficiently provided for and compensated justly by
their ability. In reality, great disparities in power and wealth existed. Money and
resources were the only reliable and effective means of social mobility. Many transition
scholars emphasize the shortcomings of socialism in practice, but few emphasize how
inherited and institutionalized behaviors of the Soviet era have failed to dissipate even
though institutional titles and structures have changed. As one scholar put it, there have
been many problems in Ukrainian nation building after the fall of the Soviet Union, but
these problems exist today because they enable solutions, not because they are
unsolvable /
4
Oligarchy in Ukraine peaked under Kuchma. During this time the President and
his administration were central to all oligarchic struggles. Direct access to the President
was a prerequisite for being an oligarch. Many oligarchs also held positions as
presidential administrators or advisors. This provided them with a formal source of
political power, in addition to their overwhelming infonnal political power, manifested in
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extraordinary wealth. These interactions were not well documented in the public sphere
because of strict government restrictions on independent media outlets.
In 1996, Kuchma shut down a television station in 1996 that ran a story on the
mysterious departure of several of aides in Kuchma’s office. From that time on, phone
calls to editors from the president’s office became commonplace. Heads of regional
administration would regularly contact networks when a newspaper or television station
criticized the government or interviewed an “undesirable” politician. ^ In the 1998
elections, for example, the OSCE concluded “the media played a critical role in the
election campaign, but not a neutral role.’06 According to the OSCE, the state and private
media “clearly promoted particular parties over others.” 7 These efforts largely took the
form of financial inspections or legal actions by state authorities that were undertaken to
limit freedom of the press. Although Ukraine had over 5,000 papers, 300 television
companies, and 150 radio stations, the OCSE concluded that it was nearly impossible for
Ukrainians to find an objective or neutral source of political information. 8
A new election law was passed in December of 1997 that transformed the
parliamentary election procedure into the mixed system it has today. 225 deputies are
elected in single member districts and 225 deputies are elected in a party list proportional
system. District candidates are nominated by parties, blocks, or by citizens, if the
candidate is an independent. The law waived the requirement that candidates must
receive 50% of the vote to decide the election. Parties or blocks can nominate candidates
for proportional representation. The minimum threshold a party must receive to gain seats
is 4%. The candidates who take office are taken from the top of the party list on down,
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depending on the number of seats the party is entitled to. The first five names of each
party list appear on the ballot.
The electoral law sought to better facilitate general elections in the wake of the
1994 elections that took nearly two years to complete. The mixed system was a
compromise between a majoritarian system and proportional system/ 4 Over 6,000
candidates competed in the 1998 parliamentary elections with approximately 30 parties
and/or blocks vying for proportional seats. 400 foreign election observers worked
alongside local election observers to monitor the election. 70% of Ukraine’s over 37
million registered voters turned out for the election. This was between the 75% turnout
for the first round of the 1994 elections and the 66% turnout for the second round.
The Communist Party of Ukraine was by far the most successful party, taking
26% of the vote and filling 1 15 seats. Other parties who met the 4% threshold included:
Rukh (9.5%, 42 seats), the Socialist-Peasants’ Alliance (6.3%, 28), the People’s
Democratic Party (6.3%, 28 seats), the Hroinada Block (4.5%, 20), and the Green Party
(4.3%, 19 seats). The number of seats gained by independents surpassed that of the
Communist Party. Independents received 31.2% of the vote and assumed 138 seats, a
slight increase from the 1994 election. 206 deputies elected were between 41 and 50
years old, nearly double the second highest age demographic, 51 to 60 years old ( 104
seats). Though the number ofwomen elected nearly tripled from the previous election,
the total number of women deputies was only 35 out of 500. Engineers were by far the
most prevalent profession of newly elected deputies (162), with teachers (79), economists
(57), and lawyers (53), well behind.
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The new system presented many new problems in terms of electoral
administration and oversight. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) reported that 17% of observers noted that voters had difficulty understanding the
electoral process. This was primarily due to the fact that national and local elections were
conducted simultaneously. Local government in Ukraine is highly fragmented. The
country is separated into oblasts, which are separated into rayons (divisions) or cities.
Rayons are then separated into villages, settlements, and cities. Each of these
subdivisions elects council members and chairmen of councils. Citizens voted with 5 or
6 ballots on which candidates were chosen, rather than crossed out as in 1994.
Disagreements regarding electoral arrangements even prevented major local elections,
such as the mayors of Kiev and Sevastopol. 60
A second set of problems revolved around the resolution of election related
disputes. According to electoral law, complaints that seek to void elections results should
be submitted to the Central Election Commission within 10 days of the results being
made public and then legal action can be taken through the court system. This led to
general confusion over which institution had ultimate jurisdiction to resolve disputes. In
several cases, complaints went directly to the courts; one was tiled after the 10-day
deadline. An OSCE fact-finding mission concluded that participants capitalized on this
confusion by shopping for the institutional alternative that best promoted desired
outcomes.
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In addition to jurisdictional issues, electoral review processes were inhibited by a
lack of standardization. What constituted appropriate evidence was unclear. This was
complicated by the fact that many candidates in disputed elections did not participate in
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review proceedings. Courts nullified elections for infractions that occurred inside polling
stations, such as open voting, family voting, and unauthorized personal present. Many
international observers witnessed these practices, but generally did not consider such
irregularities sufficient to invalidate election results.
According to the OSCE, electoral problems contributed to public perceptions of
selective enforcement of election laws. In turn, the OSCE strongly recommended that
electoral procedures be simplified in future elections to reduce the number of electoral
systems being used at various levels and recommended that all election officials receive
training on the resolution of election disputes, particularly the principles and interests
underlying contemporary elections laws. “ Though the OSCE stated “the overall election
period was characterized by violence and criminal activity,” the organization concluded
that the “elections were conducted under a generally adequate legal and administrative
r i **63framework.
Violence was particularly prevalent in Odessa and Crimea. A mayoral candidate
in Odessa, for example, physically assaulted another candidate and was detained. The
OSCE report accentuates how difficult it is to understand elections as a binary variable.
Elections were simultaneously characterized as violent and criminal, as well as legal and
administratively effective. Violence and criminal activity may not have distorted the
outcome of the election per say, as the OSCE contends, but the widespread fraud and
violence observed was significant enough to obfuscate the legitimate and peaceful
transition of power.
There were many similarities between the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections.
As in 1994, the 1999 elections were held amid economic turmoil and accusations of
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corruption.
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The election was settled in a second round of voting that pitted a candidate
who portrayed himself as a democratic reformer, President Kuchma, against a candidate
who sought a return to Soviet style rule, Petro Symonenko. Other top candidates included
Oleksandr Moroz (Socialist), Nataliya Vitrenko (Progressive Socialist), and Yevhen
Marchuk (Social Democratic Party). Twelve of the fifteen candidates who officially
registered for the campaign held government posts.
Kuchma’s first term witnessed three years of economic recession and minimal
democratic advances. In turn, analysts criticized Kuchma for failing to make significant
progress in escaping past political trends and advancing with the president's 1994
electoral platform/0 In the 1999 elections, Kuchma sought to downplay Ukraine’s
economic decline and to portray Symonenko as a radical who threatened the stability of
the State. Kuchma attempted to frame the election as a referendum on representative
government. According to the President, a Communist victory would result in a return to
repressive and unresponsive government. Symonenko, on the other hand, argued that
strong leadership was necessary to revive the Ukrainian economy. Both candidates
attempted to position themselves as the rational choice for overcoming contemporary
challenges.
Kuchma finished atop the first round of voting w ith 36.5% of the vote compared
22 .2% for Symonenko. Moroz and Vitrenko finished in a virtual tie w ith 1 1% of the vote,
while Marchuk received 8. 1% of the vote. Western Ukraine provided the base for
Kuchma's support, where he received 55% of the vote. In contrast, Symonenko was
strongest in the east (33.7%) and south (3 1 .5%), compared to a paltry 4.9% in the west.
Though Kuchma won a plurality, a run-off election between the top two candidates was
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implemented in line with electoral law. A second round victory for Kuchma was no sure
thing, considering that the top four opposition candidates combined to earn over 50% of
the votes in round one.
Kuchma figured he could depend on votes from Marchuck supporters, but
appointed Marchuck Secretary of National Security and Defense Council to be sure.
' "
The fact that two far left candidates received 20% combined still left cause for concern.
In round two, both top candidates largely retained their first round voters. Surprisingly,
however, Kuchma attracted 45% of Vitrenko voters and 35% of Moroz voters. This
combined with 78% of Marchuck voters resulted in a Kuchma victory." Kuchma
finished w ith 56.2% of total vote compared to 37.8% for Symonenko.
Kuchma voters tended to be younger, more religious, and predominately from
western Ukraine, whereas Symonenko voters tended to be older and predominately from
eastern Ukraine. Despite these demographic differences, Kuchma was able to win a
majority among all categories.
"
s
In some ways this is puzzling to outside observers
considering that economic conditions were so poor that “over 40% of the population
reports that they regularly do not have enough money to buy food and similar percentage
reveals that their income does permit them to buy clothes.”" ’ Amazingly, approximately
two-thirds of Ukrainians who perceived that economic conditions were getting worse still
voted in favor of President Kuchma. One-third of those voting for Kuchma believed the
economy would improve during the first year of this term. Roughly 15% of those w ho
voted for Kuchma, however, thought the economy would actually worsen in the next
year, but still voted for him. This suggests that Ukrainian voters in the 1999 elections
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divided their personal economic problems from their attitudes toward reform and were
willing to bear difficult times if the hope of future improvement.
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According to the OSCE, the first round of the 1999 presidential elections was
largely carried out in a “peaceful and orderly manner despite minor irregularities in very
few polling stations.” The second round, however, witnessed several serious
irregularities.
1
The campaign period was filled with allegations of obstruction, illegal
arrests, illegal seizure of campaign materials, circulation of defamatory materials, and
involvement of state officials in the campaign. The OSCL report confirmed that “many of
these allegations were true” and “substantial breaches of the legal framework” took
place.
2 The most notorious allegation of violence was the grenade attack on presidential
candidate Natalya Vitrenko.
According to eyewitness Nataliya Sokurenko, an aid of Vitrenko, Vitrenko found
a note the evening before visiting supporters in the Kryvy Rih region that stated: “Don’t
come to the meeting with N. Vitrenko or you will be blown up together with that (swear
word).” ' The planned meetings went ahead without a disturbance. After the meeting,
Vitrenko walked to her car with a small group of political officials when an unknown
man suddenly hurled a grenade at them. One of the political officials, Volodymyr
Ovcharenko, spotted the grenade and was able to kick it away.
The grenade exploded three meters away from Vitrenko, who was wounded in the
leg and fell to the ground. A bodyguard jumped over Vitrenko, prior to a second grenade
being launched by a second unknown man. The second grenade exploded a good distance
from the presidential candidate, but injured others. 47 people sought medical treatment
from the incident, 18 ofwhom were seriously injured. Two suspects, both Russian
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citizens, were arrested shortly after the attacks. Local police suggested that Moroz was
involved in the attack, but this was largely dismissed as a ploy to settle personal scores
between Moroz’s chief of staff and law enforcement officials in Kryvy Rih. Several
eyewitnesses contacted Vitrenko's staff claiming the suspects were not the ones who
hurled the grenades. The case was never solved.
A second significant attack involved Vasylii Khara, a Communist deputy in the
Rada and supporter of Symonenko. Three men assaulted KTiara and his driver outside
Khara’s Donetsk apartment. Khara claimed the attack was directly related to his support
of Symonenko. Local police blamed “local hooligans” for the attack . 74 This was typical.
Police rarely accepted political motivations as the cause of attacks. Still, leading
opposition candidates filed dozens of complaints claiming their ability to freely campaign
was obstructed by personal threats, physical threats, removal of campaign material, and
obstruction of campaign meetings. ° The Moroz campaign, for example, claimed their
campaign materials were taken in the oblasts of Zaporizhiya, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk,
Kharkiv, and Donetsk. The Symonenko campaign raised similar complaints in Donetsk.
When the election officials discussed some of these concerns with the Ministry of
Interior, at the local and national levels, the Ministry stated that materials were seized
during routine spot checks by traffic police or in searches of allegedly illegal campaign
offices.
The OSCE also confirmed many reports of senior political officials participating
in illegal campaign activities. The President is responsible for appointing the Heads of
Oblast State Administration (OSA). As civil servants, these individuals are prohibited
from campaigning according to electoral law. After the parliamentary elections.
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President Kuchma appointed 20 of the 27 heads of the OSA’s. In Vinnytsia, OSCE
officials witnessed OSA officials giving bundles of pro-Kuchma materials to the police
for distribution. In Kharkiv, observers witnessed the police actually distributing materials
at a concert. In Kerch, observers were given copies of a full-page article by the Mayor
which encouraged voters to support Kuchma. " These are just a few examples of the
many blatant violations of electoral law committed by state officials supporting Kuchma.
According to the OSCE, both the 1998 parliamentary elections and 1999 presidential
elections fell short of OSCE commitments and international standards.
Yuri Scherbak, a foreign policy adviser to President Kuchma, declared that
Europe should be happy with the outcome of the presidential election because “it means
that Ukraine will develop towards a market economy, towards integration with Europe,
and will become a normal country which belongs to the European region.” 7 * Scherbak
emphasized the large number of young voters “who rejected the ideas of communism.” 74
Symonenko had a different take on the outcome, stating “if these had been fair elections
then I'm 100% certain that we'd be able to claim victory.”* 0 The Central Electoral
Commission disagreed however. Vasil Spivak, a member of the commission, claimed
"there have been no serious breaches of electoral law; at least no reports of any have
reached the Central Electoral Commission.
”
sl
Kuchma blatantly abused his political position to significantly further his
reelection chances and received immense campaign funding from oligarchs. Complaints
of frequent attacks on opposition personnel and offices surfaced from all opposition
candidates. None of the opposition groups were satisfied with the degree to which these
irregularities were investigated. Though Kuchma expressed a desire to work with the
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European Union and NATO, neither economic, nor political reforms, produced much in
the way of results during his first five years in office. In December of 1999, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) told Ukraine that greater reforms must be
implemented before further financial assistance would be granted. The statement was
given after an IMF inquiry into whether loans to Ukraine should be resumed. IMF loans
have been frozen several times in the past. Authorities in Kiev acknowledged their
O')
inability to collect revenues, a condition ol the loans. ‘ After the election, the new fear
was that if things did not change disillusionment with liberalization would emerge among
the populace, mirroring neighboring Russia.
Still, Communists sought to obstruct economic reform, often through means that
differ from contemporary institutional practices in the West. In February of 2000, for
example, a fight broke out in the Rada between rival factions when one group tried to
seize the seats of a striking Communist faction, who brought a Communist flag into the
chamber. The Communists were protesting changes supported by centrists and right wing
factions, led by newly appointed Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, which would
accelerate the pace of economic reform. Interestingly enough, the left dominated Rada
had rejected Kuchma’s first choice for Prime Minister, Valery Pustoviotenko, who held
the position until the customary resignation with the presidential election. Many blamed
Pustoviotenko for Ukraine’s poverty and economic decline, which led to significant
tension between the president and the Rada in Kuchma’s first term.
Kuchma had hoped that working with the Rada would be easier in his second
term, but this was not the case. Squabbles and personality clashes created gridlock, while
Western investors lost patience and economic troubles failed to dissipate quickly enough.
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Yushchenko cast swift and serious reform as an urgent matter that could not be
overlooked any longer. “These months may turn out to be Ukraine’s last chance,” stated
Yushchenko in December of 1999, “we should all recognize the fact that all these years
the country has been living beyond its means.”' Natalya Vitrenko, representative of the
far left Progressive Socialist Party, claimed that “Yushchenko is a puppet of the IMF and
works against Ukraine’s national interests.
”
s4
The February 2000 incident continued with
the pro-reform contingent storming out of the Rada and holding alternative parliamentary
sessions in a nearby hall. At the alternative sessions a new speaker was elected, igniting
further scuffles when center and right wing members returned and were met by left wing
MP’s on a hunger strike.^ Confrontations such as these illuminate the great divisions
with Ukrainian politics at the turn of the century and by western standards, the
extraordinary use of parliamentary institutions to implement the collective will of varying
factions.
Kuchma’s brief efforts toward stabilization and reform in the early nineties had
came and went. Post-Soviet elites and oligarchs dominated the economic realm, forcing
many to find support in a grow ing underground economy. The collapse of the Russian
economy in 1998, however, frightened many oligarchs. Oligarch parliamentarian Viktor
Medvedchuk assembled a coalition of centrist and right party factions to prevent Ukraine
from external default. This helped lead to Yushchenko, the widely respected Chairman of
the Central Bank, becoming prime minister. Yushchenko appointed Yulia Tymoshenko to
all the important position of deputy prime minister of energy. As a former oligarch on the
outs with Kuchma, Tymoshenko knew the internal dynamics of the highly lucrative
energy sector. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and a handful of assistants orchestrated a
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substantial economic turnaround in 2000. A direct assault on oligarchic practices lay at
heart of this transformation.
One focus was deregulation. In contrast to much of the West, the wealthiest in
independent Ukraine tended to pay the least in tax. Immediately, Yushchenko’s
supporters eliminated 270 pieces of legislation that provided subsidies, tax, or regulatory
privileges for entrenched, oligarchic businesses. A second focus was the reduction of
barter. Barter was an important means to extract economic perks from government. In
turn, the State accepted only cash payments for goods and services. A third focus was
privatization. The government increased the private share of the economy from about
50% to 60%. Many large companies were sold, largely to Russian businessmen, who
were willing to outbid Ukrainian oligarchs. Prime Minister Yushchenko’s reforms raised
state revenues, turning the 1999 deficit into a surplus in 2000. For the first time since
independence, Ukraine experienced economic growth.
Oligarchs turned to the steel business to extract the profits previously extracted
from the gas industry. Significantly, however, rent seeking was seriously reduced,
transforming oligarchs into producers, rather than mere parasites of state resources.
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko distinguished themselves as strong political leaders
opposed to oligarchs. The Yushchenko-led efforts saved the country from default, but
only diminished the role of oligarchs, rather than remove it.
Several important changes did emerge in how business was conducted. As
enterprises became increasingly privatized, oligarchs accumulated more property and
increasingly sought to publicity defend their holdings. This led to an enhanced focus on
production and investment, a sharp contrast to past rent seeking. The courts worked
poorly in settling disputes, however, leaving partners and shareholders with few rights.
Oligarchs increasingly relied on vertical integration in order to diminish reliance on
subcontractors. As a result, enterprise ownership became highly concentrated, even more
so than Russia. Competition increased, even among giants like SCM and 1SD in Donetsk.
These changes, coupled with Ukraine’s desire for greater incorporation into the world
economy and international financial associations, brought greater transparency of
financial activity. Until 2000, there was little public knowledge regarding ownership of
major corporations. Oligarchic enterprises have since clarified corporate structures and
released organizational information, though journalists hope this is only the beginning of
such efforts.
In the first decade of independence, Kiev itself was evidence of progress. The
capital became a modern city, making the leap from strict government control to liberal
democracy. The situation was much different beyond this and other urban centers
however. Desperation was relleeted in the decreased population and the life expectancy
of males. In 1999, the life expectancy of a newborn boy was 65 years, 10 years below the
average of Western Europe, much less than in Soviet times. Meanwhile, the population of
Ukraine fell from 52 million at independence to 50 million.
Given the oligarchic nature of the regime, Ukrainians struggled to find hope. This
continues to be a problem in a society with such large divisions between rich and poor.
This sentiment is encapsulated by one young professional:
I live one day at a time. I do not want to think about what tomorrow could bring.
Our politicians will change nothing and we have stopped hoping. A few days ago 1 met
my old music teacher in the street. She had trained at the Moscow Conservatory. Now
she sells eggs to earn a living. That is what we have come to in Ukraine. 86
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In November of 2000, President Kuchma’s popularity began a steady decline. The
President was never able to recover. Moroz publicized over a thousand hours of
audiotape, produced by Kuchma’s bodyguard. The tapes documented Kuchma
orchestrating the murder ofjournalist Georhiy Gongadze and discussed Kuchma’s
criminal harassment of other political opponents and involvement in prolific corruption.
Kuchma was revealed at the center of a corrupt and criminal system of governance.
Though played only for the Rada, transcripts were soon publicized on the internet.
Gongadze was a persistent critic of the administration who mysteriously disappeared in
2000. Though Gongadze's body was later found, his decapitated head was not, nor were
the murderers brought to justice. Gongadze soon became a fallen hero whose murder was
a catastrophic event in Kuchma's political fate.
In response, Kuchma increasingly exceeded his formal powers to maintain power
in relations with oligarchs, often resorting to outright fraud and corruption. For many
analysts, Kuchma pursued neither eastern nor western agendas, but sought to rule
Ukraine as a personal fiefdom.
s
In public, Kuchma labeled the unification of opposition
parties to create forums and protests a threat to national security. This effort, called
“Ukraine without Kuchma,” was unique in the level of civic activity the movement
generated and in the cooperation generated among previously splintered coalitions. As
protests grew in frequency and size. President Kuchma described the actions as a form of
blackmail beyond the scope of law. President Kuchma stated publicly that he could not
see “a single constructive proposal from their side.”
NN
In April of 2001, the Rada passed a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister
Yushchenko’s government. The vote was secured through an alliance between
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Communists and oligarchs whose business interests were hampered by liberalization
efforts. While the vote was tallied, protesters chanted “shame, shame, Kuchma out,
Kuchma out.”'V) After the vote, Yushchenko stated that “as a citizen, 1 am convinced that
democracy in Ukraine has suffered a serious loss.”
10
Further solidifying himself as the
leader of the opposition movement, Yushchenko vowed not to retire from politics, but
leave temporarily, in order to return more powerful. Kuchma did not look favorably upon
the move. Instability and popular unrest were festering to a degree never before
experienced in independent Ukraine. In the hours prior to the decision, Kuchma, Prime
Minister Yushchenko, and parliamentary leaders held urgent negotiations in the hopes of
resolving the dispute. Despite the vote, Yushchenko remained the most popular politician
in Ukraine. According to Yushchenko, “those who voted against the Ukrainian
Government today showed that they are not ready to recognize the legal economy and
public politics as the only possible means for public development.”
01
This was a final
parting shot at parliamentary oligarchs who were essential to his dismissal.
The media was another component of Ukraine’s “suffering democracy.” Prior to
the 2002 parliamentary elections Ukrainska Pravda aired an article explaining temnyky.
Translated as "themes,” temnyky was slang for the guidelines on how television networks
should cover major stories. These guidelines were secret instructions that were regularly
sent down from the administration to state-controlled and private media outlets. An
example was as follows: “This week Viktor Yushchenko will make some statements on
his political bloc Our Ukraine. Please Ignore Them.” 160 The effect of temnysky was
evident in numerous commonalities throughout news coverage in Ukraine. Sometimes
journalists would expectedly receive reports provided for them directly from the
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presidential administration.
I( ' 1 The response by journalists included resignations,
initiation of parliamentary hearings on freedom of press, and the establishment a new
Independent Media Trade Union. The impact was minimal.
State-owned UT1 was the only network, as of 2002, which had nation wide
coverage. This is particularly significant considering that television was the main source
of information for 75% of the population. 1 f, ‘ Still, the 2002 elections provided a broader
range of media that facilitated more diverse political views than the 1998 and 1999
elections. The OSCE concluded that despite these positive developments, “Ukraine still
lacks a strong and independent media that could provide the electorate with objective
coverage of the campaign.” I(
”
Over the next several years, media networks came to self-regulate their behavior
in anticipation of government pressure. Most television stations, for example, maintained
lists of politicians the government did not want to receive publicity. This trickled down to
reporters, who avoided working with listed politicians in order to avoid confrontation
with editors. Eventually, pressure began to include the coverage of events, in addition to
personalities. This shift illuminates the uncertain nature of media restraint in Ukraine.
Under the Soviet system, the Communist Party distinguished between acceptable and
unacceptable behavior. Such clarity did not exist in the modem system of oppression. As
a result, networks were trapped in a risk/reward environment, where the reward of
staying in business was best maintained by eliminating all information that might
provoke the “key viewer,” Kuchma’s nickname among television managers. 4_
Essentially, media networks were no different than other business in the country; all were
dependent on the ultimate approval of the President.
Punishment took several forms. Government responses to minor irritations would
typieally be exclusion from the president’s press pool. More serious responses included
tax inspections, lawsuits, destruction of property, and/or disbandment. The government,
however, denied that censorship existed. Instead, the Kuchma administration described
such practices as a form of editorial policy. These efforts focused on suppressing
criticism of the current administration and information regarding top-level management
and financial backing of media outlets.
Though the 2002 elections witnessed reoccurring problems of favoritism, fraud,
and violence, the elections were significant in ending complete presidential dominance of
government. The success of Our Ukraine propelled a genuine and capable opposition
force into a position of national prominence for the first time since independence. After
five presidential vetoes, a new Election Law was finally adopted in 2001 that, according
to the OSCE, significantly enhanced how democratic elections were conducted. Some
confusion was created due to the proximity of the new law to the impending elections and
delays in coordinating new legislation with past election related laws. ^ Many provisions
in the Electoral Law promoted transparency and accountability in the electoral process,
such as the introduction of multi-party representation on various election commissions,
detailed rights of international, party, and candidate election observers, and streamlined
appeal procedures for elections commissions and related courts.
At the same time, the OSCE argued that the main weakness of the resulting
electoral framework was the failure to amend the Administrative Code, which deals with
the imposition of penalties for violations of election legislation. Kuchma objected to a
number of provisions related to campaign violations. The Rada declined to revise
contested points and instead largely acquiesced to the President's concerns. This created
a situation where some electoral rights in the Electoral Law were unable to be enforced
properly, undermining the overall fairness of the elections. M
The election was administered in a three tiered system that consisted of the
Central Election Commission, 225 District Election Commissions, and 33, 1 13 Polling
Stations Commissions (PSC). According to the OC'SE, the CEC administered the
elections in an “efficient, orderly, and timely manner.” ’ Furthermore, the OSCE
contends that most DEC’s performed well, particularly in meeting deadlines. Observers
did raise concerns that the DEC’s applied legal provisions impartially as witnessed in
20% of the DEC’s visited. Elections commissions were also hampered by a lack of
experience in electoral administration and unfamiliarity with electoral law. The OSCE
suggested this was primarily a training issue, considering only chairpersons of the PSC’s
received training.
Only political parties and blocks were able to register candidates for the
proportional component of the elections and this could only occur if the organization
registered with the Ministry of Justice at least one year prior to Election Day. This
requirement went before the Constitutional Court on March 7, 2002, but the court
declined to hear the case until after the election, fearing a judgment would be considered
“political.” Independents were permitted to run for single member districts. The CEC
registered party lists, while DEC’s registered district candidates. In contrast to past
practices, parties and candidates were no longer required to collect a minimum number of
citizen signatures. Instead, parties were required to deposit the equivalent of roughly
$50,000 (U.S.) with the CEC and candidates in district races were required to deposit the
equivalent of roughly $200 (U.S.) with DEC's. Funds deposited by parties would be
reimbursed if parties reeeived over 4% of the vote. The requirements were unsuccessfully
challenged before the Constitutional Court who ruled that this portion of the Electoral
Law (Article 43) was constitutional .
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33 parties and blocks, representing a total of 4,002 candidates, registered with the
Central Election Commission to compete for proportionally allocated seats. Another
3,504 candidates were registered to compete for district seats. There were a total of 403
incumbents, 233 representing parties and 180 independents. 69% of registered voters
took part in the election, which was monitored by 944 international observers. The fate of
President Kuchma and the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy were two highly
contentious issues. Both the Communist Party of Ukraine and the pro-Kuchma block. For
a United Ukraine (FUU), condemned what they believed to be American led support of
Our Ukraine. Critics of the president, such as Our Ukraine, appealed to concerns that
Kuchma might not relinquish power, even though the President was constitutionally
mandated to do so.
Our Ukraine won I 12 seats, more than any other party or block. 70 seats were
won through proportional representation. 42 seats were won through majority voting in
single member districts. FUU finished a close second with 102 seats. 66 seats were won
through majority voting, compared to only 36 in proportional representation. The
Communist Party of Ukraine finished a distant third with 66 seats, 59 proportional seats
and 7 majority seats. This was disappointing considering the Communists won 1 15 seats
in the previous election. The Socialist Party of Ukraine, United Social-Democratic Party
of Ukraine, and Tymoshenko’s block, all finished with just over 20 seats each, nearly all
through proportional voting. Independents won 95 seats, all in single member districts. 4S
Both Kuchma and Yushchenko quickly sought to recruit independents to support of their
respective organizations. The number of women delegates fell from 35 in 1998, to 24 in
2002, just 5% of the chamber.
Analysts concluded that the 2002 election was by far the most contentious
election since independence.
w
Less than a week after the election, the CEC received 99
complaints that requested that results in constituencies be annulled. One example
includes Roman Bezsmertnyi, a representative of Our Ukraine, who alleged that the
words “dropped out”' were stamped on across the party's name on ballots in constituency
95 in the Donetsk region. A second example includes incumbent deputy Mykola
Kovach, who represented constituency 72 in the Zakapatska region until losing to
challenger Ishtvan Haidosh. Kovach was initially declared the winner, but results at four
polling stations were later cancelled, resulting in a 40-vote loss. In addition to this
peculiar series of events, Kovach also encountered what analysts refer to as “tw in
syndrome.” This is when competitors secretly convince someone with the same name as
their primary challenger to enter the case, so that votes will be split in confusion. In this
case. Deputy Kovach was challenged by a farmer named Mykola Kovach, in addition to
Haidosh, the main opposition candidate. 10(1
According to the OSCE, campaigns w ere the most problematic aspect of the
election, despite provisions in the new Electoral Law that sought to create a fair
campaign environment. The abuse of state resources, a common feature in Ukrainian
elections, once again distorted the campaign environment. OSCE observers witnessed
improper or preferential use of state resources for campaigning purposes in a majority of
the constituencies visited. Electoral Law also prohibits the distribution of free goods and
inducements to citizens in the hopes of gain electoral support. Observers witnessed this
practice in 38 constituencies. In Lviv, for example, the local head of LUU distributed free
coal with official vehicles during working hours. In Kharkiv, members of an apartment
block were invited to receive free appliances if they would support LUU candidates. 101
Several opposition parties filed complaints regarding the obstruction of election
campaign. This was particularly pronounced in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea where
observers received complaints of obstruction in 47 constituencies. Obstruction took
several forms, including poor access to advertising resources, difficulties renting meeting
space, smear campaigns, and vandalism of campaign offices. 102 In one third of
constituencies, substantiated reports of “intimidation and undue pressure exerted on
employees of local administrations, schools, hospitals, universities, and state-owned
enterprises” were tiled.
10
' In Lugansk, for example, one association circulated a written
pledge to support the LUU and threatened that if employees did not sign, they would lose
their jobs.
Multiple acts of violence occurred during the campaign, including the murder of
Mykola Shkribliak, oblast director of the Social Democratic Party in Ivano-Lankivsk who
was shot nine times by an unidentified assailant outside of his apartment two days prior
to the election. Local authorities claimed the incident was a “contract hit” and did not
exclude the possibility of a political connection.
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Shkribliak was assistant chairman of
the oblast energy department. Roman Zvarych of Our Ukraine, Shkribliak’s primary
opponent, contended that if the murder were politically motivated, the purpose was to
invalidate the elections or cast a shadow over his name. Zvarych was bom in America
and a Ukrainian citizen in 1994. Flyers that were distributed throughout the district
suggested that Zvarych was a CIA spy, among other accusations, leading some local
papers to speculate that the CIA had something to do with the killing.
The American embassy issued a statement that this speculation was “just plain
wrong.”
1(b
Zvarych was not considered a suspect in the case. Given that Shkribliak was
an important player in the oil, gas, and timber industries, Zvarych suggested that
Shkribliak’s discussion of high level corruption involving regional elites may have been a
factor. After extensive deliberation, local election authorities decided to go ahead with
election as planned. Multiple cases of physical assault and harassment of both candidates
and campaign workers were also reported. Affiliates of the Socialist Party, Our Ukraine,
and Tymoshenko’s block were the primary targets. Incidents were reported in several
locations, including Kiev. Odessa, Rivne, Donetsk, Kirovohard, Poltava, and Lviv. 1116
The recent Election Law streamlined procedures for resolving disputes, a major
problem in the previous parliamentary election. The number of complaints was a concern
however. There were a total of 394 election-related complaints. The courts resolved most
complaints (281 ). The remaining 1 13 complaints were handled by the CEC. According to
the OSCE, 70% of complaints involved “candidate registration, the composition of
electoral commissions, undue influence against election subjects, obstruction of
campaigns, and illegal campaigning.” 10 The Ministry of Interior also received 1 76
reports of election related violations. Criminal cases were begun in 51 of these cases,
including 37 for placing campaign materials in places that violated electoral law.
The 2002 elections were a dramatic improvement for Ukrainian democracy on
several levels. The power of both the Communist Party and the President was limited by
the rise of a genuine opposition group, which was pro-Western and pro-democracy.
Despite these developments, violence and fraud were still pervasive components of the
election process, though a new Electoral Law enhanced procedures for resolving related
disputes. The stage was a set for a presidential battle between rising forces of change, led
by Yushchenko, and President Kuchma’s handpicked successor, Viktor Yanukovych.
Kuchma’s rise to power illuminated how democratic rhetoric can be effective in
democratic elections when this “democratic” candidate is pitted against a Communist.
Kuchma was no democratic reformer, but he effectively portrayed himself as one just
enough to capture sections of the country, such as Western Ukraine, that were most
inclined to support greater democratization. Ironically, however, Kuchma moved Ukraine
toward oligarchy, rather than democracy. There was no overt and widespread fear that
Ukrainians would vote out democracy, but there was no genuine democratic contender
either. This lack of ideological variance was a significant problem up until 2002.
A second problem was the fact that Ukraine had a democratic constitution and
institutions, yet without a viable legal system, independent media outlets, and
government recognized civil liberties, the formal political process was only pail of the
overall political landscape. Such lack of transparency allowed the Kuchma regime to
manipulate and steal millions of dollars in state resources over a period of several years,
with profound political implications. This illuminates a problem with transition theorists
who focus on formal mechanisms, such as the establishment of elections and institutions,
with little or no discussion of supporting mechanisms that help provide legitimacy and
support. Ukraine had a Constitution, but these civil libeilies were not regularly
recognized as a true check on political power. This suggests that elections and
institutions alone do not constitute democracy. As such, definitions of democracy should
incorporate government recognized civil liberties to some degree.
President Kuchma’s position grew increasingly tenuous after the 2002 Rada
elections. The strength of the growing opposition was evident. The opposition won 70%
of the popular vote for proportional seats. The Communist threat, which helped President
Kuchma get reelected, dissipated. At the same time, the opposition failed to create a
cohesive ruling coalition and capitalize on their success. This was due to ideological
divisions within the coalition as well as bribery and economic repression from outside
groups.
Despite the electoral success of the opposition, the Rada was as oligarchic as ever
as half the Rada was composed of loose oligarchic factions. Observers noted that
approximately 300 of 450 MP’s were millionaires (in American dollars) and compared
the Rada to the American Senate of the 1 880’s. I,,s Later that year, Yushchenko
concluded that “Ukraine has never been so close to an oligarchic system of power,”
claiming that the first stage of a coup was being cemented in the Rada. 11,4 Oligarchs had
become increasingly involved in political activity as members of the Rada, in contrast to
their past roles as predominately private businesspeople with extraordinary informal
influence on government. The prime incentives for oligarchs to pursue formal political
power were legal immunity from illegal business practices, the ability to block
undesirable legislation, and the extraction of state benefits via tax exemptions, subsidies,
trade reform, and privatization deals.
There were three main groups of oligarchs between the 2002 and 2004 national
elections. One group was led by Rinat Akmetov, who owns System Capital Management
(SCM) in the eastern oblast of Donetsk, which is by far the largest company in Ukraine.
Eastern Ukraine is the most industrialized portion of the country. Nearly on third of the
country’s richest oligarchs conduct business in the Donbas region. SCM is a holding
company that primarily produces steel, but has expanded to develop coal and mine iron
ore, as well as owning a brewery and regional media outlets. According to The
Korespondent Journal, Akemtov is the wealthiest man in Ukraine with an estimated net
worth of nearly $12 billion American and Forbes Magazine named him among the richest
people in the world in 2005. Akmetov took control of regional governance after
Yanukovych left to pursue national office in November of 2002.
A second dominant group of oligarchs was led by Viktor Pinchuk, whose
Interpipe, is the second wealthiest company in Ukraine. Interpipe is located in
Dnipropetrovsk, an oblast adjacent to Donetsk. The company produces steel pipes and
rail wheels. Pinchuk’s also owns Ukscotsbank and three televisions channels. Pinkchuk’s
net worth is estimated at $3.7 billion U.S., though the oligarch’s most notable asset is his
marriage to Leonid Kuchma’s only daughter. Akmetov and Pinchuk are the wealthiest
men in Ukraine. The political influence of these oligarchs is immense due their
extraordinary economic power and personal connections.
The holdings of the third oligarchic group. Surkis-Medvedchuk are less clear
because there is no central company around which the group is built. These oligarchs are
sometimes called the Dynamo group, after the soccer team controlled by Sutkis. Centered
in Kiev, many of the companies managed by the Surkis-Medvedchuk group are owned by
others outside the group, most notably government officials. As a result, ownership is
typically hidden through offshore headquarters and transactions. The group’s reach spans
regional electricity distribution corporations, large real estate holdings in Kiev, and the
three largest television channels in Ukraine (Inter, 1 + 1, First National Channel).
Medvedchuk, an experienced politician, has held prominent positions. These posts
enabled Medvedchuk to wield tremendous power over many government appointments,
particularly regional administrators and the Ministry of Interior. All of the three major
groups supported Yanukovych openly in the 2004 election.
Kuchma’s response to the 2002 elections was to appoint Medvedchuk as chief of
staff. Medvedchuk sought to convince businessman in the Rada to support the oligarchs.
Considering the wealth of these men, repression was a more effective tool than bribery.
Typical incursions included raids from tax police and arrests of top business managers.
Those who did not give in became increasingly dedicated to Yushchenko’s opposition to
the administration. In November of 2002, Kuchma dismissed his government and
appointed Yanukovych as Prime Minister.
Yanukovych was more popular than other aspiring oligarchs. Concerns were
quickly raised, however, over Yanukovych twice being jailed in his youth for violent
crime. Oligarchs were limited by their inability to create consensus and act in a unified
fashion. Kuchma responded to his declining public approval with increased disregard for
the law and increased corruption. Both were used as a means to preserve control. The
President increasingly sought to appear unpredictable to make oligarchs more insecure
and foster cooperation. Though highly corrupt, it would be inaccurate to describe
Kuchma as dominated by oligarchs. Rather, Kuchma's relationship with oligarchs would
be more accurately described as “symbiotic.”
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Unlike the Rada, Kuchma had long controlled the judicial branch. In 2003, for
example, Ukraine’s highest court ruled that it would be constitutional for Kuchma to
retain power as Prime Minister and downgrade the office of the presidency to a largely
ceremonial role. The Supreme Court typieally rules with the president, so the decision
was more disturbing than surprising. The opposition feared that the court's decision
would potentially pave the way for a coup. This did not happen. The court did rule,
however, that Kuchma could not be prosecuted for crimes committed while in office.
This protected the president from countless accusations of corruption involving hundreds
of millions of dollars. In addition, Kuchma could not be prosecuted in the Gongadze
murder, which he denied being a part of all along. With bleak prospects of a publicly
supported political future and immunity secure for the time being, Kuchma appeared
content to have a handpicked successor take his place. 1 1
1
The media, on the other hand, became much more difficult for Kuchma to control.
Resistance to censorship was sparked by the disappearance of Georhiy Gongadze. Fellow
journalists asserted their right to cover the investigation at the outset, often in direct
contradiction to the wishes of managers and ow ners. It was very difficult to prevent
journalists from covering a story so deeply connected to their everyday lives. This
resistance reached a breaking point with the discovery of the aforementioned audiotapes.
Though television stations largely ignored opposition rallies and the political motives
surrounding Gongadze’s murder, journalists began to fight, word by word, for greater
control over their reporting. In the face of this resistance authorities granted journalists
greater autonomy in determining the content of news reporting; however, the government
simultaneously sought to manipulate the dissemination of information to the public by
countering with false commentaries and deliberately obfuscating the investigation.
After the 2002 elections, the opposition deliberately sought to weaken the
government’s control of media. Purchasing an established network was not an option due
to cost and government obstruction. Instead, the opposition purchased NBM, a small
broadcasting company that reached twelve regions, including the Kiev, the south, and
east. When purchased, NBM’s audience consisted of 8 million Ukrainians out of a total
population of 48 million, which spanned only 30% of the country’s territory. Petro
Poroshenko controlled Channel 5, the Leninska Kuznia shipyard, Rosen chocolate
factory, and Pravda ukrayiny (Truth of Ukraine) newspaper. Channel 5 quickly gained
popularity and became the only station that aired content which diverged from the
government line.
Many factors came together to make Channel 5 successful. Talented journalists
who had resigned in the face censorship joined Channel 5. Anchors brought with them
popular followings and reputations for professional integrity. To ensure the integrity of
the working environment, journalists and owners publicly signed agreements that
guaranteed management would not interfere with the creative process. The public nature
of this process helped to gain the trust of prospective viewers. In turn, the station became
the most up to date and undistorted source of opposition news.
The format, as well as the content, differed from competing networks. Censorship
and fear made live television talk shows extinct. Channel 5 was the only station to stray
from coverage of heavily scripted political events, which held little to no substantive
information, and air live talk shows. According to a survey by the Academy of Ukrainian
Press and the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine,
news coverage in the summer prior to the 2004 presidential election was limited to a
single viewpoint nearly 90% of the time or higher for all major stations. The most limited
networks included the First National Channel (98%), Ukraine (96%), and 1 + 1 (92%)."'
This is not to say that Channel 5 blossomed without setbacks, such as inexperience, lack
of funding, and difficulties with live reporting. Still, the support of Poroshenko, coupled
with a staff of liberal minded journalists, enabled Channel 5 to successfully develop into
a relatively genuine alternative to existing television stations, a small, but important step,
toward reasserting an independent press.
The growth of civil society helped to offset restrictions on the media. The roots of
civil society in Ukraine date back to a strong tradition of analytical centers, akin to think
tanks and watchdog groups, which first emerged amidst Gorbachev’s reform efforts.
Organizations like the Razumktov Center helped to organize coalitions and political
activities in addition to their primary duties of providing policy analysis and research.
These groups were independent of government, but in contrast to Western notions of civil
society, had no leverage to keep government accountable to the people. Importantly,
however, analytic centers monitored political activity, such as voting records and media
regulation.
1,1
In addition to analytic centers, religious institutions have been an important
component of civil society in Ukraine. Some resident scholars, such as Mvroslav
Maranovich, argue that religious organizations have been the primary mechanisms of
collective mobilization.
1 14 97% of Ukrainians are Christian, but the fragmented nature of
the Orthodox tradition in Ukraine has made it nearly impossible for the government to
control religion as a whole. Furthermore, much of central and western Ukraine is rural. In
less populated and industrial areas, churches constitute the only consistent and lasting
institution. Though religious institutions are largely ignored as instruments of democracy
assistance from the West, the church has a long history of promoting national heritage
and liberalization in Ukraine, particularly in the west.
Differences between civil society in Ukraine and America reflect different
perceptions of the State. In the American tradition, limited government is among the most
important political principles. Though Americans like to complain about government
intervention in people's lives and criticize how inefficient government can be, Americans
have expected the State to provide some minimum quality of life for citizens since the
Great Depression. Even in highly conservative areas like the Great Plains, Americans will
simultaneously state strong preferences for reducing the size and spending of the national
government alongside equally strong preferences for expanding social programs. 1 ' " This
means that Americans tend to view the State as a potentially dangerous entity whose
power and scope should be limited, yet realize and appreciate that the State has the
potential do good and/or act in a way that directly benefits citizens. In Ukraine, on the
other hand, the State is largely viewed as a negative force that operates in currents of
chaos, corruption, and nepotism, rather than binding political principles beyond a shared
belief in independence.
This was immediately evident in my first political conversation with a Ukrainian
who was a language professor in Lviv. I began the conversation by asking if the
university was politically active. The professor questioned what I meant by political. 1
rephrased my inquiry to ask whether students demonstrated a strong interest in
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government. The immediate response was no, students are more interested in “doing
good” and “helping people,” which were understood as social activities, not political
activity. By no means a comprehensive assessment of the public opinion, this was
nevertheless, an insightful statement. The more people I spoke with, particularly at the
middle and lower economic level in Western Ukraine, the more I realized that Ukrainians
have very different conceptions of government than in America. This is particularly
poignant considering that Western Ukraine is the most nationalistic part of the country.
Ukrainians often laughed and described Ukrainian politics as circus-like. Ukrainians have
very serious concerns about the fate of their country, but conversations such as these
suggest that Ukrainians seldom believe that government has the will or the means to work
toward the benefit of society.
Such attitudes began to change with the 2004 presidential elections. Kuchma’s
connection to the murder of Georhiy Gongadze quickly propelled the unpopular leader's
fall from power. In April of 2000, Gongadze had created a web forum entitled Ukrainska
Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), which published investigative pieces on Ukrainian politics and
business. Gongadze was critical of President Kuchma on a variety of fronts, including his
inability to prevent Lazerenko from fleeing the country. In June of 2000, Gongadze wrote
an open letter to the prosecutor general claiming that he was forced into hiding because
of harassment by the secret police. Gongadze disappeared on his way home the night of
September 16 lh . On September 20 th
,
the International Press Institute informed President
Kuchma that they were deeply worried about the whereabouts of Gongadze. The Rada
then created a special commission to investigate Gongadze's disappearance. On
November 2nd a decapitated coipse was found near Tarashcha, 75 miles north of Kiev.
Gongadze's colleagues helped identity the body by describing shrapnel wounds
Gongadze received from work in his native Georgia. When preparations were being made
to move the body to Kiev, the body was reported missing from the morgue. At first the
prosecutor’s office questioned whether the corpse was Gongadze, then acknowledged the
body was in police possession.
On November 28 th
,
Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz played the audio tapes for
Rada in which Kuchma discussed Gongadze with Interior Minister Yuri Kravchenko.
Kuchma allegedly rants “Drive him out! Throw him out! Give him to the Chechens!”
Mykola Melnychenko, one of Kuchma's bodyguards, recorded over 1,000 hours of tapes
in all. Melnychenko’s defection was monumental in turning public opinion against
President Kuchma. The tapes constituted verifiable evidence of the President’s role in
Gongadze's death and a host of other illegal activities. The Kuchma administration
claimed the insinuations surrounding the tapes were groundless and threatened to press
charges on the basis of slander. Secret services members expressed doubt that one of their
own would produce such tapes. Later, however, the President admitted the voice on the
tape was his, but claimed the tapes were edited to rearrange the words. Demonstrations
against Kuchma began in December of 2002 as prosecutors questioned the President and
related officials.
Several factors led to public demonstrations against Kuchma. One factor was the
increasing political instability surrounding the President’s involvement in Gongadze’s
murder case and the resulting lack of government support. Simply having public officials
question the President’s legitimacy constituted a political crisis because of the vast power
of presidency to that point. This led to sharp polarization between the status quo and
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growing opposition in search of change. A second factor was the lack of effective
institutional mechanisms to resolve the crisis. The public was informed of the Gondadze
investigation, particularly in urban centers like Kiev where the Melnychenko tapes could
be bought. At the same time, official press and television networks were quiet and/or
controlled, the Rada was deadlocked over how to proceed, and everyone knew law'
enforcement was under the president's control. This left few options for increasingly
discontent citizens to influence the course of government, but the streets.
Young members of the Socialist Party were the first to pitch tents in Maidan and
to undertake the first mass demonstration. Other groups, like the Ukrainian National
Assembly and Young Communists, quickly followed suit, coming together from opposite
sides of the political spectrum. The unifying slogan of the movement became “Ukraine
without Kuchma.” The imprisonment of Tymoshenko in February of 2001, coupled with
the dismissal of Yushchenko as Prime Minister in April of 2001, significantly accelerated
organizational efforts for change.
Between April of 2001 and the Rada elections in March of 2002, civic
organizations increasingly worked w ith the opposition. During this time, civil society
organizations provided assistance in efforts to mobilize voters, monitor polling stations,
and conduct exit polls that could be used to judge the legitimacy of official results. The
important difference in civil society organizations before and after 2000 was their
willingness to cooperate. Prior to the Kuchma/Gongadze affair civic organizations tended
to be much more protective of their activities in order to preserve relationships with
Western donors. After the election, civil groups grew' in number and scope, particularly
among young people.
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Important youth groups like Pora. Cysta Ukraina (Clean Ukraine), and Znayu (I
Know) were formed from young people who had previously participated in the Za Pravdu
campaign or were active in similar organizations like the Ukrainian Youth Association or
Plast, the Ukrainian scouting organization. The new youth groups shared the assumption
that to be successful methods needed to be more innovative, active, and confrontational
than in the past. Pora, for example, had two wings with different levels of intensity,
though the groups often worked together during training and protests. The goal of Yellow
Pora was to ensure a legitimate electoral process by training and organizing young
activists. Black Pora was more intense and sought to challenge the government’s
authority on the frontlines through civil obedience tactics inspired by the Serbian youth
group Otpar.
1
There was a significant gap in age and perception between the Kuchma
administration and many of those at Maidan. The older generation came from Ukraine’s
Communist legacy and displayed a level of ignorance, even arrogance, toward the fact
that popular pressure could be powerful enough to influence important political decisions.
In contrast, the younger generation was largely born in the 1980’s and did not exhibit a
fear of authorities like their elders did. Many traveled west as tourists, students, or
workers, not east to the CIS. These experiences produced exposure to different societies
and influences, foreign to the older generation.
Ironically, President Kuchma, himself, inspired many young Ukrainians to
become active, rather than remain apathetic. This new attitude was enhanced by new
technologies. Young activists relied on modem communication methods, like cell phones
to talk, text message, even film unsuspecting members of government engaging in
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questionable activities. The internet was not subjected to the same restraints as television,
which enabled critical discussions of contemporary politics and the timely dissemination
of information.
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Young activists were particularly talented at using humor as a tool of
mobilization. In Kiev, for example, activists dressed up in prison uniforms and
campaigned for Yanukovych on Khreshchatyk, the main thoroughfare that is closed to
cars on weekends. Another prevalent medium was political cartoons and jokes. One
common joke was: Why have relations in prisons improved lately? Because each
prisoner is concerned that his or her neighbor could be the next president. In addition to
Yanukovych’s criminal past, these efforts tended to portray Yanukovych as intellectually
challenged. The former Prime Minister was often chided for his use of criminal slang and
alleged illiteracy, evident in the numerous grammatical mistakes discovered in his
candidate registration documents and his habit of signing his name as “professor.”
Yanukovych's image as a physically imposing man was forever tarnished when a
protester in Ivana Frankivsk threw an egg at him. The egg hit Yanukovych in the face and
knocked him down and/or caused him to faint. Either way, Yanukovych’s fall was
videotaped. In a severe political miscalculation, Yanukovych’s people claimed that it was
a brick, not an egg which was thrown.
Another equally bizarre incident involved Yanukovych’s wife, Lyudmila. After a
visit to Kiev during the electoral dispute, Lyudmila made a speech in their home oblast of
Donetsk where she explained that the Orange Revolution was a conspiracy. The United
States drugged oranges so that protestors would crave oranges. As a result, she alleged
the capital was full of drug crazed Ukrainians wanting more and more oranges. Like the
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previous incident, the speech was filmed and clips sent throughout the country via the
Internet.
Polls reflect that Ukrainians believed that Moroz and Yushchenko were the two
candidates most likely to defend the country’s national interests above clans, while
Yanukovych placed at the bottom of the list of contenders when rating levels of morality
and intellect. ' In January of 2002, Prosecutor General Mykailo Potebenko asserted that
DNA testing confirmed with 99% certainty that the corpse in question was Gongadze.
President Kuchma expressed his “deepest condolences” to Gongadze's family in an open
letter published in Financial Times
,
a London newspaper. In the letter, Kuchma explained
that he did not know Gongadze, but was aware of Gongadze’s criticisms of him.
According to Kuchma, Gongadze was not the government’s most vicious critic. In turn,
Gongadze's death, though tragic, should not be grounds for political adversaries to accuse
him of murder.
Studies of public opinion after the 2002 elections revealed that Ukrainians did not
trust Kuchma. In fact, a study conducted by the Academy of Science’s Institute of
Sociology revealed that 16% of Ukrainians trusted astrologers compared to just 13%
trusted the president.
1 14 Few Ukrainians trusted authorities to conduct free and fair
elections (20%) and most (58%) believed future elections would in fact not be free or
fair. ~ The electorate was mobilized by a lack of faith that existing institutions would
operate legitimately. As a result, many more became politically active out of desire to
prevent Yanukovych from taking office, more than belief in Yushchenko or his policies.
Prior to the 2004 election, an overwhelming amount of Ukrainians (84%) believed
they had a right to protest publicly if electoral fraud occurred, while only 6% did not.
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Furthermore, 67% of Ukrainians supported taking action against oligarchs. 121 Centrist
oligarchs were aware of the growing animosity toward them and realized it was entirely
possible Ukrainians could come to entertain the idea of an anti-oligarch coup. Oligarchs
mostly belonged to parties that supported Yanukovych, but in private some rode the fence
or favored either Moroz or Yushchenko. Divisions emerged among oligarchs, who
traditionally sought to maintain tight connections with the incumbent administration.
Some oligarchs preferred greater integration with the West, while other others preferred
greater integration with Russia. Socially, civic nationalism became an important element
of mobilization in central and western Ukraine. Civic groups rallied around the notion of
rejoining Europe abroad and promoting European values at home. These underlying
divisions in Ukrainian society rose to the surface in late 2004.
The 2004 election was guided by a new Presidential Election Law which came
into force in April of 2004 and a new law relating to the CEC was adopted in June of
2004. In contrast to past election laws, the Presidential Election Law received widespread
support in the Rada. The new law incorporated several OSCE suggestions, though several
concerns remained. Positive developments included efforts toward greater transparency,
such as permitting election observers to accompany the transportation of ballot boxes.
Concerns ranged from limits on free expression to granting parties certain advantages
self-nominated candidates did not have.
Potential candidates were required to pay a registration fee of 500,000 UAH by
August 6th, which is approximately 80,000 euro. If a candidate received more than 7% of
the votes, this fee would be reimbursed. 26 candidates sought registration, but 18 were
denied because required documents violated legal provisions. The remaining candidates
were then required to submit a minimum of 500,000 valid signatures in support of their
nomination. Election observers in 15 out of 27 regions received complaints that public
employees were pressured by their superiors to sign for particular candidates. Though the
CEC was required by law to verify all signatures, no particular procedure was specified,
and this requirement was largely ignored.
Yanukovych’s presidential campaign emphasized his current power as Prime
Minister and heavily relied on ceremony and imagery reminiscent of the Soviet past. The
campaign centered upon greater integration with Russia, both economically and
culturally. Ukraine had decreased trade with Russia from nearly all trade to about one-
quarter, while much of eastern Ukraine is fearful of western nationalists. Much has been
made of sharp division between east and west in Ukraine. Yanukovych is the epitome of
a pro-Russian, pro-managed democracy, politician of the east, in contrast to
Yushchenko’s more nationalistic, more liberal, pro-American, politician of the west.
Regardless of these divisions, support from central Ukraine, particularly the capital, is
essential to political success at the national level. Contrary to traditional impressions,
Yushchenko is not from western Ukraine, but a native of the Sumy region in the
northeast. Early in the presidential campaign, Yushchenko adopted a pragmatic approach
that was determined to build his base from the bottom up. Yushchenko’s main slogan
emphasized idealism (“I believe”), voter comprehension of publicly withheld information
(“1 know”), and confidence, despite many obstacles (“we can”). Yushchenko focused
heavily on attacking a corrupt status quo, claiming that the fair distribution of recent
economic growth was being impeded. Yushchenko also reminded voters that under his
tenure as prime minister higher wages and pensions were made possible through stricter
government control of oil and gas barons.
The nature of the campaign raised serious questions regarding the commitment of
Ukrainian authorities to hold democratic elections. According to the OSCE, “the
authorities did not attempt to create conditions that ensure a free expression of
opinions.” ' Though the voters had a genuine choice between multiple candidates, the
campaign was highly divisive with a large amount of inflammatory material and rhetoric.
President Kuchma did not campaign for Yanukovych, but also did not take action to
prevent or condone blatant misuse of State resources to support the incumbent Prime
Minister. The OSCE concluded that even though a number of campaign events were held
by a variety of candidates and their supporters, “fundamental freedoms necessary for a
meaningful election process were at times infringed upon.”'“4 In turn, the multiple acts of
coercion, intimidation, and obstruction led election observers to claim that the
prerequisites for free and fair elections were violated. The most memorable of these acts
of violence w as the attempted murder of Yushchenko, who was mysteriously
administered a near lethal dose of poison, which scars his face to this day.
The election was administered through a three-tiered system. The Central Election
Commission was the only permanent election administration body in the Ukraine. The
president appointed the 15 members of the CEC to a 7-year term on February 7, 2004.
The president chose members from a list provided by parliamentary political groups. The
CEC then appointed and supervised 225 Territorial Election Committees (TECs). TECs
organized the electoral process in 225 districts and appointed members to 33,000 Polling
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Stations Committees. PSCs were responsible for the administration of the polls on
election days.
According to the OSCE, the CEC lacked transparency and did not demonstrate a
genuine desire to conduct democratic elections. This was evident in several ways: 1 ) the
CEC did grant relief on legitimate complaints; 2) the CEC failed to effectively supervise
TECs, who selectively enforced electoral laws; 3) the CEC failed to establish transparent
and accountable practices for creating, distributing, and collecting absentee ballots; and
4) the CEC modified electoral data after the first round of voting. These just some of the
several examples of negligence provided by the OSCE. 1 '
The first round of voting was a dead heat between Yushchenko and Yanukovych
who both received 39% of the vote. Kuchma triumphantly declared that the “authorities
will never allow an aggressive minority to dictate the political logic
1
' of Ukraine’s
future.
1 '6 Kuchma figured that Ukrainians would respond passively to egregious fraud as
in the past. As early as 2000, however, polls demonstrated that managed democracy was
at odds with Ukrainian voters, 75% of whom favored greater democratization. Just 16%
ol Ukrainians considered their country a democracy, while 59% did not.
A run off election, as required in the Constitution, was to be held between the top
two candidates on November 21 st . The Yushchenko camp was convinced that they would
w in a legitimate election and anticipated clashes with authorities. Former opposition MP
Taras Stetskiv, spokesperson for Yushchenko’s strategists, claimed that plans for mass
demonstrations were started a year prior to the election. Opposition efforts focused on
spreading their belief that government would seek to overturn a legitimate Yushchenko
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victory. The opposition purchased relevant supplies, such as tents, mobile military
kitchens, and old buses, to be used as barricades.
The response plan had two components: train thousands of activists to lead
protests and devise ways to get concerned voters to the streets. Because media coverage
of Yushchenko’s campaign was practically nonexistent and tightly controlled by
government, mass rallies and face-to-face meetings were commonly used to build support
and create regional hubs of support. Again technology was instrumental in these efforts.
During the rally on September IK, 2004, for example, satellites beamed Yushchenko’s
campaign speech to 25 giant screens throughout the country. These virtual rallies were
instrumental in creating broad based support within the confines of a government-
1 8
controlled media.
Official results of the second round stated that Yanukovych (49.46%) defeated
Yushchenko (46.61%). The following day the CEC declared Yanukovych the winner.
Yushchenko refused to accept the outcome, which prompted supporters to flood Maiden
despite frigid temperatures. Channel 5 was the only channel to broadcast on site when
unrest and civil disobedience emerged. Commitment to coverage without interference
began on November 25, 2004. Ironically, the deaf were among the first to become aware
of the truth. Natalia Dmytruck, a sign language interpreter on state television, ignored the
scripted text regarding the election results, instead scripting:
The official results from the Central Election Commission have been falsified. Do
not trust them. Yushchenko is our president. I’m really sorry that 1 had to translate
lies before. 1 will not do this again. I’m not sure if I will see you again.
Dmytruk's statement was followed by similar declarations on other channels. For
the first time, the opposition movement was shown on nation television and government-
controlled stations portrayed Yushchenko in a positive light. Maidan soon became the
focus of Ukrainian television, as well as politics. Channel 5, which broadcasted directly
from Maidan, rose to the 3 ul most popular station in the country. 1
Yanukovych pressed Kuchma to take direct action, but most elite remained risk-
averse. On November 21 st
,
for example, there was no attempt to seize control of Maidan
even though Yushchenko asked the crowds to go home for the night. Instead, authorities
assumed that inclement weather would reduce the number of protesters. This
demonstrated “the semi-authoritarian nature of the Kuchma regime” in that “its first
instinct was not to crack heads, but to consult the weather forecast.” 1
' 1
At the same time,
there were several reports that violent measures were seriously considered. Over 1 0,000
troops were deployed to Maidan under Serhii Pophov, the head of internal forces, and
supposedly supplied with live ammunition and tear gas. The lights were turned off on the
22 nd
,
but the crowd of 100,000 did not disperse. The following day some 30,000
1
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Yanukovych supporters were brought to Kiev from the Donbas.
After reviewing an appeal by the opposition, the Supreme Court decided to
suspend publication of the election results, which would have made them official, in
order to allow time for an investigation. Amidst the growing turmoil, Yanukovych and
Yushchenko tried, but failed, to negotiate a resolution to the electoral dispute. A major
sticking point was Yushchenko’s demand for a new election. The Rada passed a non-
binding vote of no-confidence in the electoral commission and symbolically declared the
election invalid. Pro-Yushchenko supporters surrounded government buildings in Kiev.
President Kuchma, a major supporter of Yanukovych, declared that new elections would
be necessary to resolve the stand off. Ukraine was stuck in a political stalemate.
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The Supreme Court broke the deadlock on December 3 rd when the Court annulled
the election results. The decision “dropped all pretence of equivocation, and of ‘equal
fraud on all sides,’ and squarely blamed the authorities.” 1 " The Court declared that
numerous legal violations occurred. These included the unlawful formation and
verification of voter lists, the unlawful intrusion of government officials into the electoral
process, and the unequal access to mass media. Taken collectively, the Court decided that
such violations excluded the possibility that the results were a credible and accurate
reflection of the Ukrainian electorate. The decision could not be appealed and changed
the dynamics of the political confrontation among major players.
Tymoshenko and other prominent supporters of Yushchenko became less inclined
to accept an emerging comprise plan that sought to exchange a new election for
constitutional reform with limits on presidential power after one year. Conversely, the
regime did not simply cave, though their options were more limited. Yanukovych could
decide not to participate in a new election, which would prevent Yushchenko from
obtaining a popular mandate, or create a sufficient amount of fraud that the Supreme
Court would be faced with the prospect of invalidating another election. Kuchma,
however, was most concerned with ensuring his immunity and financial security.
Yushchenko verbally offered both several times, but things were complicated by
Kuchma's escalating material requests and the lack of long term guarantees. All involved
realized that the longer the crisis went on, the greater chance of economic fallout due to
trade disruption, falling confidence in currency, and the plundering of resources bv the
old guard.
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An agreement was reached on December 8 lh in the Rada. Deputies passed a
“packet” of constitutional reform that included a new election law, local government
reform, shifting of powers at the national level, and Kuchma's agreement to fire the
prosecutor general and chair of the Election Commission. Yaroslav Davydovych became
the new chair of the CEC and on December 15 Ih the 225 TEC's and 33,000 Polling
Station Commissions were reconstituted on a bipartisan basis with equal representation
for Yushchenko and Yanukovych. To remedy past problems with absentee voting,
those eligible were limited to the disabled and immobile. Local government reform called
for direct election of local leaders, rather than being appointed by the President as was the
case since 1994. At the national level, MP's would serve for five years, not four, and be
elected solely via proportional representation with a reduction in the minimum threshold
from 4% to 3%. Those elected had to serve an “imperative mandate,” which meant that if
a newly elected representative switched parlies, their party mandate would be lost.
Deputies were also prohibited from holding other well-paid positions or serve in other
government positions.
The most popular party or group of parties was supposed to form a “coalition of
deputy factions,” in other words, a governing majority. If this did not occur, the President
would be permitted to dissolve the Rada. How a majority should be formally recognized
was unclear, which created problems in 2007 when the President dissolved the Rada. The
Rada would propose candidates for Prime Minister, but the President ultimately selected
a nominee for Rada approval. The Rada would appoint half the Constitutional Court,
rather than one-third, and the President would appoint the other half. The Prime Minister
would select the overall composition of the national government, including the heads of
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the State Property Committee, which was responsible for privatization, and the
Television and Radio board, pending Rada approval. The President, meanwhile, retained
the power to propose the Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1 °
Yushchenko had campaigned on a platform that advocated a stronger role for the
Rada in the hopes this would strengthen Ukrainian democratic development. Clearly, the
series of reforms did just that. Ukraine had certainly struggled, democratically speaking,
under strong executives, so at the time the reforms appeared to be in the long term
interests of Ukrainian democracy. Ironically, however, Yushchenko was well positioned
to be elected head of the executive branch and problems of overlapping powers between
the Prime Minister and President would create future conflicts between the same two men
well after the election.
Yushchenko triumphed in the third and final presidential contest, with 52% of the
vote compared to 44% for Yanukovych. Fraud was significantly reduced and mostly
occurred in the East, which made it very difficult for Yanukovych to question the results.
Yushchenko took every oblast in the west and center, whereas Yanukovych took every
oblast in the east and south. Yushchenko did not win in a landslide. In fact, the results
closely resembled what many observers believed were the actual results from the
November 21 s1 election. 1,6 For the first time in Ukrainian independence, the public will
was genuinely reflected in a free and fair election process. Many believed with great
optimism that the new government elected via the Orange Revolution would produce
important and lasting change.
Looking back at Kuchma’s demise, it becomes clear that “soft" authoritarianism
can crumble under popular pressure if the authoritarian leader chooses not to use force to
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ensure the desired outcome of an uncertain political situation. Kuchma and his supporters
were more than willing to lie, cheat, and steal their way through elections and economic
liberalization. Being responsible for mass bloodshed on the streets of the capital was
another matter however. There was certainly a risk this would happen, and Ukraine came
fairly close to such an outcome, yet Kuchma never gave the order to forcefully remove
the protesters. This suggests that civic activity is a very important part of democratic
development, particularly in semi-authoritarian regimes that promote an underwhelming
status quo, yet do not rely on massive violence and coercion to maintain power. In
Ukraine, there appeared to be a tipping point for regime that corresponded with a level of
comfort regarding overt violence on the part of the State.
The legacy of Cold War geopolitics, coupled with the Communication
Revolution, showered the Orange Revolution with international attention and prompted
powerful States in the region and beyond to get involved in some fashion. This points to
another problem with transition theorists who predominantly focus on elections and
institutions. In the age of globalization, the political context is not limited to domestic
influences and concerns. As a result, to best understand democratic development scholars
of comparative political development should appreciate the significant influences that
international forces on democratic development. In doing so, scholarship would be better
served by taking into account which external actors are seriously involved in the
transition process and what incentives and disincentives are available for political leaders
to choose one path of development as opposed to competing visions.
The Orange government was simply unable to live up to their own expectations
and the ones placed on them by their followers. As Andrew Wilson puts it, “a political
140
and economic was promised,” but “it seemed unlikely that Ukraine would stage some
great cathartic trial, or ‘Truth and Reconciliation Process,’ like South Africa after
apartheid.
1
' The outgoing administration convinced Yanukovych to embark on a long
appeals process so they could “settle last minute accounts” and “destroy as many
documents as they could.” 1
' s
Hundreds of printed documents, audio cassettes, and video
cassettes were submitted to the CEC. Many complaints were simply duplicates of other
complaints.
Yanukovych resigned as Prime Minister as was replaced with Mykola Azarov,
who was largely responsible for securing Kuchma’s retirement benefits. These included a
full presidential salary, the use of state dacha 72 and its staff, an adviser, two assistants,
two cars, four drivers, free travel, free medical care for him and his wife, and half off his
electric bill, all of which would be paid by the State for life. 19 The new government
would soon seek to modify this lofty package, but they had problems of their own. The
secret Force of the People Agreement signed by Yushchenko and Tymoskenko in July of
2004 was leaked to the public. The first clause stated that Tymoshenko would get the first
shot at Prime Minister with the Yushchenko using “the ‘force of his personal moral
authority’ to ensure that Our Ukraine deputies would join the Tymoshenko bloc to
support her candidacy ‘in full.”' 140 The second clause stated that 55% of government
positions would be filled by Our Ukraine and 23% for the Tymoshenko block. The
process by which Tymoshenko assumed her new position as Prime Minister reminded
many Ukrainians of past political appointments premised on secret deals that lacked
transparency that did not fit well with the spirit of the Revolution, nor Tymoshenko's
corruption in past stints in public service.
141
The unrealistically lofty rhetoric of the new administration did not keep pace with
realities on the ground. In February of 2005, for example, Yushchenko declared that he
wanted the Gangadze affair to be solved within a few months. These hopes were dashed
when Yurii Kravchenko, the former interior minister, shot himself hours prior to when he
was supposed to provide evidence to authorities. A second example is how Yushchenko
triumphantly declared that government would be separated from business, but as Andrew
Wilson points out, “all of Our Ukraine’s key financiers had key jobs.” 141 Oligarch Petro
Poroshenko became the new head of the National Security and Defense Council and
Yevchen Chervonenko became the new head of the corruption-plagued transportation
ministry, while he operated a transport business of his own. This led many to wonder
whether new oligarchs would try to recover the losses their businesses had experienced
over the past couple of year. In addition to fanciful rhetoric, several undemocratic
political behaviors persisted under the new government. Yushchenko, for example,
adopted Kuchma’s practice of issuing secret decrees and issued 40 of them during his
first two months. Without a political agenda in place, many of the decrees were hasty and
confirmed suspicions that victory came as a surprise to the new political leadership. 14_
Not surprisingly, tensions soon emerged within the new government over sticky
issues, such as re-privatization. Yushchenko was critical of the privatization process, but
not the goal, and wanted the State to purchase privatized enterprises and sell them via
open competition for fair prices. The Cabinet, on the other hand, favored immediate re-
privatization of particularly suspect transactions, such as the sale of the steel mill at
Kryvorizhstal, which was sold to Pinchuk and Akmetov for $800 million despite a
competing bid of $1.5 billion. Tymoshenko called for thousands of re-privatizations
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whereas Yushchenko spoke of dozens. The fact of the matter was that new political
leaders were not strong enough to get bogged down in a major battle over redistribution.
Furthermore, the erosion of property rights in favor of retrospective justice would very
likely scare away Western investors. As a result, it appears that re-privatization will be
limited to a few select cases and as a result, old oligarchs will retain most of their
holdings.
There is little doubt that Yushchenko’s administration will better serve democratic
development in Ukraine than his predecessor. At the same time, the long term
sustainability and effectiveness of the Orange Coalition is far from certain. Wherever
Ukraine heads from its current crossroads, the country has certainly not been a model of
efficient democratic transition throughout the first fifteen years of independence. This
conclusion raises the question of exactly how effective elections and institutions were
during this formative period of Ukrainian development. If the core principles of transition
theory are valid, one would expect that elections would play a significant role in
promoting the peaceful and legitimate transfer of political power, political institutions
would play a significant role in promoting stable and representative government, and
economic institutions would play a significant role in promoting stable and sustained
economic growth. This has not been the case.
The first six national elections fulfilled several indicators of legitimate and
peaceful transitions of power. Elections were held frequently: 1994, 1998. 1999, 2002,
2004. All elections required by the Constitution were held without postponement or
cancellation. The 1994 presidential election was the only instance where significant
political forces openly advocated postponing pending elections, but this was a unique.
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unpopular and unsuccessful effort on behalf of President Kravchuk. Electoral turnout has
been consistently strong, evident in how both parliamentary and presidential elections
consistently produced turnouts of well over a simple majority. The average turnout for
parliamentary elections is 70% of registered voters, which is over double the turnout for a
typical Congressional election in the United States.
14
' This suggests that elections are a
normal component of Ukrainian politics in which much of the public regularly
participates in. Ukrainians have widely accepted the results of elections, even fraudulent
ones, aside from 2004.
All candidates in post-independence national elections were also selected in
processes that were open to the mass public. Though there were some restrictions on
candidates, such as the collection of a certain amount of signatures, these did not
significantly prevent candidates from being selected. More recent requirements of
financial deposits to register candidates and parties, as witnessed in the 2002 elections,
are more problematic because the requirement can effectively prevent less affluent
segments of the population from registering as candidates. Financial deposits, which are
reimbursed if electoral thresholds are met, do constitute a fairly significant amount of
money for many Ukrainians ($200 U.S. for district candidates). At the same time,
Ukrainian politicians, like Western politicians, tend to be much wealthier than society as
a whole so that candidate deposits are not beyond the reach of most aspiring candidates.
The first six national elections also failed, however, to fulfill several indicators of
legitimate and peaceful transitions of power. First, electoral oversight has been
inconsistent and often ineffective. Electoral commissions, the primary mechanisms of
electoral oversight, exercise significant power, but do not have an independent and
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constitutionally protected base of power. As a result, other components of government,
such as the President and Rada, have strongly influenced and/or manipulated the
composition and activities of electoral commissions to the detriment of democratic
development. In the 1994 election, for example, Rada party leaders appointed electoral
commissioners and the Rada leaders were Communist elites that secured power in the
undemocratic elections of 1990. Meanwhile, the Rada failed to determine the selection
process for the Supreme Court, which crippled the role of the judicial branch in solving
constitutional and legal issues. As a result, electoral administration and oversight have
largely been the responsibility of the same institution: electoral commissions.
This runs counter to American notions of popular government, such as the ideas
articulated in Federalist #5 1, which contend that powers should be divided into separate
branches with separate purposes and sources of power so that competition among
branches will limit one branch from abusing power. In Ukraine, central and district
commissioners have been incapable or unmotivated to resolve disputes in a legitimate
and transparent manner for much of the fifteen years since independence. Though
subsequent electoral laws have sought to reform electoral commissions, new problems
emerged in the form ofjurisdictional disputes between the commissions and courts, voter
confusion regarding appeal processes, and a lack of standardization in dealing with
electoral complaints and confirmed violations.
Second, the nature and extent of violence and fraud in Ukrainian elections have
not reflected legitimate and peaceful transitions of power typically found in established
democracies. Fraudulent activities included ballot stuffing, invalidation of legitimate
ballots, preferential treatment for certain political groups and leaders, defamation,
intimidation, coercion, and illegal imprisonment. All elections experienced the
inappropriate use of state resources toward political ends. Most elections did not
accurately reflect an electoral process of one person, one vote. Without an effective legal
system, political crime and violence in Ukraine was systematic in scope and shrouded in
mystery. Candidates, supporters, and political figures regularly experienced physical
assault and destruction of property. The most prolific case was the poisoning of Viktor
Yushchenko during the 2004 presidential campaign, which according to public
knowledge, was never solved.
Third, Ukraine has experienced high levels of media favoritism contrary to
Ukrainian law and to the detriment of legitimate and peaceful transitions of power. Under
Kuchma, the media was used as a means to preserve and expand the power of the
incumbent president. This was most evident in secret government policies designed to
shape the content of media coverage and the various forms of legal and financial
government harassment of independent networks. After 2005, the press has regained
freedoms lost throughout the post-Soviet period. In many ways, however, major media
outlets exist as a tool of wealthy interests to further specific political outcomes, rather
than serve as a genuinely independent collection of various viewpoints.
Fourth, candidates have not represented stable and principled political parties, nor
presented a sufficient degree of ideological variance. A disproportionately powerful
executive dominated the political landscape from Kravchuk to Yushchenko. Ideological
variance emerged surrounding the 2002 Rada elections as Yushchenko and Tymoshenko
began to establish themselves as genuinely opposed to the Kuchma regime. Ideological
variance intensified prior to the 2004 presidential elections and solidified after the Orange
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Revolution. Even with ideological variance, parties have a long way to go before
becoming stable and principled. Unfortunately, the most apparent ways in which
Ukrainian parties have adopted Western norms have not been positive.
The term "black PR" has been used to describe the ways in which Ukrainian
parties have duplicated, and in some cases Hat out hired. Western marketing and
advertising agencies to discredit opponents via mass media. Given the large percentage of
television watched by Ukrainians nationwide, competing politicians have become very
image conscious at the expense of substance. When watching television in Ukraine it is
very clear who the owner of each television station supports based on the frequent and
monolithic support of a particular candidate in advertising spots. Though competing
parties experience greater freedom to operate after 2004, many parties still operate
around the will of a single candidate, typically the creator, rather than principled
organizations of public will.
In considering these ten indicators as a whole, it becomes clear that elections have
been highly ineffective in promoting the peaceful and legitimate transition of power in
Ukraine from 1991 to 2006. Even with frequent elections that witnessed popularly
selected candidates, high voter turnout, and wide acceptance of results, comprehensive
empirical assessments demonstrate that competitions for power and transitions of power
were neither legitimate nor particularly peaceful. This strongly suggests that the mere
existence of elections do not necessarily promote the peaceful and legitimate transition of
power. This raises the question of whether experiences with institutional development
mirror the trajectory and results of electoral development or exhibit different patterns of
behavior.
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When effective, democratic institutions fundamentally promote stable and
representative government in the political realm. Ukraine experienced some indicators of
effective institutional operation. Ukraine adopted a democratic constitution and has
experienced wide acceptance of the new political system. Though Ukraine was the last
former Soviet republic to do so, the historic document was the product of intense
negotiations between Rada deputies. Ukraine was officially constituted as a “sovereign
and independent, democratic, social, law-based state.” The political system was a
“republic” in which state power is “exercised on the principles of its division into
legislative, executive, and judicial power.” The “main duty of the state” is to “affirm and
ensure human rights and freedoms.” Though a large amount of significant political
activity in Ukraine has taken place outside of constitutional boundaries, the existence of a
democratic framework has helped to promote stable and representative government by
the new structure of government it has provided.
Ukraine has also failed to experience several indicators of effective institutional
operation. Under Kuchma, there was no meaningful role for the opposition throughout
much of the post-Soviet period because of cooption and coercion. This changed in early
part of the new century as Kuchma’s popularity plummeted and fully reversed under the
post-revolution government. Ironically, the current problem is particularly divisive
opposition between now Prime Minister Yankovych and President Yushchenko. High
levels of corruption have not changed, however, and remain a systematic problem with
no clear corrective course in sight. Even current reform leaders, such Tymoshenko, have
political roots in the most dishonest comers of Ukrainian politics. Violence, like
corruption, has plagued institutional operation in Ukraine. Prominent political figures
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have disappeared throughout the post Soviet period. Some, like Mykhailo Boyehyshyn,
have never to been heard from again. Others, such as Georhiy Gongadze, were later
found decapitated, apparently in fulfillment of the wishes of the chief executive.
As a whole, democratic institutions were largely ineffective in promoting stable
and representative government from 1991 to 2006.Though some basic formal indicators
did exist, such as the adoption of a new constitution and wide acceptance of the new
political system, institutional operation in Ukraine has been unable to overcome the
corruption and related problems inherited from their Soviet past and recreated during the
transition process. Institutional operation in Ukraine has not been a transparent and
representative process undertaken within the confines of the Ukrainian constitution and
laws. Without the establishment of a genuinely independent judiciary and rule of law, this
does not look to change in the near future, regardless of whether the reform forces remain
in power or not. Unfortunately democratic institutions were no more helpful in promoting
economic development, another very important component of the Ukrainian transition
process.
Economic development in post-Soviet Ukraine could be understood in three five-
year periods. The first period ( 1991-1995) witnessed widespread instability and economic
demise. The real gross domestic product (GDP) steadily declined till finally bottoming
out in 1994 with a 23% drop from the previous year. Development was severely
inhibited by a lack ofnew elite able to manage a capitalist economy. Many political
leaders in independent Ukraine were career politicians who adapted themselves to a new
framework of government, but offered little in the way of innovative thinking or
experience with Western business practices. The preferential treatment given to oligarchs
149
by the state granted drained valuable resources that could have been used to further
production.
The second period ( 1995-1999) witnessed gradual stabilization. The GDP
decreased from -10% in 1996 to -3% in 1997. Foreign direct investment (FD1) increased
fivefold, growing from $483 million in 1995 to nearly $3 million in 1999. Foreign
investment proceeded slower in the Ukraine than central European countries such as
Poland and Hungary. Ukraine experienced limited exposure to market ideas early in the
transition process and tended to view Communism more favorably than other former
Soviet republics. As time passed, the primary problem became a lack of interest on behalf
of the ruling elite to relinquish strict control over economic and bureaucratic powers. In
2003, for example, the size of Ukraine's economy was an estimated $50 billion
American, three-quarters the size of Hungary’s economy, despite having five times the
population.
The third period (2000-2004) witnessed a significant economic turnaround. Real
wages rose between 15 and 25% each year. FD1 grew to $16 trillion at the end of 2005,
an all time high. GDP rose in double digits ( 12.1%) in 2005, another first. Each year
experienced positive growth, the lowest being 5.2%. Ukraine became a viable
investment option and the West flooded the liberal-minded opposition with support as the
government standoff unfolded. Many in the West believed a window of opportunity was
being opened in this geo-politically important neighbor of Russia.
Clearly, the economic results of reform were mixed. When effective, democratic
institutions fundamentally promote stable and sustained growth in the economic realm
and Ukraine did experience some indicators of effective institutional operation in the
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post-Soviet period. There were slow, but fairly steady, levels of foreign direct investment
and the GDP rose since 1 994, after a steep decline since 1991. In terms of raw numbers,
Ukraine also privatized a large amount of formerly State-owned enterprises, though it
would be disingenuous to categorize this development as a wholesale success because of
the negative political, economic, legal, and social consequences that resulted from the
privatization process. As the Orange government quickly realized, rectifying grossly
corrupt transition practices is very difficult to do without serious political and economic
repercussions. At the same time, if genuine reform is truly the goal, it is also very
difficult to turn a blind eye toward such massive injustice.
Ukraine also failed to experience other indicators of effective institutional
operation in the economic realm. National budgets, for example, have not been
consistently balanced in Ukraine. Cutting government spending was difficult for the
Kuchma regime, who used State resources to consolidate power, and the Orange
Government, who early on sought to protect and extend the welfare state. Wages, on the
other hand, dropped throughout much of the 1990's. With the aforementioned economic
turnaround, how ever, the dominant trend of falling wages reversed as the economic
situation improved.
Given these trends, democratic institutions were largely ineffective in promoting
stable and sustained economic growth from 1991 to 2006. Though the GDP rose since
1994, growth was not positive as a percentage of the previous year until 2000.
Furthermore, the budget was not balanced for most of the period as real wages fell. The
most resounding “success,” massive privatization of State-owned enterprises created as
many problems, if not more, than it solved. Thus, like elections, democratic institutions
have been ineffective in promoting both stable and representative government as well as
stable and sustained economic growth. This casts significant doubt on the ability of
transition theory to accurately capture the dynamics of democratic development. Greater
analysis is necessary, however, before definitive conclusions on transitions theory can be
drawn. The next section examines Russian development over the same period.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY OF RUSSIA
In the late 19
lh
century and early 20 11 ' century, the Russian Empire was among the
largest in the world. The Tsarist regime had free enterprise, but with heavy state
involvement. The dominant rural institution was the village land commune, which
w itnessed a degree of egalitarianism, a tradition of mutual responsibility, and a process of
collective decision making, but as Robert Service puts it, “life was nasty, brutish, and
short for most peasants.”
1 Under Alexander II, peasants were freed from bondage, but on
average, were actually left with 13% less land to cultivate" Alexander’s reforms did
enable franker public discussion of Russia’s problems as society was rapidly changing..
Industrialization did not occur until very late in the 19
th
century and the working
class, both urban and rural, quadrupled. Industrial workers became more politically
sophisticated, while the intelligentsia became more politically active. ’ There were no
elections or representative government at the national level until 1906. In the face of
widespread lawlessness and upheaval, Nicolas II had two main options to maintain order,
military rule or popular concessions, and opted for an ineffective mix.
Reforms, such as freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, were limited by
the imposition of martial law in turbulent provinces and bureaucratic violations when it
was believed that State security was jeopardized. 4 A popularly elected legislature w as
created, the State Duma, but could be dissolved by the crown at any time and was done
so to punish aggressive Duma’s. Liberals and radicals in the Duma were shielded with
immunity and used this right to criticize the regime. This stripped “the aura of
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omniscience and omnipotence that it had so assiduously cultivated and that the
population at large regarded as the hallmark of good government.”'
From a Russian perspective, however, the Fundamental Laws of 1906 were “a
giant step toward democracy.”
6
The crown allowed elected representatives to be actively
involved in the political process, including legislation and budgeting. This did not last
long however. Contested elections ended by 1921 and private enterprise ended by 1929.
The new Bolshevik regime fit no previous model. As the preeminent Bolshevik leader,
Lenin was both an innovative theorist, reformulating Marx to fit the Russian context, and
a revolutionary activist, who replaced spontaneous mass action with the will and
discipline of the Bolshevik Party. The regime created a system of dual authority where
an extreme dictatorship was run by the Party behind the fayade of popular self-
government embodied in the soviets.* From the outset, Russian political leaders
improvised their system of governance as they went along. Though rulers never
succeeded in providing a theoretical foundation for rule, as Richard Pipes observes, nor
succeeded in exercising completely unrestrained authority, as Robert Service observes,
the one-party state was the lasting legacy that other Communist states would come to
emulate.
The introduction of the one-party state had both destructive and constructive
elements. No one questioned that the Bolshevik Party was “the engine driving the Soviet
government.” 9 The top priority of the Bolsheviks was to uproot both tsarist and
democratic elements of the old regime. In building a new regime, a new authority was
“designed to resemble folkish, ‘soviet’ democracy but in reality akin to Muscovite
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patrimonial absolutism.”
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The goal was to transform soviets from mechanisms of
government accountability to tools of the Party.
Though Bolsheviks claimed public authority over all of Russia, the Party
remained primarily a private body." The 1918 constitution created a “dictatorship of the
urban and rural proletariat” and granted power to “formerly oppressed classes.” 1 ' There
were no protections for citizens against the actions of government and the only people
who earned a living through “productive and socially useful work” were able to vote. The
most powerful institution was the Central Executive Committee (CEC). Top Bolshevik
leaders, such as Lenin and Trotsky, quickly freed themselves from the CEC in
“the first and only constitutional clash in the history of Soviet Russia.” 1 ' Essentially, “the
two Bolshevik leaders arrogated to themselves full legislative authority and transformed
the CEC and the Congress of Soviets, which it represented, from legislative into
consultative bodies.”
14
In turn, “the system of legislation the Bolsheviks set in place
within two weeks of October coup, for all its revolutionary rhetoric, marked a reversion
to the autocratic practices of tsarist Russia before the Manifesto of October 17, 1 905.”
1 '
After just eleven years, constitutionalism was over.
The Bolsheviks became accustomed to using violence to deal with opposition, so
much so, that the machine gun became the "principal instrument of political
persuasion.”
1
" By August of 1918, the autonomy of soviets, the rights of workers to
represent themselves, and a fragile multiparty system was over. Russia embarked on
several years of one-party dictatorship. In 1924 a federal state was created and named the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Initial members included the Russian Federation,
Ukraine, Belorussia. and the Transcaucasian republics, composed of Azerbaijan, Georgia,
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and Armenia. 1 The new federal system granted much greater power to central authorities
in Moscow. A unified Communist party controlled this centralized authority and
completely dominated the political processes of all republics.
IN
In the face of wide-spread opposition and rebellion, Lenin introduced the New
Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP restored capitalism, though in a restrained form. 1 ’
The NEP produced mixed economic results, yet had far reaching social consequences.
+Slow industrial growth retarded the development of the proletariat in cities. In rural
areas, a new class of prosperous farmers led efforts to restore agricultural production and
constituted a conservative element that resisted future land reforms. The NEP helped the
Party consolidate power in the short term, by deflecting strong resistance to the regime,
but created the long term challenge of sustaining the public legitimacy of an elite
revolutionary movement dedicated to a class that was not becoming a vital social force.
As a result, the party did not have a clear sense of purpose or mission.
20
Stalin created a new post-revolutionary mission for the Party that stressed
development, over revolutionary goals. Stalin’s power was built around a new political
class of party apparat (members of governing power structure) and nomeklatura (top
governing elites). Stalin used the apparat as the eyes, ears, and mouth of the party.
Beginning in 1936, Stalin undertook a series of purges that sought eliminate all traces of
political opposition and ensure rapid industrialization and the collectivization of
agriculture. The Great Terror between 1937 and 1938 resulted in mass arrests and long
prison sentences for violations of the infamous Article 58 in the Criminal Codes of the
Union republics, which provided guidelines for dealing with “counterrevolutionary
activities.”
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Collectivization targeted the Ukraine, which was known at the time as the
“breadbasket of the Soviet Union.” Ukrainians, however, would not easily pail with their
national identity and the organization of communes at the local level. From 1932 to 1933,
Stalin instigated famine in the Ukraine by massively raising grain quotas farmers were
required to give to the State. This killed over six million people and is currently
considered among the worst genocides of the 20 th century. Forced labor killed millions,
predominately men, in gulags
,
which have come to refer to both the administration of
labor camps and the labor camps themselves. “Corrective labor camps,” as the State
called them, were originally established in remote locations, such as Siberia, but then
spread and varied geographically with the economic task at hand. The experiences of
prisoners included interrogations, transportation in cattle cars, inadequate food,
inadequate clothing, inadequate housing, poor hygiene, and lack of medical care,
throughout years of exile in concentration camps that destroyed families and often led to
premature death.
Internationally, Stalin hoped that opponents of Germany would unite until the
USSR signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, 1 This meant that the USSR
needed to be accepted as an equal in a Western-led international community. In turn, the
1936 constitution declared that class warfare in the USSR was over. Russia was hence
composed of two “friendly” classes, the proletariat and peasantry, as well as one
“stratum,” the intelligentsia. These three groups shared power through “state guidance of
society,” rather than “dictatorship of the proletariat.”"' The end of class struggle enabled
franchise to be extended to all adult citizens in direct and secret elections and
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establishment of a bill of rights. The State established the terms of compliance, however,
and many rights could only be exercised in conformity with powerful interests “in order
to strengthen the socialist system.”
-
'
Consequently, Stalinist rule was highly repressive. Formal guarantees in the
constitution were regularly ignored by the party and government. The Communist Party
and the police force monitored and controlled nearly all aspects of a citizen’s life. As a
result, legal guarantees meant very little in the face of arbitrary government action.
Stalin's death in 1953 prompted another power struggle that lasted for several years.
Soviet politics changed in two significant ways: one-man party dictatorship gradually
transitioned into oligarchic rule and struggles over who would replace Stalin set the
Soviet Union on a course of reform that would produce significant consequences well
after Nikita Krushchev, the new Soviet leader, left office.
24
Like Stalin, Krushchev extensively relied on patronage to build his power. This
translated into several appointments for supporters from the Party apparatus in Moscow,
and Ukraine, where Khruschev had served as party chairman. At the same time,
Khruschev sought to reduce the size of the central bureaucracy and decentralize power at
the union, republic, and local levels. Khruschev allowed republics greater autonomy in
their pursuit of Socialism and created a new doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” with the
West. Ultimately, Khruschev was unable to consolidate power to the extent Stalin did,
largely because of the weakening of the secret police and the difficulties that would
accompany another purge.^ Instead, Khruschev focused on transforming the Party into
one that could more efficiently manage a modern economy and in doing so, brought in
new faces through the “rotation rule” that limited Presidium members to three terms.
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By the fall of 1964, Khrushev faced an array of opponents, including the party
apparat, the military, ideologists, and conservatives."
1
’ This opposition resulted in a
widespread consensus among ruling elites that Khruschev had gone too far in pushing for
reforms and thus constituted a threat to their political survival. In turn, Khruschev
became the first and last Soviet leader to step down from a vote of no confidence."
The fourth and final Soviet constitution came in 1977 under Khruschev’s replacement,
Leonid Brezhnev. This Constitution adopted an optimistic tone in discussing the creation
of a new Soviet community, held together by increasingly fused set of differing
nationalities. The new community would develop from further perfection of Soviet
democracy and the increased involvement of everyday citizens in governance.
When Gorbachev came to power in 1986, only someone very old could remember
contested elections or private enterprise. At the expense of constitutions, which had
limited significance, one thing the Soviet Union did do, was emphasize voting as a moral,
civic responsibility, even when it was meaningless. Competitive elections were extended
to all levels of government and a new legislature was established in 1988. Richard Kelly
contends that Gorbachev’s strategy was embodied in three concepts: glasnost (openness),
perestroika (restructuring), and demokraitzatsiia (democratization) and argues that each
was purposely utilized as a political weapon. These weapons “were intended to mobilize
the intelligentsia that had given up hope of reform or meaningful involvement in public
life, to reassure the dissident community that had been pushed aside or worse in the
Brezhnev years, and to win the support of the general public that had soured on the
fiction of soviet democracy and the promise of a better life.”' lS
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Glasnost sought to accomplish three goals: 1) make information more available
throughout the society in the belief that censorship had inhibited modernization; 2) garner
support of the intelligentsia and dissident community who were skeptical of official
versions of truth; 3) spotlight to highlight the current political problems or opponents.
24
Soon, however, newspapers acquired a new level of independence in an increasingly
pluralistic media environment and Gobarchev's opponents of all stripes took advantage
of the opportunity to publicize their versions of truth as well. Perestroika, meanwhile,
became increasingly radicalized over Gorbachev’s six years of rule. Perestroika
originally represented “tinkering with the existing institutions,” then became “a
commitment to across-the-board structural reforms.” 0 In turn. Demokraitzatsiia
occurred both within the Communist Party and throughout different levels of
government. In the party, the power of the appratchiki was diminished as the power of
rank-and-file members was enhanced, while in government, soviets were permitted to
become more involved in governance.
1989 was a watershed year in Russian development. While Gorbachev promised
material improvement, there was a reversion to food rationing. As Robert Service
observes, “Soviet queues, already legendary for their length, became longer and angrier
in the course of 1989.” ’’ Technological divisions between the Soviet Union and
industrial capitalist countries had widened in all sectors but weapons procurement. The
state budget w ould have been massively insolvent under Brezhnev if not for domestic
revenues derived from vodka sales. Agriculture was so inefficient that food imports
constituted 40% of hard currency expenditures. These and other social ills precipitated a
state of economic emergency.
165
Gorbachev suddenly faced “two life-or-death alternatives: either abandon the
reforms or make them more radical.”' Abandoning reforms was never seriously
considered. According to Archie Brown, Gorbachev, more than any other political actor,
was responsible for the pluralization of the Soviet political system, specifically “the
creation of institutions that put an end to the command polity,” including the Communist
Party's monopoly of power. " The first televised session of Congress enthralled the
public. People were fascinated to hear open debate of public questions. The group was
generally supportive of Gorbachev, but no longer demonstrated pure obedience to the
General Secretary. As Robert Service puts it, “what once had been said privately in
living-rooms was given full-throated public utterance.”' 4
Gorbachev wanted the Congress to become the primary mechanism of ratification
for political and economic reforms, rather than a verbal battleground between
conservatives and radicals. Boris Yeltsin put a crimp in these plans. Yeltsin ran for a
representative position in Moscow as a strong critic of the nomenklatura and won 90% of
the vote. Yeltsin led more radical elements of the Congress who were determined to use
the institution as a foundation of formal opposition to the communist regime, even though
many were still party members. ° In doing so, the so called Inter-Regional Group sought
to pressure Gorbachev into further action against conservative party comrades. 6
At the same time, reformers only numbered a few thousand and were unable to
stimulate genuinely popular resistance. As a result, Gorbachev remained the country’s
most popular politician until the mid-1980’s when Yeltsin overtook him. Robert Service
explains:
Youth did not revolt against authority; it despised and ignored it. Indeed citizens,
both young and old, treated politics as a spectator sport but not a process deserving their
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participation. The quest for private pleasure outdid the zeal for public service . . . After
years of being bored by stuffy Marxism-Leninism, their ideal of freedom was not the
freedom to join a political party and attend open meetings on city squares. They wanted
to stay at home and enjoy the freedom to be frivolous, apolitical, immobilized. ’ 7
Things were different outside of Russia. Nationalist dissent rose throughout
Soviet Republics. Various leaders convinced their citizens that respective national
problems could not be effectively addressed without greater economic and administrative
reforms. Meanwhile, the KGB no longer arrested citizens for unlawful dissent, which
allowed for a moderately independent press to emerge slowly. The farther west a nation
was from Moscow, the bolder the resistance. Many republics created democratically
elected presidencies and legislatures, though the degree of democracy varied from region
to region. Every country east of the River Elbe was Communist at the beginning of 1989.
By of the end of the year, just one country, Albania, was still Communist.
By 1990 it was clear that “perestrioika was no longer a project for partial
TO
alterations, but for total transformation.” In February of 1990, Gorbachev sought
approval from the Congress of People’s Deputies for multi-party politics. When ratified
in April of that year, “the one-party state defended by communist apologists since the
Civil War was relegating itself to oblivion.’” 9 Yeltsin was the most outspoken proponent
of faster and deeper reform.
In January of 1991, 15 people were killed when Soviet Special Forces in
Lithuania overtook the Vilnius television tower in an attempt to deter separatist ambitions
throughout the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, however, denied prior knowledge regarding the
use of force and blamed local officials. 40 Determined to preserve territorial integrity in
the USSR. Gorbachev organized a public referendum in March that asked: Do von
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consider necessary the preservation ofthe Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics as a
renewedfederation ofequal sovereign republics in which the rights andfreedom ofthe
individual ofany nationality will be guaranteed?
The phrasing of the referendum “made it difficult for reform-minded citizens to
vote against sanctioning the Union.” 41 Attached to the referendum on the preservation of
the Soviet Union was a referendum on the creation of a presidency for the Russian
Republic, not the Soviet Union. Creating a post of president was even more popular than
preserving the Union. On June 12, 1991, Boris Yeltsin became the first publicly elected
president in Russia. Yetlsin earned 57% of the vote and in doing so prevented a second
round run off. Yeltsin was concerned that if the Community Party did not adapt to
changing political attitudes, they would be dealt a “total historical defeat.” 4 ' The concern
was prophetic.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin reconciled their differences in April, but Gorbachev had
other problems. Gorbachev orchestrated a new Union treaty that would grant greater
autonomy to regional governments. The treaty was accepted in principle by the Central
Committee, but led to significant political divisions among top Soviet leaders in Russia.
The date for signature was August 20, 1991. The agreement was not signed, however,
because of an attempted coup by prominent Soviet leaders, such as Valentin Pavlov
(Prime Minister), Vladimir Kryuckov (Head of the K.G.B.), Dmitri Yazov (Minister of
Defense), and Gennadi Yanaev (Vice-President). The coup sought to obstruct the treaty,
which would significantly reshape the nature of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was held in
isolation as coup leaders declared he was incapable of fulfilling his executive duties and
implemented a state of emergency.
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A major failure of the coup was their failure to test the loyalty of Pavel Grachev,
the chief of military operations, prior to the assault. When put to the test, Grachev refused
to abandon Gorbachev and Yeltsin. This enabled Yeltsin to organize an impromptu rally
at the White House, where tens of thousands of Russians gathered. Yeltsin famously
climbed on to one of the tanks and from an exposed position declared his opposition to
the coup. Coup leaders were not willing to be responsible for significant casualties. 4
'
Demonstrations against the coup broke out in other major cities, it collapsed days later. 44
When Gorbachev returned to Moscow, the attempted coup had seriously
discredited his personal political influence as well as the overall prestige of the regime.
Gorbachev refused, however, to blame the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the
same time, Gorbachev reluctantly agreed to dissolve the Communist Party under pressure
from Yelstin. The coup had fundamentally changed the USSR and Yeltsin, not
Gorbachev, emerged atop the political hierarchy.
That fall, Gorbachev sought to retain a role for the presidency by redrafting the
Union treaty, but these efforts unraveled when Ukraine supported a referendum for
independence on December 1. On December 7, the Commonwealth of Independent States
was formed as a loose association of states who shared a commitment to economic
coordination. Gorbachev resigned as president on December 25 and at midnight,
December 31, 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics came to an end.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union was “a transformation for which
Gorbachev bears a large measure of responsibility even though it was an outcome he
struggled desperately to avoid.
”
4
^ By embracing democratization, Gorbachev permitted
the articulation and defense of dissent, which forever altered the centralized nature of the
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self-described Soviet democracy. Clearly, the Soviet political process was not in line with
Western conceptions of democracy. At the same time, both the Soviet Union, and the
Russian Federation which emerged afterward, shared formal elements of democracy,
such as constitutions, institutions, and elections. These things meant very little in terms of
a competitive political system with representative government. The key question after
1991 was if and how this would change.
The Soviet Union ended abruptly. The implementation of reform was of
paramount concern. Yeltsin had proven to be a decisive leader. A central figure in the
collapse of the old order, Yeltsin set out to create a better government and economy while
his popularity was still extraordinarily high. In early 1992, two main courses of actions
were seriously debated by Yeltsin and his advisers. The first option was to hold new
elections that would provide a popular mandate for economic reform. The second option
was to proceed with reform in anticipation of later electoral approval. Yeltsin chose the
later option.
Yeltsin allowed Gaidar to replace fixed prices with free-market prices. Price
liberalization would be one of several steps toward comprehensive reform. Other steps
would include a balanced budget and the elimination of state subsidies. David Lipton
described the road to freedom and prosperity in Russia as long and narrow.
4,1
Yeltsin's
decision to avoid the electoral process and instead rely heavily on executive decrees
caused more problems than it solved.
4
Yeltsin adopted political practices he once
strongly attacked and in doing so set a precedent that was later used under Vladimir Putin
to consolidate political power and undermine the democratic process.
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At the same time, such practices enabled Yeltsin to pursue a reform agenda
alongside a Russian Supreme Soviet whose majority did not share his conviction to create
a market economy. The industrial nomenklatura demonstrated a high level of anxiety and
uncertainty regarding the consequences of economic reform. These industrial leaders and
managers were accustomed to an endless supply of resources to support their “enterprise
empires” and felt threatened by changes in government involvement with economic
activity. The nomenklatura pushed to slow and soften the reforms, which produced a
struggle for economic control of Russian enterprises. Lipton described the relationship
between reformers and the nomenklatura as a marriage, in which Yeltsin sought to ensure
that reformers maintained the upper hand.
4s
Yeltsin and Gaidar mistakenly neglected to publicly justify new political
programs, instead assuming people were tired of hearing about economic programs. The
Communist Party was gone and Marxism-Leninism discredited, but much of the old
order still remained. Local political and economic elites operated largely separate of
Moscow and began to work closely with criminal groups toward promotion of common
interests in a new era of market economy.
Yeltsin rarely met with or sought approval from the Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin
"confined deliberations on policy to a small circle of associates" and "sacked personnel
whenever and wherever his policies were not being obeyed ."
4
1
Where local opposition
existed, Yeltsin introduced his own appointees who under a variety of titles, such as
"plenipotentiaries," "representatives," "prefects," and eventually "governors," enforced
his political will. Service claims that "in the guise of a President, Yeltsin was ruling like
a General Secretary" and doing so "with less deference to 'collective leadership."'
Ml
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Yeltsin built a reform team of relatively unknown men who were predominately
in their thirties and forties/ 1 Most had little intention of staying in power long. Yeltsin
saw himself as a modern Peter the Great. "Having seized the reins of Great Russia's
coach and horses," Service explains, Yeltsin was determined "to drive headlong along a
bumpy path." Those familiar with 18th century Russian history, however, "trembled at
the comparison." 2
After price liberalization, Yeltsin's reform agenda soon expanded to include
privatization. This process was overseen by Anatoli Chubais, the Chairman of the State
Committee for the Management of State Property. The overriding question in transferring
state property to the private sector was who exactly should own previously state-owned
companies. Chubais created a voucher system. Vouchers were available at 10,000 rubles
per citizen and could be invested in companies when formed. Employees and managers
were permitted to purchase up to 25% of the shares in their respective company once put
on the market and further privileges were available should someone desire a majority
stake. Results were mixed at best. Given the high rate of inflation, 10,000 rubles was a
very small grant for individual citizens, and the internal enterprise buy-outs practically
guaranteed that former Soviet managers could retain total control over their respective
companies/'
Lobbying organizations became highly effective in pressuring Yeltsin during this
period of economic transformation and uncertainty. These efforts were led by directors of
energy, manufacturing, and agriculture, such as Arkadi Volsky and Viktor
Chernomyrdin, who had been politically powerful under the Soviet system as well. Such
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men suggested that economic collapse was on the horizon, but were willing to negotiate
with Chubais. Robert Service explains:
Their basic demand was that if the government was going to insist on the de-
nationalization of companies, this should be done without ending state subsidies and
without threatening the immediate interests of the directors and workers. It was only
when Chubais gave way on this that the Supreme Soviet ratified his program of
privatization on 1 1 June ( 1992). This was the last success of the radical economic
reformers for a year. They knew that they had compromised. But their rationale was that
they had introduced enough capitalism to ensure that the members of the old Soviet
nomenklatura would not permanently be able to shield themselves from the pressures of
economic competition. 4
Popular discontent was not limited to portions of the ruling elite. Social
dissatisfaction and unrest became widespread throughout 1992. Food and industrial
production fell. Many "simply cut out a patch of land on the outskirts of towns to
cultivate produce or keep rabbits, pigs, or even cows," while others "moonlighted from
their jobs, selling cigarettes at Metro stations." " Factories lacked discipline and funds to
pay workers. Unable to maintain consistent production, hours were restricted and workers
were laid off. Barter became more prevalent. Petty theft was widespread under
Communism and persisted during the transition capitalism. For example, grocery clerks
kept the best sausages, factory workers swiped screwdrivers, and acquisitions like these
were traded among friends. The government no longer harassed people who legally or
illegally sought to gain a bit of luxury in an economic environment where luxury was
predominantly out of the reach of all but top elites. Poverty was widespread. People
formed tent settlements, even in Moscow. Most of the poor were pensioners, oiphans,
and military invalids. "
All Russians, not just the poor, suffered from vast environmental degradation
before and after the fall of the Soviet Union. There were significant increases in
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respiratory and dermatological illness in heavy industrial areas, such as Chelyabinsk.
Spent nuclear fuel was discarded in the White Sea without sufficient caution or oversight.
Not since World War II, "had so many citizens of Russia felt so lacking in care by the
authorities." ^ Alcohol abuse increased, while life expectancy fell. Most of the social
problems facing common Russians were out of their control. These included deteriorating
healthcare, lack of pollution standards, lack of industrial safety standards, and the fall in
average family income.
The legal order was fragmented and ineffective. Everything was in flux, which
made a law-based state elusive. As Robert Service puts it, "a world of experience was
being turned upside-down."
N
Under these conditions, "criminality was pervasive in the
development of the Russian market economy." ' Bribery of government officials was
commonplace. Generals regularly sold military equipment to the highest bidders, even
Chechen terrorists. Wealthy Russian capitalists were not eager to invest their profits in
their own country. These and other factors kept Russian development from proceeding at
the same pace as neighboring countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia.
In November of 1992, a Constitutional Court decision enabled Communist
conservatives to reconstitute themselves as the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation. The party was led by Gennadi Zyuganov and dedicated to the memory of
Lenin and even Stalin. Yeltsin claimed to be above party politics, but backed Gaider,
though not the extent of creating a party together. Critics of authoritarian government
came under fire, most notably Gavriil Popov, who resigned as the mayor ofMoscow in
1992 after being accused of fraud. This was indicative of a larger trend: wholehearted
advocacy of liberalism became less common.
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A party system had yet to develop in Russia. In contrast to the Soviet tradition
“the problem was no longer the existence of a single party but of too many parties."
Robert Service explains:
The problem was no longer the existence of a single party but of too many parties.
The distinctions between one party and another were not very clear; their programs were
wordy and obscure and the parties tended to be dominated by single leaders. The far-right
Liberal-Democratic Party was described in its official handouts as 'the Party of
Zhirinovski.' Russia had not yet acquired a stable multiple-party system, and this
circumstance increased Yeltsin's freedom of maneuver."
0
Regional assertiveness was also a problem, particularly in areas predominantly
inhabited by Russians. In Svedlovsk, for example, Yeltsin had to deal with his home
territory which declared in 1993 that it was the heart of a so-called Urals Republic.
Yeltsin used to encourage such behavior under Gorbachev. Once in power, Yeltsin
asserted the prerogatives of centralized power, enacted taxes, and clearly stated that
separatist tendencies would not be tolerated.
After the Russian Supreme Soviet sought to impeach Yeltsin in March of 1993,
Yeltsin held a referendum on his polices. 59% of those who participated voted in support
of the President. 53% approved of Yeltsin's economic policies. This was a victory for
Yeltsin, but Yeltsin still had to rely on executive decrees, given the slim nature of his
popular majority. Yeltsin also plotted to disband the Supreme Soviet by decree and hold
new elections. When the executive degree was issued, however, deputies of the Supreme
Soviet were informed and prepared. Hundreds barricaded themselves in the White House
and declared control of government.
Yeltsin stressed his recent popular mandate, in contrast to the Supreme Soviet,
which was elected in 1990. Neither side was particularly prone to compromise, though
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that was what the public preferred. 61 Yeltsin eventually ordered the White House to be
retaken by force. On October 4, military forces shelled the building, captured the coup
leaders and detained them in the same prison that several of the August 1991 coup
plotters were still being held. 6 This violent episode secured the future of economic
reform and enabled Yeltsin to use his new power position to shape a new constitution
which Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet had been working on for some time.
Dating back to the spring of 1992, constitutional alternatives were entertained by
a constitutional revision committee in the Supreme Soviet. Some advocated a system
based on division of powers, which feared if either the executive or legislature became
too powerful totalitarianism would reemerge. Other alternatives called for a strong
executive modeled around the Fifth Republic in France and divided the legislatures into
upper and lower chambers. Growing tension surrounding the creation process was
temporarily diffused with a compromise in December of 1992 that called for a
referendum on the draft constitution.
6 '
Months later, however, Yeltsin produced another constitutional draft, with a
stronger presidency, and formed a Constitutional Conference composed of delegates from
different regions in the federation. The conference created a moderate draft that
incorporated demands from both the president and parliament. Constitutional negotiations
descended into crisis along with the "October Events" of 1993. In December, an amended
version of the constitution was ratified via public referendum with 58% of the popular
vote.
64
The Constitution was divided into two sections. The first section, which
compromises nearly the entire document, is divided into nine chapters, each with a
separate focus. The second section consists of concluding and transitional provisions.
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The Russian Federation was constituted as a “democratic, federal, rule-of-law
state with republican form of governance.”
66 Power was separated into separate
legislative, executive, and judicial components. The adoption of a state ideology or
religion was forbid. Individual rights and liberties are a “supreme value” and the
recognition, observance, and protection of these rights are the obligation of the State.
There are 47 articles in Chapter 2 that list the rights and liberties of Russian citizens.
These include:
• equality before the law the courts regardless of gender, race, language,
origin, property, associations, etc. (Article 19)
• freedom from torture and violence (Article 21
)
• right to a timely judicial process (Article 22)
• right to define one’s own ethnicity (Article 26)
• right to move (Article 27)
• freedom of religion (Article 28)
• freedom of thought and speech (Article 29)
• freedom of association (Article 30)
• right to petition government (Article 33)
• right of private ownership (Article 35)
• freedom from forced labor, right to vacation (Article 37)
• right to social security (Article 39)
• right to housing (Article 40)
• right to medical care (Article 41
)
• right to a favorable environment (Article 42)
• right to education (Article 43)
• freedom of expression (Article 44)
• right to an attorney (Article 48)
• right be considered innocent until proven guilty (Article 49)
• freedom from double jeopardy (Article 50)
• freedom from self-incrimination (Article 51
)
The constitution created a strong presidency where the executive is designed to be
a source of stability in a contentious political environment. The President is head of state,
guarantor of Constitutional rights, commander and chief of the armed forces, and top
policy leader, both foreign and domestic. The president is elected to four-year terms via
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secret ballot. The President must be at least 35 years old and may not serve more than
two consecutive terms. The President has several enumerated powers which include
selecting the Prime Minister, the ability to dissolve parliament, the ability to schedule
referenda without legislative permission, the ability to veto legislation, and the ability to
issue decrees. The President has legal immunity, but may be impeached through a long
and difficult process.
The Russian court system operates from Constitution provisions and federal law.
Federal judges must be at least 25 years old and have attained at least 5 years of
professional legal experience. Similar to the U.S. Constitution, little is said about the
Judiciary aside from specific types of courts and perimeters ofjurisdiction. There are
three major types of federal courts: Constitutional, Arbitration, and Supreme. As the
name implies, Constitutional Court deals with constitutional issues and federal laws, the
Supreme Arbitration Courts deal with economic disputes and the Supreme Court is the
supreme judicial body.
The parliament, called the Federal Assembly, is a bicameral legislature. The State
Council is the upper chamber, which consists of 178 directly-elected delegates, two
deputies elected at large from eighty-nine districts throughout the Federation. The State
Duma is the lower chamber, which consists of 450 directly-elected delegates, elected via
secret ballot for four year terms. Representatives must be at least 21 years old. While in
office, Duma members may not engage in paid activity except for teaching, research, or
other creative activity. Half of the Duma seats are filled based on proportional
representation. Parties receive seats based on the percentage of the vote received. The
minimum threshold a party must obtain to qualify for seats is 5%. Half of the seats are
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filled based on single member districts, which are very similar to the U.S. House of
Representatives.
New elections for the State Duma were a clear defeat for Yeltsin and pro-reform
forces/
1
'’ Yeltsin had to once again deal with a lower house primarily composed of
opponents to economic reform and negotiate with provincial elites from less than a
position of strength/’
7
Peter Ordeshook observed that “the marvel of the December 1993
elections (were) not that democratic reformers did so badly while Vladimir Zhirinovsky
did so well, but that the fascists, ultranationalists, and hardcore anti-reformists somehow
failed to secure outright control of the new legislature.” 68
Russia’s Choice, led by Gaidar, won the largest number of seats (96), but this was
far short of majority control. When combined with other reform organizations, such as
Yabloko (33 seats), the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (27 seats), and the Democratic
Reform Movement (8 seats), pro-reform parties only totaled 36% of the seats. 6 ' At the
same time, the elections were not an unqualified victory for major reform rival Vladimir
Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky was ultra-nationalist, but an economically liberal and anti-
Communist. Zhirinovsky’s LDPR gained 59 seats and outperformed all other parties
competing for proportional representation with over 23% of the vote. In single member
districts, however, LDPR only gained 1 1 seats and in turn, the LDPR finished as the third
largest faction behind Russia’s Choice and the New Regional Policy. 70
Clark contends that the real winners in the 1993 elections were the Communists.
There were two major Communist parties: the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (CPRF) and the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR). CPRF received over 13% of
the vote, while APR won over 8% of the vote. The two parties combined held 1 12 seats.
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which constituted the largest bloc. 1 Though public support of the Communists
vindicated their struggles with Yeltsin, control of the Duma did not translate to
Communist control of the national political agenda. The new constitution, ratified along
with the elections, expanded presidential power at the expense of the most popular pail of
Russian government. Legislation requires a simply majority in the Duma and State
Council prior to being sent to the President for signature. Presidential vetoes can be
overridden with a two-thirds majority in each chamber. Communists, however, were not
close to a two-thirds majority, evident in the fact that pro-reform factions were able to
prevent the override of a presidential veto, often with Zhirinovsky’s help.
The Duma was limited “in its ability to affect government” because “the president
hold the trump card of dissolution in any case in which the Duma might attempt to
exercise authority vis-a-vis either the president or the bureaucracy.” 72 This was roughly
similar to the tsarist Duma between 1906 and 1917 in its relationship to the executive and
led to criticism among Russian scholars. Peter Ordeshook concluded after the 1993
elections that “instead of building a sensible incentive structure to support stable
democratic institutions, Russia's democrats have opted for a naive, populist version of
democracy featuring crude demarcations of power between Moscow and federal subjects,
a simplistic view of presidential leadership, and parliamentary-election procedures that
try to be all things to all people.”
’
With the ratification of the new Constitution and corresponding elections, Russia
had embarked on an uncertain path toward democracy. Though democratic institutions
are designed to promote peaceful transition of power and representative government, the
early years of the Russian transition depended on violence and extraordinary use of
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presidential power to resolve institutional conflict and implement reform. When
questions were put to the public, narrow support existed for reform, but Communists
were granted a majority in the most popular branch of government. Themes such as
violence, vast presidential power, and mixed public sentiment toward reform would come
to characterize Russian development in ways that significantly inhibited the country's
ability to develop fully-functioning democracy well after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Looking back on Russian history, one is struck by the fact that Russia experienced
“democratic” elections, institutions, and constitutions in the Soviet period, yet these
meant very little because of disproportionate power vested in the Communist Party and
the State. This illuminates how any history of democratic procedures is not necessarily a
helpful history in terms of democratic development. Past legacies with democratic
structures will very likely influence present conceptions toward these structures and
related systems of governance. In Russia, few citizens were excited about the prospect of
elections and institutions as something of value in themselves because they meant so little
for so long. This suggests that transition theorists would be better served to incorporate
greater discussion of institutional legacies in particular parts of the world, rather than
making universal generalizations regarding the effectiveness of, and corresponding
popularity toward, democratic structures.
Similar to dominant scholars of democratic transitions, dominant scholars of
capitalist transitions present a fairly monolithic model for best promoting capitalism
throughout the former Soviet Union: the faster the better. Jeffrey Sachs is among the
most notable economists focused on transitions to capitalism in the former Soviet Union.
Sachs was an adviser to the Russian government as the notion of shock therapy was
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developed and implemented. According to Sachs, the fall of the Soviet Union created an
“unprecedented opportunity to create a law-bound and prosperous international
system.”
,4
Sachs claims that developing countries have a “relatively straight forward set of
guideposts for most fundamental reforms” because “all developed countries have
openness, private ownership, and corporate governance.” ° In turn, Sachs believes these
guideposts constitute a basic three-prong model for capitalist development around the
world. According to Sachs, capitalism is the best economic system because “one
overriding lesson from the comparative growth experience of the last 50 years ... is that
capitalism 'pays.'” More specifically, Sachs contends that all countries which maintained
the main tenets of capitalism between 1970 and 1990 (open trade, currency convertibility,
private sector as engine of growth) experienced increases in per capita income.
Unfortunately, “many countries have behaved badly until recently” and “are stuck in a
transition crisis” because they took too long to adopt “the core capitalist institutions.”
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Sachs argues that the benefits of capitalist transitions are not just limited to the
economic sphere. The expansion of capitalism promotes global security. Sachs claims
that “the market revolution has gone hand in hand with a democratic revolution” in
“virtually all of Latin America, Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union.” This is an
important relationship for Sachs because the spread of democracy “almost surely reduces
,77
the risks of war, as do the increased economic links among countries.” Thus, capitalism
is the best economic system because capitalism is not just the most lucrative, but capable
of enhancing world democracy and peace as well.
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Considering these benefits, Sachs claims the most perplexing aspect of capitalist
development is figuring out why it has taken so long for capitalism to triumph. According
to Sachs, the modem capitalist system emerged in the early 1800’s “with the
development of the factory system, the modern corporate form of company organization,
central banking, and the elimination of servile obligation in Western Europe, and the
easing or elimination of mercantilist trade practices.”
s
This movement began in England
and its colonies, and then spread to Western Europe and beyond.
By the mid 18 lh century, the “profound economic superiority of capitalist
institutions was apparent to keen observers no less than Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels,
who rightly predicted in The Communist Manifesto that capitalism would undermine
traditional societies. ° Sachs cites a passage from The Communist Manifesto that states
capitalist development draws “even the most barbarian nations into civilization.”
Throughout the 18 th century, countries across the globe, such as China and Japan, and
powerful empires, like the Russian and Ottoman empires, all embarked on “modernizing”
reforms.
Sachs observes that the “financial turmoil of the 1920s, and the collapse of the
international economy in the Great Depression of the 1930’s” prevented “successful
transition” in Russia, China, the Ottoman Empire, and elsewhere/0 Leading economic
theorists of the 20 lh century, such as John Maynard Keynes acknow ledged that capitalism
was unstable and “the state became the great stabilizer.”* 1 “By the time World War II
ended in 1945,” Sachs explains, “there was no international trading system; no
convertible currencies except the American dollar' and no moral attraction in the
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developing world to a capitalist system that had led to imperialist plunder, depression,
and two world wars in 30 years.’
After the war, “the world divided into the proverbial First, Second, and Third
Worlds and the division remained in tact until the 1980’s.”
s
' Sachs claims that “the
Capitalist Revolution of the 1990s” unraveled the tripartite world system.” The
“overriding reason for the revolution” was that 2
nd
and 3 ld world alternatives “did not
work.” In contrast. First World countries “experienced an economic boom of
unprecedented magnitude.”M Sachs explains the consequences of this boom:
As a result of developments of the past decade, a global capitalist economy is
within view for the first time, though it has not yet arrived. Countries with a combined
population of roughly 3.5 billion people have undertaken radical economic reforms to
adopt the institutions of the capitalist system. These core reforms include six common
points:
( 1 ) open international trade;
(2) currency convertibility;
(3) private ownership as the main engine of economic growth;
(4) corporate ownership as the dominant organizational form for large enterprises;
(5) openness to foreign investment;
(6) membership in key international economic institutions, including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the GATT, which is
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now superseded by the new World Trade Organization (WTO).‘
Sachs fears that this unprecedented window of opportunity may close and
concludes that “the world has much to gain from the spread of capitalism, and much to
lose, if the West fails to act decisively.
”
s
" Despite this vast record of success, Sachs does
acknowledge that early efforts toward economic reform in Eastern Europe faced
significant challenges. Sachs claims “most of these problems (could) be ameliorated by
rapid privatization.”
The major failure of Eastern European governments has been the inability to
"devise privatization strategies that adequately address the systematic crisis of the state
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enterprise sector.” Sachs argues that Eastern European countries “have tended to view
privatization as an exercise to be carried forward one enterprise at a time and on a
‘voluntary basis,’ in which various stakeholders in the enterprise are given a veto over the
process.”' ' As a result, most large enterprises from the Soviet era failed to escape heavy
state control years after reforms were initiated, plagued by the lack of a clear path to
future privatization.
Sachs calls for “across-the board mechanisms of privatization in which thousands
of industrial enterprises are moved along the privatization process simultaneously.'
”
N °
Sachs claims “the key initial step” is the “mass commercialization of enterprises, in
which thousands of enterprises are transformed into joint-stock companies, with the
initial claims over the shares reflecting the balance of interests in the enterprises .”
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commercial transformation would “provide a system of enterprise governance .” 91 Once
enterprise governance was established, “a supervisory board would be appointed for each
enterprise, bound by the standard responsibilities defined in European and American
corporate law.”
0
Like Sachs, Anders Aslund was an adviser to the Russian government during the
conception and implementation of shock therapy. Aslund claims that Western politicians
and media misunderstand Russian corruption and deteriorating infrastructure. These were
not the products of poorly designed reforms, but the remnants of Soviet mismanagement,
which have taken many years to be corrected. In turn, Aslund argues that Russia’s
transformation has developed a unique mythology that does not accurately reflect the
development process.
9 ’
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Like Sachs, Aslund was a leading proponent of shock therapy. Aslund contends
that one popular myth surrounding Russian economic reform is that “shock therapy was a
failure.”
14
Conventional wisdom, according to Aslund, states that radical economic
reforms, like price liberalization and privatization, were implemented too fast and too
soon. In response, Aslund claims that Boris Yeltsin faced little choice but to reform
rapidly in the wake of several gradual and ineffective reforms. Furthermore, the most
successful transformations in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Estonia, implemented
reforms far more radical than Russia. As a result, Aslund considers most problems facing
Russia at the turn of the century to be indicators of insufficient reforms: excessive state
intervention, corruption, high tax rates, lingering inflation, and limited rule of law. In
turn, “Russia’s real problem was too little shock and too much corrupt state therapy in the
form of subsidies to the country’s elite.” 93
A second myth Aslund seeks to debunk is that privatization has only generated
corruption. Aslund claims “it would be more accurate to say that it has generated national
wealth.” Aslund points out that the private sector generated no less than 70% of Russia’s
GDP from 1997 to 2001 . Whereas corruption is typically understood as the misuse of
public power for private gain, privatization “permanently deprives public servants of
public property.”
"’
Thus, privatization is one of Russia's most successful reforms, though commonly blamed
for all economic shortfalls. Aslund claims it would be more logical to criticize less
successful reforms, like price liberalization.
Aslund is a supporter of shock therapy and mass privatization, but acknowledges
serious failures in Russian attempts to implement radical economic reform. In 1999, for
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example, Aslund states that “radical economic reform largely failed because of
extraordinary rent-seeking by old enterprise managers.” ' Rent-seeking managers are
“virtually unconstrained economic elite” who seek to strengthen their position by
maintaining state subsidies and corruption, rather than furthering capitalist
transformation.
Other economic problems that hampered Russia in the 1990’s were a 40% drop in
GDP, a significant rise in poverty, and high employment. Aslund argues that “reforms
could have been reinforced if democratic institutions had been developed faster if the
West had provided financial support for the reforms in early 1992.” Given these
outstanding problems, Aslund concludes that shock-therapy was “neither radical, nor fast,
but slow and partial.”
Sachs and Aslund are two leading economic scholars of transitions to capitalism.
These proponents of shock therapy argue that the urgency of the model emerges from the
overall profitability of the system over time. To end the perpetuation of inefficient state
control of the economy, which severely inhibits economic growth, rapid liberalization is
the quickest path to economic efficiency. The pace of reform must be as immediate as
possible because societal openings for capitalist reform are historically limited and
capitalism is universally desirable. Any short-term costs are nothing compared to the
long-term advantages.
The arguments of Sachs and Aslund exhibit parallels between economic scholars
of transition and aforementioned political scholars of transitions, such as Huntington,
O’Donnell, Schmitter, Karl, Linz and Stepan. Both understand capitalist-democracy to be
universal components of social progress. Both understand capitalist-democracy as the
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victorious ideology in the wake of World War II, which defeated Fascism, and the Cold
War, which defeated Communism. Both provide understandings of the transition
processes that can effectively fit in any social context as long as the proper model is
followed.
Transition to democracy scholars, such as Huntington and O’Donnell, claim that
founding elections instigate a transition and democratic institutions inevitably consolidate
transitions, whereas transition to capitalism scholars, Aslund and Sachs, claim that fully-
functioning capitalism best results from rapid economic liberalization. These
understandings predominately reflect a Western perspective that does not necessarily fit
with an array of powerful social perspectives and values abroad, such as theocracy,
socialism, tribalism, national pride, anti-Semitism, and anti-Americanism. Furthermore,
both approaches provide an excessive focus on the end result of transitions, while
overlooking many important complexities of the development process itself, such as
popular attitudes toward reform, the implementation challenges that face specific
countries, and expectations based on experience, which might be called “culture” or
“tradition.”
As a result, 1 question these major assumptions made by predominant scholars of
both economic and political transitions, particularly as these assumption fit in the
relatively unique context of the former Soviet Union. Given Russia's size, culture, and
history, a rapid transition to capitalism was bound to have varied and profound effects on
Russian society for years to come. The turbulent years of rapid reform produced many
different viewpoints on the nature and impact of shock therapy in Russia, most of which
were predominately negative throughout the first decade of reform.
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The implementation process of Shock Therapy generated a significant debate on
the effectiveness of the model. David Lipton contends that “in the midst of political and
economic turmoil in Russia, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that economic reforms
launched in the beginning of 1992 brought about significant improvements” in a
relatively short period of time.
00
This turmoil most notably took the form of inflation
which reached 250% in January of 1992. When Gaidar removed official price restraints,
in line with policies of price liberalization, demand pushed prices upward. “Even though
markets will not function well until stabilization and privatization are accomplished,”
Lipton observes, “the Russian economy has been transformed to a market economy.” 100
According to Lipton, the Russian economy of 1993 barely resembled that of the
economic situation in 1991, “let alone that of the past seven decades.” 101 The remnants of
central planning were removed by liberalization of prices and economic activity, while
enterprises were granted the freedom to determine what goods to produce and how to
produce them. Government and industry associations stopped issuing directives to
enterprise managers. New commercial ventures and activities quickly developed, such as
the kiosk business in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Internationally, trade barriers were
lifted and a floating exchange rate was developed that helped to enhance access to world
markets.
Though liberalization efforts were far from complete by the end of 1993, Lipton
concludes that new commercial relations were “emerging everywhere” and most
importantly, these relations were “based on market conditions, rather than on
directives.” " Lipton argues Russia's great natural resources and human resources
provide for tremendous economic potential. To implement fully functioning capitalism.
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however, Russia will have to shift resources out of heavy industry and into consumer
orientated manufacturing services. The dominance of military production has created vast
inefficiencies within the economic system that need to be corrected if capitalism is going
to take hold.
Abram Bergson views the “big bang” reforms under Yeltsin as the successor to
Gorbachev's reforms. Bergson claims that Yeltsin inherited “fiscal and market disarray”
upon taking office and points to Gorbachev's acknowledgement in 1990 that the “most
serious mistake in the years of pereistroika” was that “we lost control of the financial
situation in the country.” Responding to this grave situation “was a cardinal matter with
which Yeltsin would have to deal urgently.”
Bergson states that to Yeltsin’s credit he did so, “though with mixed results.” Bergson
points to privatization as a major component of the "big bang” development. “Under the
Big Bang,” Bergson explains, “property is supposed to be privatized in a wholesale way,”
but “how that is accomplished and how rapidly are knotty questions on which the
‘standard prescription’ itself understandably allows a degree of discretion.”
10
' In Russia,
privatization occurred quickly. By July of 1994, for example, 43% of all Russian
enterprises were privatized. Bergson claims this exhibits the sense of commitment by
Yeltsin and his associates to an unprecedented pace of transformation.
Bergson states that legally speaking “there has been a veritable revolution in
agricultural ownership, paralleling that in industry.”
104
The land no longer belongs to the
State, but those who work the land. Land can be bought and sold. Ownership can be
individual or collective. Given how quickly the market was initiated, however, "a farmer
must be bold to strike out on his own in Russian circumstances.”
10
" If in a cooperative
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farm, one likely faced resistance from other members. Local political authorities
developed binding policies that posed bureaucratic obstacles for farmers. The availability
of needed supplies and equipment was limited. For these and other reasons, there were
only 277,300 private family farms in April of 1995, just over 5% of Russia’s arable
land.
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Despite progress, Bergson discusses several areas of concern surrounding “big
bang” development in Russia. One area of concern is the monopolization of formerly
State controlled industries. According to Bergson, the government response to this
development was “rather ineffective” and by 1995, when the piece was written, the
problem w as not adequately resolved. 10 A second area of concern was the high inflation
of the early 1990’s. Though a price surge was expected under Gorbachev, as Lipton
acknowledges, “the nearly fourfold jump in 1992, however, was even greater than
anticipated.”
II,N
The Russian inflation rate was 2318% in 1992, 841% in 1993, 205%,
and 131% in 1995. "" Whereas inflation was repressed under Gorbachev, it became a
significant and overt problem under Yeltin. Inflation was the main the reason for the
resurgence of the Community Party in 1993, especially among older people who saw
their life savings made worthless by inflation.
A third area of concern was a steep decline of Russian output. Bergson points to
official data that revealed the GDP in 1994 was just 62% of the GDP in 1990. The
accumulated drop in GDP between 1992 and 1994 was nearly 40%, compared to just a
30% loss in GDP between 1929 and 1993 in America during the Great Depression 1 1(1
Bergson concludes that the collapse was due, at least in part, to the Big Bang and the
“confusion” and “disorganization” surrounding the transformation. Furthermore, Bergson
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contends that Russia absorbed a multitude of simultaneous shocks, which negatively
impacted economic growth. These shocks included the end of the Cold War, a shrinking
defense sector, the dissolution of Comecon, the Communist trading bloc, and the breakup
of an economically integrated USSR. 1 1
1
Given these trends and concerns, Bergson concludes that Russia experienced a
severe inflationary depression, just three years after independence. Inflationary
depression was a typical phenomenon in post-Communist transitions, but the severity in
Russia was unique. This development was not favorable to the introduction of markets
and entrepreneurship, but many Russians fared well and not just the economic elites. This
was evident in the continuation of a social safety net that took a more liberal form.
Padma Desai is more critical of the ways in which shock therapy shaped the
development process in Russia. As Russia entered its fourth year of economic reform in
1995, Desai claims that doubts centered around three issues: 1 ) the pace of reform; 2) the
prospects for success; 3) the role of outside influences in the transition process.
According to Desai, the rapid economic reform undertaken in Russia simply could not be
achieved within a democratic political setting, “where consensus building is a slow but
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necessary process.
The size of the task created concern for scholars, such as Desai, who questioned
whether public attitudes necessary for free markets could rapidly take root in a country
that was used to central planning.
11
' Desai states that:
Decisions that are routine in market economies- what to produce, which
technologies to adopt, where to set up a factory, how much to borrow from a bank- turned
out to be daunting for those who had never been faced with such choices. Household
decisions about which job to select, or whether to borrow money to start a small business,
proved no less formidable. The interaction among countless choices like these generates
market efficiency. Few reforming economies were ready to leap from centralized
192
planning to a market in which innumerable decision makers had to play by an unfamiliar
set of rules.
1 14
Unfamiliarity was a problem in terms of foreign aid as well. “Russian
policymakers,” Desai explains, “unfamiliar with the complexities of aid diplomacy,
nursed hopes for aid and credits bilateral and multilateral sources that ran far ahead of
any potential flow.” These policymakers were joined by Harvard professors Jeffrey Sachs
and Graham Allison, who had “unrealistic expectations” and “floated a megabuck aid
plan designed to initiate rapid economic reforms in Russia.” The problem was that
Russian policymakers and the aforementioned Western advisers failed to recognize that
“foreign investors would not send capital to Russia without sound opportunities to turn a
profit” and a stable, dependable economic system that makes risks more bearable. 11
^
Desai argues that the transition would have been more successful if Congress and
the Reagan administration had not insisted on democratization including the liberation of
the Baltic Republics and that aid, trade, and credits, would be delivered "only if the
USSR embraced a full package of market-based reforms in the areas of financial
discipline, price decontrol, and privatization of factories.” 1 "’ This “all-or-nothing
approach” was designed to prevent a sequencing of reforms that would undertake one
type of transition, political or economic, prior to the other. The Russian reform process
soon demonstrated that “economic reforms cannot be swiftly initiated and carried out if
political arrangements include checks and balances between the executive authority that
proposes reforms and the legislature that must accept them.” 1
1
Shock therapists, such as Sachs, did not realize this at the time and instead
believed that time and compromises were “like a ditch that could be leapt in a single
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bound.” More specifically, the period of “extraordinary politics” was understood as a
unique situation in which “the public would be willing to endure the pain of high prices
and joblessness.” In contrast, a more gradual approach “would drag things out
intolerably, making such costs felt long after politics had turned ‘ordinary’ again and
giving opponents of reform a chance to regroup and counterattack.” 1 Is
Desai, on the other hand, was clearly a proponent of a more gradual approach in
both the political and economic realms because such an approach would have been more
effective in producing lasting democratic norms, such as a peaceful process of consensus
building. Instead, Russian policymakers and Western advisers sought to push a set of
reforms in 1992 through a “window of opportunity” that were not supported by the
popular branch of government. This reduced the reform process to a “disappointing
routine” by the end of 1994.
The amount of aid was far short of promises and what aid was granted was not
being absorbed quickly enough. For example, $43.4 billion was promised to Russia from
abroad in 1993, but only a little more than half that amount actually allocated. In addition
to aforementioned criticisms of shock therapists, Desai blames Russian authorities for not
coming up with appropriate project proposals to utilize available funding. The World
Bank, for example, approved nearly $3 billion in loans in June of 1994, but at the time,
only $587 million from the first World Bank loan in August of 1992 was used. Similarly,
Congress approved nearly $2 billion in aid between 1992 and 1994, but less than $500
million was spent by December of 1994. 111
Still, the heated confrontations between reformers and the nomenklatura did
subside in favor of greater pragmatism. Unlike 1992 and 1993, the Chernomyrdin
194
government prepared to compromise with various Duma factions in 1994 when it came to
limiting the budget. At the time, Desai concluded that “the sensible option for Russia
(was) a steady transition defined by a more manageable inflation rate” because “how
inflation control is handled will influence political outcomes, which in turn will help to
structure economic choices in the next round of Russia's transition.” 120
According to Hedlund and Sundstrom, the next round of reform was a bit more
successful than the period described by Lipton, Bergson, and Desai, though significant
problems and obstacles remained. The summer of 1995 produced the first signs of
potential recovery. This was evident in falling inflation, which reached a low of 3.2% in
December of 1995, and a decrease in the rate of GDP decline, which fell from double
digits between 1992 and 1994 to a 4% decline in 1995. The OECD released a study in
October of 1996 that claimed inflation and the budget deficit were under control. 121
Hedlund and Sundstrom argue that “the debate on Russian economic reform has
been marked by two characteristics which have combined in a rather unfortunate manner
to block traditional economic analysis.” The first characteristic was a strong focus on
policy, which led to a debate between rapid and gradual approaches to reform. The
second characteristic was “the sense of being involved in something exceptional” which
“led to the application of a variety of miracle cures at the expense of sound existing
knowledge.” 1-
'
Hedlund and Sundstrom contend that the exceptional nature of shock therapy was
unfortunate because the institutional realities of Russian society were pushed to the
background by assuming that Russia did not significantly differ from Western market-
oriented economies. Five years into the transition, Hedlund and Sundstrom conclude that
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this assumption was wrong because “Russian society was seriously lacking in terms of
such institutions- formal and informal- that combine to make a functioning market
economy possible.” Rather, a shared belief in the exceptional nature of the Russian
transition “provided legitimacy for miracle cures, which often had little or no foundation
in economic theory.” Hedlund and Sundstrom explain:
With more than four years of accumulated experience of attempted systematic
change, we can hardly avoid concluding that many of even the most pessimistic
expectations have been met and exceeded. This applies not only to shortcomings in the
design of reform- the really crucial issues relate to the ability of the Russian economy to
undertake institutional change, and the ability of Russian society to transform such
fundamental social and legal norms as they combine to draw the line between the junule
1 ^4
and the market economy.
The poor state of the Russian economy between 1992 and 1994 of economic
transition was evident in a 40% drop in GDP, a 45% drop in industrial output, a 60%
drop in investment, and a 25% drop in real wages. Hedlund and Sundstrom adopt
Steven Rosefielde’s characterization of the situation as one of “hyper-depression.” 126
Furthermore, Hedlund and Sundstrom point to other scholars, such as Vincent Coen and
Michael Marrese, who provide several reasons as to why Russia should have
outperformed its neighbors, both in and out of the former Soviet Union. Russia had
several advantages over other transition economies, such as “vast deposits of natural
resources, a huge domestic market, a potential for substantial gains in terms of trade,
lagging sectors with a great potential for efficiency improvement, a total absence of
restitution problems and- perhaps most important- overwhelming interest and support
from the West.”
Other scholars, however, emphasize continuity, rather than variance, in
understanding the post-Soviet transition. Stanley Fischer, for example, points out that all
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former Soviet republics experienced shocks, the most important being the collapse of
Comecon and Soviet trade. At the same time, Fischer argues that cross-country data fails
to support the idea that shock therapy produced a decline in output that would have been
greater than no reform or a gradualist approach.
Countries that decided not undertake rapid reform programs, such as Ukraine and
Hungary, have output declines as large as declines in countries with radical reform
programs, such as Russia and Poland. In turn, Fischer concludes that the debate between
big bang approaches and gradual approaches oversimplifies debates over the pace of
reform. In contrast to Desai, Fischer argues that conditions in the former Soviet Union are
very different than in China, the predominant model for gradual transition. Fischer
explains:
The economies are more heavily industrialized, and their agricultural sectors are
too small to be the driving force of reform. Their state-owned industrial sectors are too
large and inefficient to be ignored, as they were in China, and the restructuring is certain
to cause more unemployment. While China has succeeded in maintaining
macroeconomic control, both Poland and Russia had to start their reform programs in
conditions of extreme macroeconomic instability. 1 "
In addition to significant drop-offs in output, however, Hedlund and Sundstrom
contend that the distributional consequences of inflation in Russia were “dramatic.” “All
those with minor savings in the bank saw their capital being wiped out,” Hedlund and
Sundstrom explain, while “all those who lived on fixed incomes- state wages, pensions or
other transfers- experienced a sharp reduction in their real incomes.” Like Bergson,
Hedlund and Sundstrom claim that the impact of inflation was much more severe than
anticipated. In 1991, for example, money expansion was “clearly out of hand,” as
“Moscow printed more money than had been created during the previous 30 years!”
I_s
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Though inflation in Russia was much less in 1994, “an annual inflation rate of more than
200% must nevertheless be considered a very serious problem.” I2g
1 ledlund and Sundstrom also discuss other indicators aside from the commonly
discussed macroeconomic indicators. They claim there is also cause for concern from a
regional perspective, where the dynamics of redistribution are more astounding. Between
1992 and 1994, the gap between per capita real incomes of the poorest oblast compared
to the richest oblast, increased from eight times more, to 42 times more. This indicates
that some of regions now suffer from very severe poverty. Equally troubling, is the fact
that 75% to 80% of all financial transactions just take place in Moscow. 110
These developments lead Hedlund and Sundstrom to conclude that the Russian
economy was significantly restructured, true to the intention of reformers, but the
direction of change “has hardly been that which is normally associated with
modernization within the framework of a modern economy.” 1
' 1 A significant problem
w as how “shock therapy was implemented as a military offensive- there would either be a
quick breakthrough or the whole war would be lost.” 1 ’ 2 The shock was artificial because
it failed to adequately consider the specific institutions of the Russian economy,
suggesting that Russian transition policy was more driven from expediency, than
comprehensive strategies rooted in economic theory and development experiences.
Politically, voting in way that actually meant something was still quite new in
1995, the year of the Duma election. Voting occurred frequently under the Soviet system,
but only since independence did Russians had the opportunity to choose between
candidates, parties, or between voting and not voting. The Duma was elected to a two
year term, in contrast to the typical four year term. Shortly after the success of
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ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Communists, Yegor Gaider, leader of pro-
reform Russia's Choice, acknowledged that reformers were dealt a “bitter defeat” and
resigned from government. The 1995 Duma elections were positioned to shape
parliamentary politics for rest of the decade.
Electoral law in 1995 was very similar to the 1993 election. The controversial
dual system of party lists and individual constituencies remained in place. The political
environment was quite different however. Aforementioned economic turmoil promoted
significant economic inequality. Many Russians were living below basic subsidence, as
high as one-third by some estimates. 8% of Russians were officially out of work, while
another 20% not being paid on a regular basis. Meanwhile, the wealthy were getting
wealthier in both absolute and relative terms. In 1995, the wealthiest 10% were earning
25 times more than the poorest 10%. 1 " Life expectancies were falling and crime was
increasing. The number of murders had doubled in just three years and three Duma
members were among the victims.
The Central Election Commission reported that 273 organizations were entitled to
nominate candidates for the Duma and 69 organizations declared their intention to do so.
To compete, electoral law required that electoral associations gather at least 200,000
signatures of electors and no greater than 7% of these signatures could come from one
republic or region. Candidates running for single member districts were required to
gather at least 1% support from the respective constituency. In these 225 districts, the
candidate who secured the most votes won the respective seat. The remaining 225 seats
allocated by proportional representation required that electoral associations secure at least
5% of the vote and at least 25% of the electorate turn out to vote.
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2,627 individual candidates were nominated, 1,055 independents. 43 parties were
registered. 5,675 total candidates filled out party lists. Parties could be divided into four
groupings: 1 ) reform; 2) pro-government; 3) national-patriotic; 4) Communist. The
reform group was dedicated to further democratic and capitalist reform. Reformist parties
included Russia’s Choice, under Gaider, the Peasant Party, under Yuri Chernichenko, the
Social Democratic Party, under Alexander Yakolev, and Yabloko, under Grigorii
Yavlinksky. The pro-government group was a coalition of power-holding elites dedicated
to maintaining Chemomydrin's governance. The group represented two major interests;
the energy complex, in which Chemomydrin was a central figure, and the metallurgical
complex, in which Oleg Soskovets was a central figure.
The national-patriotic group was centered on organizations such as the Congress
of Russian Communities, which was led by representatives of important constituencies.
This included Yuri Skokov, a former chairman of the Security Council, Sergei Galz’ev, a
former minister of foreign trade, and Alexander Lebed, a very popular military general.
The Congress sought the gradual and peaceful reconstruction of the Soviet Union, the
restoration of Russia as a great power, tougher action against crime, the promotion of an
effective and socially oriented market economy, and greater support of traditional
Russian institutions such as the church and family. 134 The Communist group centered on
the Communist Party of Russian Federation led by Zyuganov. The mass membership of
over a half million and relatively well developed networks of local activism was unique
compared to other parties. In turn, the Communist Party was the only organization that
was truly larger than its key leader. This was evident in how Zyuganov was less popular
than the party he led.
1 °
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White, Wyman, and Oates contend that the single most important document that
dictated the nature of the 1995 campaigns was adopted by the Central Electoral
Commission on September 20. 1 ^ ’ Regulations stated that the media must refrain from
any bias in news coverage and required the allotment of free air time to all registered
parties and candidates. One hour of each day between November 15 and December 15
was shared by registered parties, while individual candidates made arrangements with
regional electoral commissions. Individual candidates were granted up to 20 minutes of
radio or television coverage as well free advertising in local press. The European Institute
of the Media, who monitored the campaign on behalf of the European Union, reported
that free time was distributed with compliance to regulations aside from a few minor
complaints. Given tremendous size of the country and the weak development of
membership structures and winter conditions, parties put a lot of effort into television
commercials. Both television and printed media focused more on individual leaders than
party platforms.
The Central Electoral Commission also limited campaign expenditures. Campaign
funds were processed through special temporary accounts in the national bank. Campaign
spending for political associations was capped at $2.4 million and $95,000 for individual
candidates. Donations were regulated as well. Individuals could contribute up to $284 to
a party and no more than $190 to a candidate’s election fund. Private firms could
contribute up to $1,900 to candidate’s election fund and $19,000 to a party. Contributions
from foreigners, international organizations, and Russian firms with over 30% foreign
ownership were prohibited. 1
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According to survey evidence, Russians had mixed feelings about the electoral
process. 90% believed the results would be manipulated, while 57% thought they would
have little to no effect on government policy. At the same time, over half of those polled
believed that it was the duty of citizens in a democratic society to participate in elections,
two-thirds of whom completely supported this view. In October of 1995, 70% claimed
they intended to vote, which was up from 60% in April. Three quarters of Russians
believed that Russia was headed in the wrong direction. Only 16% expressed confidence
in Yeltsin and just 1 1% in the Duma. Discontent could be explained by the fact that 56%
of Russians stated their standard of living had declined in the previous year. 1
s
64% of the electorate turned out to vote. 993 registered election observers from 61
countries were distributed throughout the country. The consensus of international
observers was that the will of the populace was accurately reflected. A delegation from
the European Parliament declared the elections were “100% free and democratic.” The
International Foundation for Electoral Systems claimed that the high turnout was an
“important indicator of the confidence of electors,” w hile America’s Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded that popular sovereignty had finally taken
roots.
Some observers asserted that most problems that were observed, such as
obstructed ballot boxes, open voting, family voting and insufficient verification of results,
were more the product of exhaustion and democratic inexperience, rather than fraudulent
intent. Other observers were less complacent and raised concerns about how the Central
Electoral Commission allowed parties to fill in all the information ofmembers on their
party lists aside from their signatures and pointed to evidence of falsification of electoral
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results. The OSCE parliamentary delegation commented that the large number of parties
permitted to participate in the election created confusion among voters and the ballot was
so large that it could not be spread out in the voting booth.
14
Four parties surpassed the 5% barrier in the proportional representation portion of
the election. Not surprisingly, the left did very well at the polls, particularly the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). Electoral support of the CPRF rose
10% from 1993. The CPRF won double the vote totals of any other party and gained
control of over one-third of the Duma. The Liberal Democrats under Zhirinovsky was
the second most successful party in terms of party lists, but the 1 1% vote share was half
their total in 1993. Yabloko emerged as the central party within the democratic
opposition to Yeltsin. The party captured five single-member constituencies in St.
Petersburg, which made it the best positioned party in the city. Our Home is Russia, the
final party to surpass 5%, was down a bit from the major pro-government party in 1993,
Russia’s Choice.
The Duma that took office in January of 1996 was “an imperfect reflection of the
parties and individual candidates that had been successful in the elections.” 140 Hundreds
of candidates withdrew from party lists, dozens became independents or switched party
affiliation, and “many of the leading figures on party lists decided not to take their
seats.”
141 As a result, the election was more of a referendum on Yeltsin, than an
organized choice on political alternatives. Given the power granted to the president in the
constitution, the Duma election was little more than a dress rehearsal for the upcoming
presidential election.
Other scholars understood the consequences of the 1995 elections to be more
profound. Steven Fish, for example, emphasized the paradoxical nature of the elections.
Though the elections were free and fair, the results revealed “a portentous popular
nostalgia for a radiant communist past.” ~ Fish argues that “the elections both refuted a
clutch of assumptions that have informed the pessimistic conventional wisdom on the
Russian electorate and revealed the decrepitude of present-day Russian liberalism.”
Fish argues that many assumptions about the Russian electorate were overturned
as a result of the 1995 elections. First, the election demonstrated that Russians were not
politically passive. Nearly two-thirds of all Russian adults voted. Less than 3% of
Russian voters voted against all parties. Second, the election demonstrated that Russians
were not easily manipulated even though voters were unaccustomed to democratic
participation. The most successful party, the CPRF, did very little advertising and spent
just $250,000 on the campaign. In contrast. Our Home is Russia spent ten times more and
won just half the votes. Third, the election demonstrated that Russians do not just vote im-
personalities. Parties that were led by engaging personalities, such as Boris Fedorov's
Forward Russia and Svyatoslav Fedorov’s Party of Workers’ Self-Management, were
outperformed by parties led by “colorless bureaucrats,” such as Zyuganov’s CPRF and
Chernomydin's Our Home is Russia. Given these developments, Fish views the Russian
electorate as a threat. The aftermath of the election “raised an extremely unpleasant issue:
What if the Russian people vote democracy into oblivion?” 14 ' The problem, as Fish sees
it, is that Liberalism in Russia as of yet had not “offered an effective solution to the
crucial matter of reconciling private interests and the public good.”
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In transitions theory, the second election typically is a significant milestone on the
path to democratic consolidation. Significant political actors are supposed to have
accepted the political and economic rules of the game which have been stabilized.
Russia’s 1995 election, on the other hand, did not bring these signs of consolidation.
Michael McFaul explains:
The 1995 parliamentary elections served to divide Russian political forces more
sharply into supporters and opponents of the new political and economic order. Most
strikingly, and in contrast to East European transformations, Russia’s main opposition
party still accepts neither the political nor the economic institutions of the new status quo:
Communist leaders have called the dissolution of the Soviet Union a criminal act that
must be reversed. The fusion of nationalism and communism in the CPRF makes it more
dangerous than communist-successor parties in Hungary, Poland, or the Baltic states.
While Russian Communist leaders now affirm that private property can coexist with state
and collective property (but deserves no special privilege), they have also vowed to undo
“illegal” privatizations. In sum, Russia's Communists have not “reformed” in the way
that their Polish or Hungarian counterparts have. Russian Communist leaders, far from
disavowing the heritage of the CPSU (the same party that squelched democracy,
eliminated private property, and killed millions of its own citizens), proudly flaunt it.
These deep divisions persisted in the 1996 presidential election, which many
political observers expected Yeltsin to lose. As a commentator from Pravada put it:
“logically, he should have lost, since he was unable to fully solve any of the problems
that have piled up: the stagnation of production, the improverishment of a majority of the
people, growing unemployment, the chronic nonpayment of wages, the decline in
science, culture and education, the continuing conflict in Chechnya, etc. Nevertheless,
Yeltsin receive a majority of the electorate’s votes.” 144 In of January of 1996 Yeltsin was
only at 8% in the polls. Other major candidates, such as Gennadi Zyuganov, Grigori
lavlinski, Aleksandr Lebed, and Vladimir Zhirinovski, were more popular. 14 The
election was held in two rounds of voting, the first on June 1 7, and the second on July 3.
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Yeltsin used the media to his advantage throughout the campaign. Observers from
the OSCE reported that relevant electoral law on the allotment of free television and radio
time for candidates was generally respected, but news coverage and political commentary
was significantly imbalanced in Yeltsin's favor, both in terms of the amount of coverage
and how positively Yeltsin was portrayed compared to other candidates. OSCE
spokesperson Michael Meadowcroft stated that “from a very early time the contest came
to be regarded as virtually a two horse race and the media retlected and accelerated this
perception with the result that there was hardly any coverage of the remaining
candidates.” Yeltsin (35%) and Communist candidate Gennadi Zyuganov (32%) emerged
as the top two contenders after the first round of voting.
Electoral law stated that incumbent Presidents pursuing reelection “may not take
advantage of his official standing for the term election.” Yeltsin, however, made highly
publicized visits to various regions and promised large sums of state funds for local
projects. On Election Day, multiple infringements of electoral law were observed in
varying degrees of seriousness. The most widely shared concern of international
observers was the lack of secrecy during the voting process. Greater instruction was
needed to ensure that voters voted in the voting booths. Several presidential candidates
voted in public, which many observers believed this set a bad example. The most
egregious cases were in Tatarstan where Yeltsin supporters solicited votes in front of
voting booths. In some cases, individuals were seen coming out of the voting booths w ith
several ballots.
146
Many of the same problems persisted in the second round of voting. The OSCE
observed that "the continued provision of desks, together w ith pens, in the open area of a
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number of polling stations suggests that the vital concept and purpose of secret voting
have not yet been appreciated.” Yeltsin’s disproportionate media coverage persisted as
well. The OSCE mission concluded that “the impotence of the Central Electoral
Commission in enforcing its own resolutions showed both a lack of will on its members’
part and also a need to strengthen the C’EC’s powers in relation to media regulation
during the period of the election campaign.”
14 '
When the votes were tallied. Yeltsin won nearly 54% of the vote, compared to
40% for Zyuganov. In contrast to many postcommunist states, the sitting government in
Russia was not punished for poor economic performance as had been the case in
Lithuania, Poland, flungary, and Bulgaria. Yeltsin’s success was the product of several
factors, such as the manipulation of the media, widespread promises of federal funding,
the announcement of Chechen peace talks, and a widely shared belief in the electorate a
capitalist market was inevitable. I4S Despite electoral transgressions, the European
Institute for the Media and the OSCE declared the elections were well managed and
accurately reflected the will of the electorate, despite the imbalance of media coverage,
disproportionate resources available to candidates, and inappropriate activities from
within the administration during the campaign period. 14g
Yeltsin narrowly, but successfully, navigated himself through very difficult
political terrain. This enabled economic reform to continue, albeit uncertain, inequitable,
and unpopular. The first chapter of the post-Soviet era closed with democratic elections
being secured as a commonly accepted pail of the political system. At the same time,
deep political divisions, economic woes, and institutional uncertainty loomed as serious
and constant threats to the sustainability of a transition to popular government and a
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market economy. Though most advocates of greater reform did not realize it at the time,
Russia was fast approaching a deep and profound crisis.
Russia faced several obstacles to reform prior to the 1998 economic collapse. One
problem was tax collection. Lawrence Summers observed that “despite some of the
highest tax rates in the world, Russia has one of the lowest rates of overall tax
collections” because approximately “17% of firms pay taxes regularly and in full, while
at least a third publish no accounts and make no tax payments at all.” 1 ' 11 Clifford Gaddy
explains:
New taxes are introduced and others abolished, rates are raised or lowered,
exemptions are granted and withdrawn at a dizzying pace. This unpredictability has been
detrimental to economic development, especially new business creation. But an important
element of predictability in tax policy is the seriousness w ith which it is being enforced.
The collectability of a tax is as much a part of who or what is being taxed as how much.
A sudden crackdown in enforcement, though laudable on paper, is in fact a major
unanticipated increase in the real tax burden.
1 1
Organized crime has also had a devastating impact on Russia's economy because
“it discourages foreign investment, deprives the country of its tax base, dominates the
banking sector and financial markets, and exacerbates the already widespread problem of
corruption.”
1
" In contrast to Columbian and Italian organized crime, most profits from
Russian organized crime are deposited and invested abroad, rather than domestically. An
estimated $50 to $150 billion was exported from Russia between 1991 and 1997. At
minimum, 40% of the approximately $2 billion in capital flight each month was
attributable to organized crime. 15
’
In addition to not paying taxes, organized crime deprived the state of needed
resources. Regional crimes bosses controlled customs warehouses throughout the country
and many customs officials were on the payroll of crime groups to divert revenues from
208
the state to organized crime. Organized crime infiltrated the domestic banking sector as
well, which caused millions of citizens to lose their limited savings in pyramid schemes
and collapsed banking institutions. Hundreds of banks were run by organized crime and
launder money abroad. Other banks, who did not launder money, cannot compete. In
turn, “this criminalization of the banking sector and financial institutions has boosted
capital night .”
1 4
Atop Russian society, a wealthy group of individuals exercised a disproportionate
amount of power and influence. In 1996, Boris Berezovsky, a business mogul in
automobile manufacturing, oil, and the media, claimed that a “magnificent seven” group
of wealthy individuals control half of the Russian economy. 1 ^ The remaining six men
include Vladimir Goussinsky, Mikhail Kodorkovsky, Valdimir Potanin, Alexander
Smolensky, V. Vinogradov, and Rem Vyakihirev. Akin to Berezovsky, these men are
powerful figures in industry, banking, and the news media.
During the first several years of the Russian transition, the government struck
deals with tax debtors of insolvent companies out of fear for the social consequences of
enforcing financial discipline. Only a quarter of Russian companies were financially
sound firms as of 1996, with well-established domestic or export markets. As Blasi,
Kroumova, and Kruse observe, “three quarters of Russian corporations (were) in need of
radical and far-reaching restructuring” and “at least a quarter of those firms should be
bankrupt.”
IM '
Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse argue that the government would soon face a huge
budget crisis and not be able to simultaneously fund social programs for the needy and
grant tax breaks for corporations and cronies. In turn, “the government must start to
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extend aid to weak citizens directly through health, welfare, unemployment, and training
programs and let firms stand or fall on their own.” 1 ' By March of 1997, Russia owed
more than $8.8 million in back wages to more than a million of government workers and
pensioners. Budget revenues were only 55% of the anticipated amounts in January and
February of 1997. As a result, spending was only half as much as anticipated. 1 s
The first six years of economic transition undoubtedly produced profound change.
Though government ownership of the economy was significantly reduced, the
consequences of rapid reform led to significant debate over the effectiveness of shock
therapy as a model of transition. The first period of reform ( 1991-1994) was highly
unstable and produced little economic benefit aside from massive privatization.
Significant problems included the persistent influence of the nomenklatura
,
monopolization of former state industries, extraordinarily high inflation, shrinking
economic production, decreased investment, and falling real wages. The second period of
reform ( 1995-1998) witnessed stabilization of earlier chaos and disruption, but failed to
establish a solid economic foundation for sustained economic development. Many
analysts feared that economic crisis was imminent if the government remained unable to
effectively raise and distribute revenues.
The emphasis of economic transition scholars, such as Jeffrey Sachs and Anders
Aslund, who served as Western advisers to Russia, clearly prioritized privatization over
the creation of transparent, legitimate, and sustainable market environment, which would
take much longer. Such policymakers deserve credit for removing State ownership from
much of the economy; however, an inadequate focus on the processes of institutional
reform produced economic, social, and political consequences that generated widespread
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hardship for many Russians and severely limited the development of an effective
capitalist economy. Shock therapy, therefore, can only be said to have produced mix
results at best.
Gregory Glazkov’s critique of calls for radical reform under Gorbachev provides
a useful metaphor in understanding the process of shock therapy. “There is a transition
problem,” Glazkov explained prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, “if you want to get
down from a tree, you have to climb. What you are offering us it to jump. We will break
our legs and neck!” 1 '
4
As 1 see it. Russian policymakers and Western advisers opted to
jump. At this point, it would be difficult and of limited usefulness to speculate whether a
more gradual approach would have tit better in Russia. Clearly, however, the Russian
experience is not an empirically sound validation for the shock therapy model being
similarly applied to other nations. At the very least, Russian shock therapy would have
significantly benefited from greater recognition of how the process of transition was as
important as the desired results, if not more so. Doing so would have helped to establish a
solid foundation for a competitive, efficient, and legitimate privately-owned market
economy. Instead, shock therapy created widespread chaos and uncertainty which served
as a foundation for the rise of a strong political leader more concerned with stability than
fully functioning capitalism or democracy.
Investor panic was the proximate cause of economic crisis in 1998. Foreign
investors were shaken by the Asian financial crisis and feared that short term treasury
bills, known as GKO’s, would lose value because of the ruble exchange rate. Loss of
revenue created significant problems for Russian authorities who faced large budget
deficits, persistent capital (light, and falling world oil prices."’" As a result, the “fragile
turnaround ofGDP growth visible toward the end of 1997 came to a halt.” 161
In May of 1998, President Yeltsin, and his new Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko,
worked to pass an austerity package that would cut the budget deficit. Success was
limited however. Soon, the Moscow stock market was less than half the starting level of
the beginning of the year. The yield (monthly average of trading GKO's) dropped below
20% in the summer of 1997, 40% in May of 1998, and 60% in June. 16"
In June of 1998. Russia’s international finance negotiator, Anthony Chubias
campaigned abroad for $10 to $15 billion to help stabilize financial markets. According
to Chubias, funding would help Russia stabilize the ruble and pay off mounting debt.
Kiriyenko set forth plans to cut government spending by 42 billion rubles ($6.8 billion)
and increase tax revenues by 20 billion rubles ($3.2 billion). The proposed reforms were
designed to address concerns of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who criticized
Russia for not restructuring quickly enough. President Yeltsin gave parliament a deadline
for supporting the measures or they would be pursued “by other means.” 16 '
A Western financial assistance package was reached in July. The package was
composed of $22.6 billion from the IMF, World Bank, and Japanese government
credits
164 $14.8 billion was loaned immediately and another $7.8 billion loaned in
1999."’" The assistance package did not immediately restore market confidence and
yields continued to rise. Yeltsin continued to resist devaluing the ruble. Days later,
however, the Central Bank announced that the ruble would be allowed to fluctuate (up to
9.5 to one dollar), after much effort to keep it pegged at 6.3 rubles per dollar, halted
interest payments on foreign debt for 90 days, and converted GKO's into long-term bills.
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Sergei Dubinin, governor of the Central Bank, claimed the moves were designed
to help Russian citizens and hurt “financial speculators” taking advantage of the Russian
marker for months.
166
The changes created problems for Russian banks, however, many
of whom held GKO’s and borrowed large sums from abroad. As the ruble fell below the
new exchange rate, banks started to reject attempts by Russian citizens to convert rubles
to dollars.
16
Analysts warned that a weaker ruble could increase inflation, the lowering
of which, was a major economic achievement under Yeltsin's government. Yeltsin had
more immediate problems.
In a special emergency session, the Duma called for President Yeltsin to “stop
fulfilling his presidential power before the end of this term.” 161' The Duma declared that
Russia was in a “deep crisis” and the President was not taking the necessary steps to
protect citizens. Kiriyenko defended the government's record, claimed this was only the
beginning of financial crisis, and urged the Duma to drop its opposition to economic
reform measures advocated by the President. Yeltsin sacked the entire Kiriyenko
government and sought to replace Kiriyenko with Victor Chemomydrin. The Duma
rejected the appointment eight days later. A deal was discussed to keep Chemomydrin as
Prime Minister in exchange for granting the Duma more power in Russian governance,
but this was abandoned just prior to the vote. 164
As acting Prime Minister, Chemomydrin asked the Russian people not to
withdraw their money from private banks. The currency fell to 13 rubles per dollar,
which was a 50% drop in just two weeks. A few days later, the Duma rejected a second
vote on Chemomydrin as Prime Minister. This prompted President Yeltsin to nominate
Yevgeny Primakov for the post, a decision welcomed by the Duma and one that enabled
decision enabled Yeltsin to avoid potential impeachment hearings.
Primakov was a career diplomat, primarily in foreign affairs, and had no
experience in economic affairs. The new Prime Minister appointed Yuri Masalyukov, a
Communist, to the post of Deputy Prime Minister. Though Primakov denied that the
appointment constituted a return to Soviet ideology, the Prime Minister did claim that a
“socially orientated economy” was best for Russia. A new government was formed
again in May of 1099. which dropped Masalyukov, but “failed to install a strong, united
economic policy team.” 1 71
Economic and political instability surrounding the 1998 crisis significantly
impacted every day citizens. Allan Little explains:
1 did not realize it in that instant, but when 1 caught her eye she was just going
into the first phase of a profound emotional trauma, this quiet, patient middle-aged lady at
whom 1 was pointing a television camera and asking for her views on the latest twist in
Russia's agonizing descent into economic collapse. And in the few minutes that followed
she visibly fell apart, weeping, inconsolable, unable finally even to speak.
She and her husband had been queuing since 8:00 in the morning - it was now
about 3:30 in the afternoon - at a bank kiosk near Red Square. All day they had
persevered, watching with each hour that passed the value of the rubles they were waiting
to withdraw drop further and further against the dollar on the electronic price board by
the kiosk window.
And when finally their turn came, suddenly and cruelly the attendant behind the
bullet-proof glass slammed the hatch shut in their tired anxious faces, declaring that the
kiosk had run out of cash and was ceasing trading for the day.
That was when 1 caught her eye. Her husband spoke because she could not. They
had worked for 20 years at a military base in the frozen north of Russia, and saved all that
they had earned and had returned to Moscow at the end of the 1980s. In the hyper-
innation that attended the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 they had lost everything.
They had picked themselves up and started again, saving enough in the 90s to put
them back on their feet and allow them to think, cautiously, about retiring. And now they
could see it all beginning to happen again. And there was one theme he kept returning to
214
again and again: we are honest people, he kept saying, we have worked honestly and
earned honest money and this is our reward. 1
Little observed in 1999 that “if you are honest in Russia the chances are that your
family will go hungry” or “your children will not be educated,” whereas the dishonest
thrive.
1
' According to Little, this was a form of humiliation, rather than just economic
hardship. Consequently, many Russians failed to understand how the West viewed
Yeltsin as a “progressive liberal reformer taking on the twin evils of reactionary
communism and criminal mafia business tycoons.” President Bill Clinton, meanwhile,
described Western support as a process of “helping Yeltsin’s overcome the worst of the
past, including his own past,” in which progress occurs incrementally with “two-steps
forward, one-step backward.” 1 °
Strobe Talbott argues that the loans-for-shares program belongs among the worst
of President Yeltsin’s past. Prospects for reelection in 1996 were so dismal that Yeltsin
and his advisers concluded that the campaign needed to rely on oligarch wealth and
control of media outlets to enhance public relations. In turn, “the Kremlin paid oligarchs
back with vast opportunities for insider trading.” 17
"
By decree, Yeltsin implemented the loans for shares program which claimed to
sell state assets to “citizen investors.” In reality, auctions were “rigged in favor of large
banks that then made massive loans to government.” 1
7
Consequently, some of the
world’s largest energy and metals companies were hence controlled by a small number of
financial groups. Talbott claims that “loans for shares introduced a new and distorting
factor in Russia’s evolution, since it substantially increased the power of oligarchs as a
force in Russian economic and political life, making a mockery of Russia’s incipient
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regulatory structures, like its new Securities and Exchange Commission.” 1 s Media
outlets were liberated from state control, but many of these and other enterprises were
placed under the control of oligarchs such as Berezovsky.
Yeltsin’s erratic behavior in 1997 and 1998 was particularly troubling to Russian
oligarchs. The President looked sickly and made several public blunders while recovering
from heart surgery. Many Russians felt that a strong leader was necessary. Berezovsky
and other oligarchs began to seriously entertain the idea of creating a “corporate
government.”
lso
This government would operate as “a shadow board of directors” who
would appoint ministers and “informally run the country.”
The State was feeble, but big capital was strong. David Hoffman explains:
The tycoons gathered quietly at the headquarters of Yukos, Russia's second-
largest oil company, which was run by one of the oligarchs, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. The
shadow board of directors decided it was time for Chernomydrin to go, and they
discussed who would replace him. Berezovsky also met with Yeltsin’s chief of staff,
Valentin Yumashev, and the president’s influential younger daughter, Tatyana
Dyachenko.
On Saturday, March 21, 1998, at this country house outside of Moscow,
Berezovsky gave a long, taped interview to Itogi, a television news program popular
among the political elite. The program was carried on Russia’s largest and most
successful private television channel, NTV, founded by another of the oligarchs,
Vladimir Gusinsky.
In the interview, Berezovsky declared pointedly that the campaign to succeed
Yeltsin was already under way and that none of the leading candidates were ‘electable.’
He spoke vaguely about ‘immense opportunities to bring forward new people.' The
interview was broad cast on Sunday evening. The next morning, Yeltsin fired
Chernomydrin. 1NI
The 1998 crisis, however, was a significant turning point in Russian economic
development. Joseph Stiglitz emphasizes how devaluation led to a significant excess
supply of goods and decrease in imports. As a result, many Russians went from buying
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1 g2 .imported foreign goods to domestically produced goods. " Anders Aslund emphasizes
how the impact of the crash forced the government to cut public expenditures,
particularly subsidies of large industries, while the practice of barter was reduced by
requiring payments in hard currency.
IN
’ Though both distinguished economists agree that
the 1998 crisis provided a foundation for real economic change in Russia, Stiglitz and
Aslund disagree over the role of the International Monetary Fund in the recovery process.
Aslund claims that “the IMF action appears as a remarkable success in hindsight.” IM
Stiglitz, a well noted critic of the IMF, acknowledges that “Russia’s performance since
the crisis has been impressive,” but points out that “the IMF did not want Russia to
devalue” and Russia’s GDP as of 1999 was still nearly 30% below' its level at the
1 XS
beginning of the decade. ‘
Public contempt for government was strong. According to Rob Parsons, rarely has
an electorate become so disillusioned with the promises of liberal reform so quickly.
Millions were forced into destitution, while the Duma extended their parliamentary
privileges, stalled on important legislation, and remained saturated in corruption. Parson
describes the state of affairs leading up to the 1999 Duma elections:
The electoral debate has insulted the intelligence of ordinary Russians. In truth,
there has been no debate - not because there is no freedom of expression - there is - but
because television and the press have become the tools of the Kremlin and its rivals.
Truth has been the first victim of a relentless campaign of mud-slinging.
And all around there is chaos. There is no strategy for economic recovery,
corruption eats into the heart of the state apparatus, wages are miserly if they are paid at
all, crime goes unsolved, mobsters operate w ith impunity, billions of dollars leave the
country every month, and a human rights' report says torture has become routine in police
.
.• 1X6
stations.
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Some institutional was progress made however. Duma election law was upgraded
w ith each successive election. Updated laws incorporated recommendations of the
international observers. For example, the election law was amended in June of 1999 to
clarify the supervisory role of the Central Election Commission and enhance
transparency mechanisms, particularly for domestic observers. Is One significant revision
was replacing the rigid 5% barrier to elect party list candidates with a floating threshold.
Smaller parties who attain a 3% barrier were hence included if the total votes of parties
receiving at least 5% of vote was less than 50% of the participating voters. A second
revision created an alternative method to get on the ballot. Rather than gathering the
required signatures, candidates could “pay an electoral deposit of 2,000 times the
minimum wage (approximately $7,000) for a single mandate candidate and 50,000 times
the minimum wage (approximately $1 70,000) for a party list.” 1 SN The amounts were
approximately 10% of permitted campaign spending and had to be paid out the electoral
fund. The financial option was chosen by several individuals and organizations as their
method of registration. The limit on electoral expenses was $65,000 for single mandate
candidates and $1,700,000 for party lists. Still, most of the new electoral laws repeated
exact language of previous laws, which created confusion as to which law prevailed and
legal loopholes for candidates to undermine the intent of the law.
In contrast to the 1995 election, there was a movement toward broader alliances,
which cut the number of parties from 43 participating organizations to 26. Economic
recession, terrorist bombings, the conflict in Chechnya, and attempts to impeach the
President, all contributed to a turbulent political environment. Unlike past contests, “the
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campaign was not a clear reflection of an ‘opposition vs. incumbent’ contest in the usual
sense.”
189
Furthermore, “the 1999 election was not a struggle of political leaders teamed
against the ‘Communist threat’ which characterized the 1996 elections, but rather a
struggle of personalities to guarantee their own presence on the political summit during
the next four years.” Former Prime Ministers dominated the political landscape.
Examples include Yablako, who enticed Stepashin into the party leadership, and the
Union of Just Forces, who convinced Kirienko to head its party list. From the beginning,
many observers viewed the election as a primary for the presidential election scheduled
for the following spring.
Two new groups emerged as major contenders: the Fatherland-All Russia Bloc
and the Interregional Unity Movement otherwise known as Unity or Medved
,
which is
Russian for “the bear.” Competition emerged between these two groups within the
Kremlin base. The Unity Bloc was led by Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei
Shoigu, and the Fatherland-All Russia alliance was led by Luzkov, the powerful mayor of
Moscow, and Primakov, the former Prime Minister. This division among powerful
political elite was a sharp contrast to the alliance between Yeltsin and Mayor Luzkov,
which helped ensure the President’s success in the 1996 elections.
The campaign process was characterized by several features that led the OSCE to
conclude that “party politics in the traditional sense, has yet to fully mature.” First, party
politics continue to center on individual personalities, not platforms. Second, “the most
powerful players remain those that come together, not as real political parties founded on
common ideologies, but as strategic alliances often looking no farther ahead than the
specific election in which they want to compete.” 90 Third, campaign rhetoric was largely
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devoid of issues. A new phenomenon of “black” campaigning developed in Russia during
the 1999 campaign. This w as the use of slanderous attacks on opponents in lieu of
promoting programs or ideologies.
According to Robert Parsons, the parliamentary elections felt like “a sideshow to
two more important developments- the war in Chechnya and the rise of opinion polls of
the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.” For Parsons, the two developments are inextricably
linked because “the prime minister owes his popularity in large part to the success of the
Russian armed forces.” 1 " Lilia Shevtsova describes Putin’s rise to power:
Vladimir Valdimirovich Putin appeared on the national stage unexpectedly. The
political class as well as the public was surprised to see him, but everyone was so
exhausted by the moves leading up to this that the new holder of the prime minister’s
office roused no opposition. He was seen as just one more premier in a long line, most
likely an accidental figure. No one realized that this was the true heir. The unlikely
choice and Putin’s personality lulled suspicions. Many people simply paid no attention to
him or considered his appointment something of a joke. 19"
Putin quickly became an important political figure as the Kremlin’s favored
choice for the presidential elections scheduled for June of 2000. As Prime Minster, Putin
promised to restore Russian pride and enhance stability in a nation “tired of politics” and
“crying out for order again.”
11
' In turn. Putin's youth, toughness, and hawkish approach
to Chechnya resonated with voters. Support from various factions of the intelligentsia
gradually fell into line as Putin solidified his position as presidential frontrunner. If
successful, no political figure wanted to be on the wrong side of the most powerful
political figure in the country. Both Yeltsin and Putin supported the Unity Bloc in the
parliamentary elections to create a political foundation in the Duma upon which a
successful presidential transition could be built.
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The impact of the media on the electorate was unprecedented. This was due, in
part, to the consolidation of ownership after the presidential elections. After 1996, many
of the independent media outlets and major shares of state-controlled media were
purchased by “a few successful and politically connected businessmen who understood
the role and importance of the media in forming public opinion.” 1 4 Effective media
regulation was particularly vulnerable because of “inadequate Federal laws capable of
restricting the influence of media owners and the underdevelopment of civil society
capable of exerting market leverage to control media behavior.”
Russian law that governs the television industry is particularly weak, even though
television is the most important form of media. As of 1999, 98% of Russian households
had a television set. Three stations were available throughout Russia: ORT, RTR, and
NTV, the main independent channel. In many parts of Russia, viewers could only access
two of the state-controlled stations, ORT and RTR. Three other major channels reach
one-third to one-half of the populace. This medium was most abused during the 1999
electoral process.
The European Institute of Media (EOM) concluded that all television channels
were biased to some extent.
1
State-controlled stations were the worst offenders,
particularly ORT. The State owned just 51% of ORT, however, the rest was owned by
private shareholders, the most prominent of which was oligarch Boris Beresovsky. The
EOM claimed that “the smear campaign by media supported by Berezovsky and the
government on one hand, and Luzkov and NTV’s director Gusinsky on the other, had
featured prominently in the information sphere for the past year, but that it had intensified
196during the campaign.”
There were 93,000 polling stations ereated to cater the 107 million voters in
Russia. International observers widely agreed that Precinct Election Commissions
performed well and rated their compliance with relevant procedures at over 98%. 147 The
most common concern ofOSCE observers was how often voters scored their ballots in
the public. At the same time, party and candidate representatives were stationed as
observers at 98% of voting sites, which the OSCE considered a very positive
development.
Voter turnout was 61% of the electorate. There were six parties that passed the
5% threshold. This meant that over 22% of the eligible parties earned the right to
participate in the Duma, which was up from 9.3% in 1995. In turn, just 15% of votes
went toward parties that did not make the threshold, down from 45% in 1995. Once
again, the Communist Party (24%) received the most proportional votes, narrowly edging
Unity (23%), which did not compete in 1995. Fatherland-All Russia ( 13%) and Union of
Right Forces (9%) both performed well, while the Zhirinovski Bloc (6%) and Yabloko
(6%) barely made the cut. | )N The number of independents was up significantly from 77 in
1995 to 120 in 1999. Even though the Communist Party won the most total seats, their
numbers dropped to 113 from 157 in 1995. Seats for the Zhirinovski Bloc (LDPR) and
Yabloko dropped significantly, 51 to 17 and 45 to 20 respectively. Meanwhile, two new
parties earned over 100 seats: Unity (73 seats) and Union of Right Forces (29 seats). 1
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Though the OSCE concluded the polling was conducted in an orderly manner and
accurately tallied the votes, there were areas for improvement. Electoral law allowed
individuals to run for office in single member districts “even if they have no ties to the
community whatsoever.” Campaign spending limits were easily circumnavigated and
m
over half of polling sites observed did not adhere to relevant electoral law which required
each ballot be displayed and announced as counted. Finally, many journalists and editors
at state-run media lost their jobs after criticizing political figures. 200 For the second time
in as many independent elections, the Communist Party was the most popular party in the
Duma. At the same time. Unity was established as a new and influential political force.
The presidential election was held three months earlier than anticipated because
of President Yeltsin’s unexpected resignation on December 31, 1999. As stated in the
Constitution, the Prime Minister assumed the Presidency until a formal election. This
solidified Putin’s electoral prospects because he would now enter the presidential contest
as an incumbent. In turn, the pluralism characteristic of the Duma elections was short-
lived. The OSCE concluded that “several factors contributed to what was to become a
race dominated by a single, seemingly undefeatable candidate, in a campaign short on
issues and a political environment in which the pluralism achieved in the Duma elections
seemed to erode in a matter of weeks.”"01
Shortly after the Duma elections, many political blocs disbanded as quickly as
they had formed. The Fatherland-All Russia Bloc, for example, split apart after a
disappointing performance, which resulted in nearly 40% of their followers joining other
Duma factions. A second problem was the inability of blocs and parties to incorporate
single member deputies into their ranks. This was part of a larger trend where “beginning
in the early weeks of the presidential campaign and throughout the lead-up to the election
day, even the strongest opponents of pro-Kremlin forces and the administration during
the Duma elections began to capitulate in favor of the Acting President's candidacy.” 202
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Political shifts, such as these, are emblematic of a weak party system, where most
organizations are formed around strategic considerations specific to a certain election.
Even Unity had a far way to go if the block was to consolidate into a formal political
party. Unity was created “to provide a new name and identity to the existing Kremlin
power structure wanting to secure its position through the Duma elections.” 211 ' The bloc
represented an incumbent regime and did not emerge as a grass roots force based on
ideological themes. The impact of such political shifts is described by the OSCE:
The embryonic state of party politics in Russia exacerbates a tendency to fall back
on traditional practice whereby demonstrations of loyalty to the ‘party of power’ is
deemed necessary to political and administrative survival. This reluctance to ‘get on the
wrong side' of existing power structures was equally evident among the regional heads as
the inevitability of a Putin victory became obvious. 204
Public opinion leading up to the 2000 presidential election reflected
dissatisfaction with political weakness and deep cynicism toward the legitimacy of
democratic institutions and elections in Russia. When Russians were asked what the
country needed, 71% of those polled replied “a strong leader,” 59% replied “a strong
state:” just 13% replied “democratic institutions.” 54% believed that Putin’s campaign
was dishonest. 72% thought that there would be chicanery in tallying the votes of the
election. 58% believed Putin was connected with oligarchs. Still, only 25% were
concerned about Putin’s KGB past and 63% claimed to trust the President. Russians were
more interested in a new personal savior, rather than lasting democratic institutions, and
despite reservations toward Putin, few conceived of any other serious option.
" 10'
Over 94,000 polling stations were created throughout the country and over
1 ,000,000 election officials were trained to operate these stations. Polls w'ere open in all
89 units of the Federation, including 2/3 's of the districts in Chechnya, as well as 130
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countries for citizens living abroad.
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There was a three step process to register as a
candidate. First, candidates had to be nominated by parties, blocs, or citizens who formed
a special nominating group of at least 100 voters called initiative voter groups. Second, a
candidate had to gather at least 1,000,000 million signatures in support of the candidacy
w ith no more than 70,000 from the home province of the candidate. An estimated 20% of
collected signatures underwent a verification review based on random sampling." Third,
the nominating group had to submit a financial disclosure statement regarding the
finances of the candidate. The impetus of this regulation was to discourage criminal
elements from entering the political arena. If the statement misrepresents assets or
provides false information, the candidate had to be rejected.
33 candidates were nominated for the 2000 election, but only 1 5 gathered the
required signatures by the February 15 deadline. Originally 1 1 candidates were formally
registered, until a 12
U|
candidate was added after a successful court challenge. The OSCE
concluded that “the process was subject to controversy as the applications of some
candidates underwent investigations for omissions of property details on their financial
disclosure statements, while others became subject to an intense review when allegations
emerged regarding the potential falsification of signatures in their supporter lists.
”
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A major problem was the subjectivity permitted in interpreting important
components of relevant laws. In the case of Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR), for example,
the crux of the dispute rested on what constituted an “essential inaccuracy” in
information submitted by a candidate. Even Putin was not exempt from the speculation of
disclosure irregularities as debate ensued over a country house owned by his wife. The
OSCE concluded that electoral law should be amended “to remove such critical
ambiguities that place the Central Election Commission in the undesirable position
having to make subjective decisions without sufficient legal guidance.” 200
The media environment surrounding the presidential election was much different
than the Duma election. Presidential campaigns were “subdued” in comparison to the
“vitriolic media wars and a battering of blocs and candidates w ith often irresponsibly
slanderous reporting.”'
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Enforcement agencies took a more active role in curbing
inappropriate campaign activity during the presidential election In contrast to the hands-
off role adopted by the administration in the face of black campaigning for the Duma.
The persistent problem faced by the media in the 1990’s was funding. Though post-
Soviet Russia witnessed greater freedom of speech, economic hardship threatened to
close many new outlets, particularly print, which led to 80% of regional media being
financed by local authorities in the absence of independent businesses able to fund such
efforts. This development became known as “municipalization.” 2 " As print outlets faded,
television became the dominant medium, evident in the fact that 98% of households
owned and watched television.
The most common problem on Election Day was family voting, which was noted
in 82% of polling stations. A second problem was proxy voting (voting on behalf of
someone else) which was witnessed at 34% of polling stations. A third problem was
inadequate compliance w ith rules governing the counting of ballots. For example, in 57%
of election officials failed to announce the preference of the ballot as they were sorted by
candidate. On the plus side, voter turnout was strong once again, evident in the 69% of
the electorate who turned out to vote. Despite aforementioned problems, the OSCE
concluded that “the presidential election was conducted under a constitutional and
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legislative framework that is consistent with internationally recognized democratic
standards." In turn, “the competence and expertise of election administrators to can y out
well-organized and accountable elections is fully institutionalized." 2 12
Given the numerous advantages Putin had as an incumbent hand-picked by
Yeltsin, the unresolved issue was when Putin would win, rather than if. Putin cleared the
50% threshold with 52.94% to win the election in the first round. As expected, Zyuganov,
the Communist candidate, once again finished as runner up, with just under 30% of the
vote. Grigory Yavlinsky, the most prominent liberal candidate, finished third with just
5.8% of the vote. Putin and Zyuganov received approximately 82% of the vote, which
was up from the 67% received by Yeltsin and Zyuganov in 1996. Despite Zyuganov’s
loss, the Communist leader was able to maintain a relatively consistent share of support
across the Russian electorate. Ironically, the most developed and stable party in during
the first ten years of post-Soviet Russia was the Communist Party. By the end of the
decade. Communists had accepted the new electoral system and reformulated their
platform toward the adoption of social democracy, rather than Communism per say.
Uncertainty, destitution, and manipulation characterized the first ten years of the
Russian transition experience. The 1991 presidential election was an election for radical
change. The 1996 presidential election was a vote to end Communism as a governing
system, once and for all. The 2000 presidential election was a vote for stability. 21 ’
Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russians found the strong leadership and social
stability they desperately craved; however, many in the West would find that Putin had a
very different conception of democracy and began to would wonder if Putin's style of
governance could be called democratic at all.
This points to the significance of public opinion in the transition process. Many
transition theorists simply assume that democracy is the best form of government and
capitalism is the best form of economic system. Given the massive uncertainty involved
in a simultaneous political and economic transition, it would be foolish to expect
monolithic public attitudes toward governing and economic systems. Clearly, Russians
did not want the terror that characterized the Stalin era, yet they did want a minimum
quality of life and an acceptable of national prestige. If a less than democratic Putin
government could fulfill such expectations, there is little need for Western conceptions of
freedom and democracy. In turn, transition scholars would be better served by greater
appreciation of variance in public attitudes towards democracy around the world and
important role that various cultures can play in shaping or disfiguring democratic
transitions.
Vladimir Putin was a little known figure until his appointment as Prime Minister
in August of 1999. At the age of 23, Putin graduated law school in 1975 and embarked on
a eareer in the KGB, serving as a spy in East Germany. After retiring with the rank of
Colonel, Putin began his political career in local government, quickly rising to the
position of Vice-Mayor in St. Petersburg. In 1996, Yeltin's inner circle appointed Putin
deputy chief administrator at the Kremlin. The following year Putin became head of the
Federal Service and secretary of the Presidential Security Council.
Far from charismatic, Putin kept a low profile and quickly gained a reputation for
rarely smiling and speaking softly. The way in which he wielded power out of the public
spotlight earned him the nickname of “grey cardinal.” After becoming Prime Minister,
Putin was immediately regarded as a man of action, particularly in dealing with Chechen
uprisings. Putin ordered the Russian army to expel Chechen Islamic militants from
neighboring Dagestan in response to violent incursions throughout the region. Putin then
blamed Chechens for a number of mysterious apartment bombings in Russian cities.
Troops were ordered in Chechnya to root out and destroy the rebels. This hard line
position significantly increased Putin’s popularity.
Despite his hard line image, Putin was endorsed by some of Russia’s best known
liberals prior to being elected President. Sergey Stepashin, Putin's predecessor as
premier, described him as a “decent and honest man,” while Putin worked closely with
liberal Anatoli Sobchak, the mayor of St. Peterburg. Putin’s lack of record as a public
leader allowed voters to project on him their desires for the future. Putin's inauguration
ceremony “reflected the hybrid style and substance of the new ruling group, which
embraced seemingly incompatible features- the KGB past of the new Kremlin boss, his
liberal activity, and his nearly monarchical ascendancy to power orchestrated by
anticommunists and revolutionaries!”214 Putin claimed that Russia depended on a strong,
paternalistic state and viewed this as a reality of social policy that Russian leaders must
address. Consequently, Russia was not ready for classical liberalism and would not soon
resemble the United States or United Kingdom, if ever.
The Russian economy, on the other hand, was in relatively good shape in early
2000. Though Russia still lacked a comprehensive vision of economic development,
some important reforms were developed under Putin. Most importantly, a new law
created a Hat income tax of 13%. The GDP rose 10% in 2000. By the middle of 2001,
high oil and gas prices produced a $2K million trade surplus and reserves at the Central
Bank increased from $7 to $35 billion. The GDP grew by 5.2% in 2001, which brought
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the cumulative growth since August 1998 to over 20%. Real disposable household
income increased by 5.9% in 2001, while real wages grew 19.8% between 2000 and
2001. 215
At the same time, Putin faced a serious problem in the merger of “power and
capital, politics and economics, the public and the private- a Soviet tradition Yeltsin had
not only failed to break but in some areas had even reinforced. 216 A large amount of
goods and services were produced and sold in a gray zone that existed beyond the scope
of formal regulation and taxation. Millions of Russians operated in this shadowy space
which constituted an estimated 30% of Russia’s GDP. The system benefited criminals to
the detriment of state revenues. Influential oligarchs under Yeltsin still held significant
influence and resisted any change in the status quo under Putin.
Upon being elected, Putin’s approach to the press quickly caused consternation.
Putin considered “every criticism of his policies as a challenge to the state” and took
advantage of every opportunity to retaliate again his critics. One early and prominent
example was Andrei Babitsky of Radio Liberty who criticized Russian policy toward
Chechnya in 1999 and 2000. Babitsky was charged with being a Chechen spy, held in
isolation, interrogated, and turned over to armed Chechen authorities, like a terrorist, in
exchange for Russian soldiers. A group ofjournalists protested in a letter, a portion of
which stated:
Not once since the stall of perestroika have the authorities permitted themselves
such blatant lawlessness and cynicism toward representatives of the mass media. If the
journalist Babitsky has committed an illegal act from the point of view of the authorities,
then the question of his guilt or innocence must be decided in an open judicial trial. If the
actions against Babitsky are a reaction to the contents of his reporters from Chechnya,
this is a direct violation of the principle of freedom of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution.
-ls
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Babitsky was later released and the charges dropped. The message to journalists
was clear however. Russia was not a friendly place for independent journalism.
Persecution was back after a reprieve under Yeltsin and Gorbachev.
In addition restricting individual liberties, Putin also sought to limit the
independence of regional governance throughout Russia. This was a sharp contrast to the
Yeltsin era where various territorial entities of the Russian federation were commonly
allowed dissimilar rights and obligations. From the outset, Putin worked toward
reestablishing Moscow’s supremacy and weaken regional barons who profited from the
policies of the previous administration. Shortly after taking office, Putin created seven
okrugs (federal regions) which coincided with military okrugs. The new okrugs
essentially divided the 89 republics of the Federation into spheres of federal control
headed by newly appointed representatives of the President. Five of the seven
representatives were from siloviki (power structures) close to Putin.
The President then sent a trio of laws to the Duma which sought to weaken the
role of regional leaders, as well as the Federation Council, the upper chamber of
parliament and legislative body for top regional politicians. With an estimated 30% of
local laws violating the Russian constitution, greater regional subordination was clearly
was Putin's goal.
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’ The Federation Council was contrary to the principles of divided
government because executive representatives convened ex officio and functioned as a
legislative body. Still, the Council was the only barrier on the path to strengthening
authoritarianism tendencies of the President. Regional elites were unable to organize
unified resistance to the move.
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Regional government was not the only target in Putin’s political restructuring
efforts. In 2000, Putin issued a decree that stripped the Central Bank of independence and
ordered the CEC to streamline the party system. Parties were required to have at least
10,000 members with organizations in at least 45 regions and no less than 100 members
m each. Every two years parties were forced to re-register and if the party failed to
participate in an election over a five year span, they would be denied registration. The
goal was limit the amount parties in Russia from nearly to 200 to fewer than 20.
~
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In 2003, Putin used decrees to extend the powers of the Federal Security Service
(FSB), the replacement of the KGB, and eliminate rival bureaucratic structures, such as
the Federal Border Guard Service, Federal Tax Police Service, and Federal Agency for
Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). Putin claimed the moves were a
response to the fact that fighting drugs and terrorism w as “getting tougher.” Post-Soviet
reform, however, had gradually stripped the secret police of control over border guards.
Liberal opposition in Parliament expressed concern. According to MP Boris Nadezhdin,
“an initial analysis of this would lead you to believe that the FSB has virtually taken on
the form what used to be the KGB.”" 1 The abolition of these three agencies removed
three remaining members of Yeltsin’s elite: Mikhail Fradkov from the tax police,
Konstantin Totsky from the border guards, and Viktor Matyukim of FAPSI.
Putin’s top-down approach concentrated power in his hands, which “gave the
democrats reason to suspect him of acting more harshly in the interests of the narrow
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groups of influence- old and new- that occupied the Kremlin.” Putin was neither a
democrat, nor a dictator, and society was largely indifferent. Shevtosova explains:
There was no mass resistance to Putin’s initiatives, nor could such resistance
appear. There were several reasons for that: media controlled by the central authorities;
the lack of a strong opposition; society’s passivity and fatalism; the hope that Putin would
pursue honest politics; and a reluctance to criticize him. The president continued to be
above criticism in Russia. Russians behaved as if they could not afford to lose hope in
their new leader. Therefore, the Kremlin could disregard the scattered hotbeds of
dissatisfaction among intellectuals and a few stubborn liberals."'
How to deal with Russia’s small circle of multi-billionaires was another realm of
reform for Putin. Their combined wealth and connections rivaled the power of the State,
which was particularly disconcerting when significant resources were directed against the
Kremlin. Yeltsin had an informal agreement with the Russian economic elite. If oligarchs
supported his administration and stayed out of the day to day political process, they
would be rewarded with political patronage. Putin, on the other hand, quickly went on the
offensive, albeit in a highly selective manner.
The first target was Boris Berezovsky, a former Yeltsin insider and prominent
beneficiary of shock therapy. Putin quickly sought to curb Berezovsky's political
ambitions despite the fact the Berezovsky was the one who introduced Putin to Yeltsin’s
inner circle called “the family.” In March of 2000 Berezovsky stated that “Putin cannot
decide there will be no oligarchs in Russia . . . if anything, their role will increase.”"
4
In
October, however, the Kremlin stripped Berezovsky of the major television station
Russia First, which had been so instrumental in Yeltsin’s victory in 1996 and was used
more recently to discredit Putin's presidential opponents. The shares were sold to the
State. By years end Berezovsky settled in the United Kingdom after self-imposed exile.
Berezovsky was charged with fraud and corruption in 2001 and hence became a wanted
man in Russia. After surviving several attempts on his life, the former oligarch is open
about his commitment to bring down Putin by force or through bloodless revolution,
neither of which has materialized.
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In contrast to Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky directly challenged Putin back in
1999. Four days after Putin's inauguration, the government seized NTV, the second
largest television channel in Russia, and other major assets. Gusinsky had amassed the
largest media empire in Russia, which criticized Putin and supported Putin’s political
rivals. Like Berezovsky, Gusinsky left Russia in 2000 and his empire was since
dismantled. Russian authorities charged Gusinsky with money laundering and fraud. In
2001
,
Gusinsky described the charges as “a joke” and claimed that “if I were to go to
Russia, it’s a one way ticket.” According to Gusinsky the real problem is that Putin
craves absolute power, which threatens Europe. This is evident in how the regime only
destroyed media and left alone other industries, such as steel and oil. Things would soon
change however.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the top boss of Yukos Oil, was arrested in 2003 and
detained on charges of fraud and tax evasion. Much of Khodorkovsky's estimated $15
billion w as attained through the highly suspect privatization process of shock therapy.
1 1 is arrest came after several moves in the political arena, which included the acquisition
of the prestigious Moskovskiye Novosti newspaper, the hiring of a leading investigative
journalist who was very critical of the Putin, and contributions to political parties
opposed to the President. Khodorkovsky was convicted of tax evasion and sentenced to
nine years in prison. Meanwhile, Yukos was bankrupted, auctioned, and purchased by
state owned oil firms such as Rosneft and Gazprom.
Putin angrily rejected the notion that Khodorkovsky’s fate was retribution for his
political activities. In contrast, Putin coined the phrase “dictatorship of the law’’ to
supposedly describe the strict adherence to law. Still, the process by which Putin attacked
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oligarchs was highly selective, which left many to conclude it was more about
eliminating personal rivals than justice. Gusinsky, for example, was originally
imprisoned, then released, after agreeing to give all his property to the state “at gunpoint”
in exchange for his freedom." 6 After Gusinsky went public and rescinded on the deal, he
once again became a wanted man.
Russians hardly felt compassion for Gusinsky or any of the elite group of
oligarchs who profited royally from a privatization system which left many Russians in
grave conditions. In turn, the political dynamic situation could be described as little else
than dysfunctional from a Western perspective of democratic development. The most
powerful opposition to Putin's regime, which had moved away from rudimentary
democratic practices of the Yeltsin era, were former oligarchs who amassed their
extraordinary wealth from stealing billions of the dollars from the State under Yeltsin. As
long as political and economic stability persisted, the public appeared content. In July of
2000, for example, 73% of Russians approved of Putin, even though 59% of Russians
admitted they knew very little about him. 60% endorsed concentrating all power in one
person's hands to solve the problems facing Russia, while just 27% supported the
independence of branches of government. 227 Most Russians (52%) supported state owned
property, while just 15% favored an unfettered free market. 22N
Russian oil production and rising global oil prices generated popular and
scholarly attention as Russia stood down OPEC’s production and export cuts in 2001 and
briefly surpassed Saudi Arabia in 2002 as the world's largest oil producer. "
1
Moscow
was touted as “the new Houston” with Putin crowned as “the world’s new oil czar.”
Others claimed that Russia’s growth was premised on a “virtual economy” propped up by
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high oil prices, rather than genuine and sustainable economic growth. Russia was one
of the top producing and exporting countries in the world, but ranked “much lower in
proven oil reserves, with only 5% of world supply.”" ' 1 Though Russian oil production
increased from 6 million to 7 million barrels per day between 1999 and 2001, it was
highly unlikely that Russia would regain the peak production of 1980's at 12 million
barrels per day. LUKoil, for example, held the largest reserves in Russia, yet only
increased output by approximately 1% between 2000 and 2001. In turn, the oil boom in
Russia was “the result of high oil prices, not increases in production, as world oil prices
soared from around $10 a barrel in December 1998 to a peak of around $33 a barrel in
September 2000.
”
2 ’"
The economy benefited from several years of rapid growth and oil prices that
were coupled w ith increased political stability. This combination enabled much of the
economy to operate at full capacity. At the same time, structural imbalances were still a
serious concern. The public sector remained inefficient, which led to mismanagement of
public resources and services. Private sector ownership remained centralized in a few
major conglomerates. New firms, an important component of economic growth in
transition economies, were slow to develop in an enterprise structure that still resembled
the Soviet model. Despite high consumer confidence, the grow th rate of the GDP and
fix capital investment began to slow'."'
4
Given the inherently unpredictable nature of the
world oil market, uncertainty surrounded the sustainability of Russia's economic
recovery. A 2002 World Bank report explains:
This period may well turn out to be decisive in determining the path of economic
development in Russia. In a period of high oil prices and political stability, reforms have
been carried out at unprecedented depth and speed. But these favorable external
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conditions are unlikely to last forever. Only then will it be clear whether the economy has
changed enough to adapt to adverse circumstances/ 0
In 2003, the first elections to the Duma under President Putin were held. With the
presidential election just months away, the elections were viewed as a significant
indicator of future democratic development under Putin. The political environment was
much different than 1999. In 2001, the merger of Unity and Fatherland All Russia
resulted in the creation of a new pro-presidential party United Russia. This enabled
United Russia to surpass the Communist Party (CPRF) as the largest party in the Duma.
Consequently, the CPRF became the main opposition party.
Two new pro-presidential parties and blocs emerged. The People’s Party was
formed by MP’s elected as independents in single member district races back in 1999.
The Rodina (Homeland) Bloc was formed by high-profile deputies in 2003 in an effort to
weaken support for CPRF. Yabloko and Union of Right Forces lost support in the run up
to the election, which made the 5% particularly important for each. As a whole, there
were several new political organizations in 2003, evident in the fact that over half had not
participated in the previous Duma elections.
Though most electoral law was very similar to the 1999 Duma election, there
were some changes. For example, political organizations were required to register as “all-
Russia” electoral associations to compete in federal or regional elections. The OSCE
expressed concern that “this new requirement may seriously inhibit the development of
local or regional political activism and effectively block the establishment of new
political parties by any groups that seek to represent local, regional or minority
interests. 44 associations were eligible to compete in 2003 under this title. 18 parties
237
and five electoral blocs registered. In another new legal change, parties that reach the 5%
barrier no longer had to collect signatures or pay a deposit to nominate candidates for the
next Duma election.
The major problem of the electoral process was an unfair campaign environment
that disproportionately favored the interests and affiliations of President Putin. Most
complaints centered upon the use of administrative resources by the State to further the
candidates of United Russia. This included violations of the requirement that official
functions are suspended while they are candidates and local government support of some
certain candidates. Other problems included denial of equal conditions for campaign
activities, such meeting space and advertising, and direct pressure on voters, such police
detention of campaign workers and seizing campaign materials. Such activities “blurred
the distinction between the party and the executive administration.” 2
’ 7
A second significant problem with the campaign centered upon the media. The
majority of media coverage was biased in both degree and content toward pro-
presidential parties. State controlled television channels adhered to electoral law that
required allocation of free air time for all candidates. At the same time, remaining airtime
openly promoted United Russia. 19% of news coverage at First Channel, for example,
covered United Russia, all ofwhich was positive or neutral. C'PRF, on the other hand,
received 13% of coverage, most of which was negative. TV Russia, a second example,
granted 16% of its coverage to United Russia, overwhelmingly positive, compared to
CPRF, which received comparable time, but was predominantly negative.
Print media represented multiple views, but outlets supported specific parties of
blocs. Voters were able to form an objective view, but it required consuming several
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publications. Like television outlets, state-funded newspapers fulfilled legal expectations
for allotting free time, but were biased in favor of United Russia and against the
CPRF.
'
’ After the election, an unlikely coalition. Communists and liberals tiled a legal
suit which claimed there was serious bias in state run media and Russia's electoral
commission fixed the vote count to reduce opposition in parliament. The case was
eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court.
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On Election Day, turnout dropped fell to 55% as compared to 61% in 1999. This
corresponded with the generally low level of public interest that characterized the
campaign. 41 On the plus side, the electronic processing of preliminary results allowed
the result to be posted within 24 hours of the polls closing. The voting process was
largely peaceful, though there were isolated acts of violence, including the death of an
electoral commission member in Chechnya. The election proceeded fairly for the most
pail, but significant problems existed. Top concerns were the lack of secrecy during the
voting process, an insufficient number of polling booths in many stations, and failures to
follow proper procedure in recording results.
The results were a resounding success for United Russia, which won 37% of the
vote. The Communists finished second with 12% of the vote. LDPR and Rodina were the
only other two groups to surpass the 5% threshold for proportional representation.
LDPR’s 1 1% was a surprise in light of their steady decline since 1995. The liberal
Yablako (4%) and Union of Right Forces (4%) both fell short, which collectively
constituted a major failure for the liberal opposition.
The “against all” vote in the proportional pail of the election was up to 4.72%
from 3.36%, while their remained a relatively low level of women in federal politics. Just
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2 I women were elected in proportional lists, 20 in single member districts, which
constituted 0% of the Duma. Parties and blocs that supported the administration became
an overwhelming majority in the Duma. United Russia controlled 224 total seats, which
was close to majority. When the new Duma convened, four factions registered: United
Russia (300 deputies), CPRF (52 deputies), LDPR (36 deputies), and Rodina (36
deputies).
Similar electoral problems resurfaced in the 2004 presidential election three
months later. Once again, the advantages of incumbency were extended beyond
appropriate norms, particularly with the media, and there were serious concerns
surrounding open voting and vote tabulation despite a litany of voter rights. Efforts
toward what the West would consider worthwhile goals created unintended
consequences. “Get out the vote” campaigns undertaken by government were broadcast
throughout the country with imagery and themes that appeared to favor the incumbent.
Desires to expand franchise in remote locations raised doubts of whether satisfactory
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precautions were taken to prevent multiple voting.
The Duma election was a major reorganization of parliamentary politics. This left
many parties without representation in the Duma and a weakened party machinery.
Consequently, most presidential candidates joined the race lacking substantial party
support. With Putin’s party in control of the Duma, the president refrained from most
aspects of conventional campaigning, such as participating in public debates. Regardless,
Putin remained highly popular and faced a group of opponents with little public
support.
-4 '
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The campaign was described by the OSCE as “very low key.” Aside from a few
visits of candidates to certain regions, “there was almost no visible campaign activity
beyond what was present in the media.” Putin was understood to be “in an unassailable
position as frontrunner” and as a result, competing candidates were unmotivated and
unable to gather resources and investment in effective campaigns.
244 Once again, the
operation of polling stations was generally considered legitimate, with the majority of
complaints surrounding the role of the media. Putin easily defeated the other six
candidates with 71% of the vote, up significantly from 52% in 2000. Turnout,
meanwhile, dropped to 63% from 68% in 2000. As had become the norm for several
elections, the Communists, under candidate Nikolay Kharitonov, came in second with
13% of the vote. None of the remaining candidates topped 5%.
In just over one term as president, Putin had effectively consolidated public and
institutional support even though his conception and approach to democratic governance
did not fit with Western norms, which became more and more apparent the longer he was
in office. Economic development, meanwhile, exceed expectations in 2003 and into
2004 with high growth, and advances in household incomes, industrial production, and
investment. Once again, however, many equated this with equally impressive increases in
the price of hydrocarbons. The average price of oil in the first half of 2003 rose from
$18.5 per barrel to $23.7, due to the American-led invasion of Iraq, a 28% increase
compared to the previous year. -4 " The World Bank estimated that approximately 3% of
the 7.2% economic growth in 2003 was the result of rising oil prices. -4 " Still, Russia’s
macroeconomic position in 2003 and 2004 was very strong. In the five years after the
1998 crisis, the economy grew by a cumulative total of 38%, while inflation gradually
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declined to 12% in 2003. The federal budget ran a surplus for the fourth straight year and
federal reserves hit a record high of $86 billion in February of 2004.
Brisk economic growth continued throughout 2004 as the price of Russian oil
increased by 20% between January and May compared to the same period the previous
year. As a result, the average cost of oil was $28 per barrel. GDP growth remained above
7%. “As a simple rule of thumb,” the World Bank reported in 2004, “growth above 5% in
Russia has always come with an increase in oil prices.”- “The best news,” the report
states, “is that this is not news anymore as growth rates in excess of 7% acquire an air of
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normality.”- By mid-decade it was the clear that “Russia proved an exception to the
rule that financial crashes and defaults leave a measurable dent in output growth during
subsequent years.”-
4 ' 1
Other macroeconomic indicators, in addition to GDP and inflation, witnessed
steady and positive change from 2000 to 2005 as well." 11 The average wage in Russia
grew from $80.2 in 2000 to $1 79.4 in 2003, $237.2 in 2004, and $301 .6 in 2005. Real
disposable income steadily rose to 185% of 1999 levels in 2005. Unemployment, on the
other hand, fell from 10.4% in 2000 to 7.6% in 2005 as 15.8% of people lived below'
substance level in 2005 compared to 30.2% in 2000. Gross FD1 in 2004 was double 2001
levels and in 2005 it was triple 2001 levels. By 2006, it was safe to say that Russia had
fully stabilized politically and economically after nearly a decade of turbulent
transformation. Though stable, it remains very difficult to label the Russian regime in
conventional Western terms. Under Putin, Russia has simultaneously become a major
player among G-8 nations, yet faced harsh criticisms for the decline of Russian
democracy.
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This work evaluates the role of elections and institutions in Russia’s transition
from Communism from 1991 to 2006. Experiences of post-Soviet Russia have produced
several indicators that elections have effectively promoted the peaceful and legitimate
transition of power. Elections were held frequently in Russia: 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999,
2000, 2003, and 2004. All elections required by the Constitution were held without
postponement or cancellation. The frequency of elections suggests that elections are a
normal component of Russian politics. Elections became fully institutionalized in the
Russian system with the 1996 presidential election which was the final clash between
liberals and communists over the systematic nature of the regime. There is no evidence of
any intention to suspend constitutional government, but given Putin’s willingness to re-
conceptualize and reformulate Russian governance away from previously established
democratic norms, it is possible Putin may not give up power in 2008 as required by the
Constitution or more likely, distort the transition process. This remains to be seen
however.
Turnout for national elections in Russia was consistent with norms in other
democratic countries. More than 50% of registered voters turned out to the polls for each
national election in post-Soviet Russia. The average turnout was 66% for Duma elections
and 67% for presidential elections. Polls in 1997 revealed that two-thirds of Russians
believed that it was the duty of citizens in a democratic society to participate in elections.
These trends and attitudes suggest that strong voter participating is an important part of
national elections in Russia.
All candidates in post-Soviet elections were selected in processes that were open
to the public. There were some restrictions, such as the collection of signatures, but these
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did not disproportionately prevent candidates from being selected. In each parliamentary
election, for example, there were several thousand individual candidates, many of whom
ran as independents. The more pressing issue was figuring out an effective way to verify
that information provided by candidates complied with relevant electoral law. This was
complicated by the large numbers of candidates participating in each election.
Electoral oversight procedures are adequate, but not optimal. The Central Election
performed w ell in some areas, such as enhancing transparency of the electoral process,
and not as well in other areas, such as enforcing violations regarding the use of State
resources for campaigning. A major problem was the substantial and widespread lack of
secrecy during the voting process, evident in consistent trends of public voting and family
voting.
Since 1996, State resources have been used by incumbent Presidents to further
their electoral interests in violation of electoral law. This, coupled with the inappropriate
cooperation of government officials and media oligarchs in violation, suggests that fraud
is a significant problem that taints Russian elections. At the same time, there have been
relatively low levels of violence surrounding national elections, with some isolated
incidents, and international observers concluded that the will of the populace was
reflected in every election. Still, Russians have not expressed faith in the electoral
process. Public opinion polls in 1997 revealed that 90% of Russians believed that
electoral results would be manipulated, while over half thought they would have little to
no effect on policy. This in part reflects the long history of inconsequential elections
throughout the Soviet Era and the massive instability of Russian society throughout the
1990’s. In turn. Russians have widely accepted election results since the fall of the Soviet
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Union. There have been no popular movements in Russia against either the electoral
process or creeping dictatorship as witnessed in the Rose Revolution in Georgia or
Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Manipulation in Russia was pervasive, but occurred in the
less blatant realm of communication, rather than electoral administration.
In 1995, new campaign regulations required the media to refrain from bias news
coverage and required the allotment of free air time to all registered parties and
candidates. The regulation was abused by media controlling oligarchs, often in cahoots
with political leaders. As economic liberalization put many legitimate print media outlets
out of business, television became the dominant medium of communication. Yeltsin’s
improbable bid for reelection in 1996 was secured through a regular bombardment of
pro-administration propaganda by major networks controlled by Yeltsin-friendly
oligarchs, such as Boris Berezovsky.
Under Putin, the dynamic changed, yet the result remained the same. Putin
selectively targeted media moguls critical of the administration, such as Vladimir
Gusinsky, and used unrelated criminal charges to destroy media empires by cutting off
the head. This possibly would have been done literally, if oligarchs had not escaped
multiple attempts on their lives and rendition after fleeing Russia. Throughout the
process, targeted elites were portrayed as enemies of the State because of their political
and economic activities since the fall of the Soviet Union. Over time, independent media
in Russia was gradually destroyed.
At the same time, there was significant ideological variance among candidates in
national elections. Thousands of candidates competed in each national election, a
significant portion ofwhom were independents, and represented various political
245
persuasions. Four major party groupings emerged in 1993: reform, pro-government,
national-patriotic, and Communist. Though parties came and went, the general groupings
persisted in subsequent Duma elections. Hence, the average number of parties officially
registered in parliamentary elections was 37. In 1995 four parties passed the 5%
threshold for proportional seats, while 6 parties made it in the 1999 and 2003 elections.
Presidential elections have been consistently centered on two dominant party groupings,
pro-government and Communist, though several other candidates from various political
backgrounds have run. As Putin consolidated power through United Russia, ideological
variance among candidates in national elections has significantly decreased. The
upcoming elections in 2007 and 2008 will likely detennine whether this trend will
continue downward, stabilize, or reverse.
Ideological variance has not been institutionalized in stable and principled parties
however. Most parties have been unable to organize and sustain meaningful national
party structures, let alone determining principles for which the party will stand. Instead,
most parties in Russia have revolved around personalities of the party leader or leaders.
Ironically, the most organized and durable party in post Soviet Russia has been the
Communist Party. Though Communists advocated the resurrection of Communism in the
early 1990’s, this changed after the 1996 presidential election, when the party no longer
sought regime change and instead focused on promoting more generous social policies.
Presently, United Russia appears to have an infrastructure that very well may endure
under the next administration, though to date, Putin's dominance of the organization has
earned United Russia the reputation of little more than a rubber stamp for the Kremlin.
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As a whole, elections in Russia have produced mixed results in terms of
promoting the legitimate and peaceful transition of power. Elections premised on popular
selection of candidates from across the political spectrum have occurred frequently with
high voter turnout. The administration of elections has experienced relatively low levels
of violence with adequate electoral oversight and wide acceptance of results. At the same
time, elections in Russia have been de-legitimized by uncharacteristically high levels of
fraud undertaken by the State to further the electoral interests of people in power. This
includes the inappropriate use of State resources and the elimination of independent
media. These fraudulent activities are particularly problematic considering there has been
few, if any candidates that represented stable and principled parties that genuinely offered
a serious and more accountable alternative.
Even though elections have been moderately effective in promoting the peaceful
and legitimate exchange of political power in Russia, the illegal use of State resources
under Yeltsin and Putin has cast an increasingly ominous shadow over the entire electoral
process. Whether this cloud will lift or settle is unclear. There is not a strong affinity for
democratic governance within the Russian elite or populace, which puzzles and unsettles
many in the West. Russians understand themselves to be different than the United States
and expect these differences to manifest themselves politically. Perhaps the development
of institutions served as important and necessary corollary to the shortcomings of a
democratic electoral process.
Unfortunately, however, experiences with democratic institutions in Russia have
demonstrated few indicators of stable and representative government. Russia established
a democratic constitution in 1993. The constitution divided political power among
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legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Several dozen liberties and rights are listed
in the constitution, some of which are included in the U.S. Bill of Rights, such as freedom
of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of association. Many of the liberties are
commonly associated with social democracies, such as a right to medical care, a right to
education, a right to housing, and a right to social security. Problematically, however, the
constitution was the product of a tense negotiation process that disintegrated into a
violent contest for political power.
In March of 1993, the Supreme Soviet sought to impeach Yeltsin, who responded
with a public referendum on his policies that was narrowly supported by a majority of
Russians. When Yeltsin issued a decree to disband the Supreme Soviet and hold new
elections, hundreds of deputies barricaded themselves in the White House and declared
control of government. Though most Russians wanted compromise, the conflict was
resolved by force. On Yeltsin's orders, military forces shelled the building, captured coup
leaders. This enabled Yeltsin to use his new power position to shape the 1993
constitution.
Unfortunately, violence was common beyond major institutional disputes. For
example, several Duma members were murdered in office. Victims have come from
different parties, including Communists, liberals, liberal democrats, and pro-government
forces, but generally shared business backgrounds. The murders appear to be contract
killings and typically go unsolved. Such violence is emblematic of society as a whole. At
the turn of the century, official statistics of violent crimes in Russia and the prison
population were comparable to the world's most criminalized countries.
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In addition to violence, corruption has been another significant problem before
and after the fall of the Soviet Union. Criminality was central in the development of a
market economy. Bribery of government officials was commonplace. Economic elites
stole millions of dollars from the State and invested the capital abroad to avoid the scope
of Russian law. Throughout the 1990’s, the legal order was fragmented and ineffective,
which made a law-based state elusive. Putin’s reforms provided much greater stability,
but law enforcement is now used selectively as a tool to promote the personal and
political ambitions of the Kremlin.
Despite violence and corruption, there has been a gradual acceptance of the
political system adopted since the fall of the Soviet Union. It is difficult to celebrate this
development, however, given the current system is so far from Western democratic
standards. Over a dozen journalists critical of the current regime have been mysteriously
murdered since 2000. A lack of public criticism and government transparency has
compromised the development of a democratic political process. There is no meaningful
role for the opposition as the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent political system
failed to displace the Kremlin as the nerve center of Russian politics, which even today
continues to be abused by political elite
To detriment of Russian democratic development, political conflict exceeded the
peaceful confines of formal institutions early in the post Soviet era. The violent resolution
of this conflict established a skewed institutional dynamic where henceforth the Duma
was subservient to the executive, rather than an independently powerful component of
government in its own right. By constitutional and unconstitutional means, Yeltsin
battled the Communists by deliberately seeking to isolate himself personally and
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politically from threats of impeachment and prosecution. In promoting and protecting
economic reform Yeltsin began issuing decrees, which both Yeltsin and Putin have used
frequently used to circumvent traditional checks on executive power and avoid
institutionalized political opposition. Putin and his creation. United Russia, currently
exercise so much control over Russian politics that meaningful political opposition is
practically extinct.
Akin to the development of stable and representative government in Russia,
formal institutions have not been highly effective in producing a stable and capitalist
economy. The implementation of Shock Therapy generated significant debate on the
effectiveness of the model. Few scholars, if any, understand economic transformation in
Russia to be a highly effective and well orchestrated process, though few deny that some
very important changes transpired. Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin
administration undertook vast economic reform, beginning with price liberalization and
privatization. Central planning was moved aside in favor granting enterprises freedom to
determine what goods to produce and how to produce them.
In January of 1992 reforms immediately freed 90% of retail prices and most of the
remaining prices followed in the subsequent months. Prices increased over 1,000% and
inflation rose to over 2,000%. ~ " Under a voucher system introduced in October of 1992,
privatization of industry proceeded quickly as well, though a substantial portion of
private companies remained under direct or indirect control of the same managers who
were appointed under the Soviet era. -
'
Agriculture proceeded much slower than industry
as just 5% of arable land in Russia was owned by family farms in April of 1995." 4
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As a whole, a significant number of enterprises were privatized under the Yeltsin
administration. The raw number, however, does not sufficiently reflect the negative
consequences of the process by which this occurred. The most significant long-term
problem was how most of the new ly freed property ultimately ended up in the hands of a
select few economic elites that invested the bulk of their profits abroad. Other significant
problems included: the persistence of the nomenklatura
,
corrupt bargaining between
politicians and economic elites, the development of a concurrent shadow economy
beyond the scope of formal regulation, high levels of poverty and economic inequality,
and a collective failure to address serious structural problems prior full economic
collapse.
High global oil and gas prices remain an important, but inevitably fragile, part of
increased economic growth because of the substantial increase in State revenues these
prices produce. Most economic activity also remains confined to the region surrounding
Moscow, which continues to be a problem. Rising GDP has helped alleviate Russia's
budget deficit, a significant problem throughout the first decade of economic reform. The
Yeltsin administration sought to solve budget problems by changing the main source of
borrowing from the Central Bank to the IMF, state bonds, Eurobonds, and the World
Bank. Two significant obstacles to raising revenues was an inability on behalf of the
State to effectively collect taxes and cut subsidies. With the implementation of a 13% fiat
tax, high global oil prices, and the rise in GDP, Russia's debt is now on pace to become
the lowest in the Federation’s history.
In contrast to GDP, foreign direct investment (FD1) steadily grew from 1994 to
1997 and then plummeted because of the economic collapse. After a slight rise between
1998 and 1999, FDI gradually fell until 2002 when the downward trend sharply reversed.
In 2001, for example, outflow exceeded inflows, which meant that resources were sparse
when they were most needed. Through the post Soviet period, several obstacles have
hampered FDI in Russia. Obstacles include concerns surrounding tax laws, property
rights, creditor rights, macroeconomic stability, political stability, banking, accounting,
and corruption. Though FDI doubled between 2002 and 2004, Russia was still much less
successful in attracting foreign investment than other Central European countries."
^
As a whole, formal institutions have been limited in terms of fostering political
and economic development. Russia established a democratic constitution, but without a
strong legal system. As a result, many of these provisions continue to be severely limited
in terms of practical application. Furthermore, Russia has demonstrated w ide acceptance
of the political system, but the highly popular President Putin has centralized formal and
informal power in such a way that the system lacks many of the institutional processes of
fully functioning Western democracies, such as a meaningful role for the opposition, low
levels of fraud, and low levels of violence. In turn, formal institutions have been largely
ineffective in promoting stable and representative government.
Formal institutions have been ineffective in promoting a stable and capitalist
economy. After nearly a decade of falling GDP, falling wages, and increasing budget
deficit, the new millennium witnessed reversing trends in all of these macroeconomic
indicators. While such trends are promising, the net gain has been limited. After nearly
two decades the GDP has just begun to match levels that predate the beginning of Shock
Therapy. This is not to suggest that capitalism will not “pay” as transition scholars have
argued, but that payment is not guaranteed given Russia’s dependence on global oil
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exports and greater attention to the process by which institutional reform was undertaken
most likely would have produced a more equitable, efficient, legal, stable, and prosperous
economy. Today, Russia still struggles with creating the necessary formal and informal
institutions of a fully functioning market economy, which limits its competitiveness
abroad, evident in a rising, but inadequate FDI.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In determining the best direction for studies of democratic development in
comparative political scholarship three basic questions must be addressed: 1) How should
we define democracy? 2) What has been the focus in understanding democratic
development? 3) What should be the focus in understanding democratic development?
The dominant paradigm, as Thomas Carothers puts it, has been transitions theory. 1 A
detailed discussion of the development of transitions theory as a response to
modernization theory was provided. Essentially, transition scholars understood the
transition process to be dynamic, rather than based on preconditions, and emphasized the
establishment of elections and institutions in producing a functioning democracy. As
Steven Fish observes, this focus has largely failed "to provide a reliable road map for
understanding regime change."'
As 1 see it, there are several reasons for this. First, a focus on elections and
institutions under appreciates the lack of new political and economic elites, particularly in
post-Soviet societies. In Ukraine and Russia, for example, prominent "democratic"
leaders have had previous careers in the former regime be it office holding (Boris
Yeltsin), secret service (Vladimir Putin), or economic bureaucracy (Victor Yushchenko).
This has caused several development problems. Elites often lack training and experiences
with democratic norms and procedures in various capacities of government operation. As
one Western observer put it, "I've been to meetings with Yushchenko. They last for
hours. He has no knowledge or experience ofhow to run things efficiently." 1 Other
problems include a lack of transparency, a general will to moderate the pace of change in
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order to preserve traditional power structures, the consistent abuse of slate resources, a
general willingness to restrict civil liberties, and a general lack of motivation to be
genuinely accountable given the relatively limited nature of organized and sustained
popular pressure.
Second, a focus on elections and institutions under appreciates mixed public
sentiment regarding democracy, specifically the roles of institutional implementation
and international forces in shaping these attitudes. As Phillip Roeder points out, "many of
the institutions recommended by political scientists for deeply divided societies actually
aggravate the problems of political stability and thus undermine democracy ." 4 Ukrainian
children are taught they live in a democracy based on rights granted in the Constitution,
yet university students commonly speak of the need for justice and fairness, not freedom
and democracy, when reflecting on the shortcomings of contemporary government.
In Russia, meanwhile, the turbulent period of shock therapy propelled stability atop the
list of public priorities for government, well ahead of abstract principles regarding the
role of government in society'. Such observations do not intend to suggest that
democracy should not be universally valued by those who study its development and
promotion. Rather, scholarly approaches must be particularly cognizant of how various
societies in the age of globalization conceive of democracy and w hat the end result
should be. Democracy as a form of government is a process, but one by its basic nature
that will be undertaken with different cultural attitudes, values, and objectives that
constantly shape, even impede, development processes.
Third, a focus on elections and institutions under appreciates the lack of
meaningful and sustained political organization necessary for elections to
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have governance and policy that is representative of public will. As Ishiyama and
Kennedy state, "where relatively stable patterns of partisan competition have emerged
in most states of the former Soviet Union" it has taken the form of "pseudo-parties" that
are "largely shifting coalitions of individuals unanchored in post Communist society and
incapable of performing even the most basic functions of political parties." The problem
has not been an insufficient quantity of parties, but insufficient quality. In Ukraine and
Russia, for example, pseudo-parties center upon dominant political figures, rather than
platforms, many of which come and go with various elections.
In addition, civil society has been sporadic and disorganized. In Ukraine, strides
were made with the Gongadze affair and Orange Revolution. Just a few years later,
however, Madan became a public space for parties to pay people to stand around next to
this flag or that flag each time the President and Prime Minister reached a standoff. Many
Ukrainians describe their politics as "a circus" where money, not collective action, speaks
the loudest. This is not surprising considering that even "free” medical care requires
informal payments to government practitioners to ensure adequate care.
As a whole, a focus on elections and institutions under appreciates the role of
personnel, attitudes, and organizations related to democratic development, particularly in
the Russia and Ukraine. Criticizing various shortcomings of transitions theory is
important, though regional scholars, particular of the former Soviet Union, have been
highly dismissive of any potential benefit of the transitions approach. To best
serve comparative political scholarship, “regionalists” and "transitologists” should move
beyond largely methodological debates like the ones between Bunce, O'Donnell, Karl,
and others. Greater empirical debate that clarifies and questions transitions theory would
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be more useful to the study of democratic development as a whole. Such efforts
would help establish consensus among scholars and help determine where the literature
should go from here. The world is full of diverse experiences in an age of highly
interrelated and accelerated political, economic, and social change. In turn, pockets of
scholarship that share the general theme of democratic development will not remain in
isolation long, nor should they. Conversely, universal generalizations that fail to face
comprehensive reflection and revision are of limited scholarly benefit. A middle ground
between "regional ists” and “transitologists” needs to be found in which the best of each
approach is combined.
To move toward this middle way, scholars need to reconceptualize and refine
basic ideas toward democracy and democratic development in comparative political
scholarship in a way that people can understand, rather than simply expanding the
literature by constructing more abstract and elaborate models that focus on obstructing
recession of the third w ave. This begins by asking what is democracy
,
a simply question
that has generated significant debate. Election centered definitions, as put forth by Joseph
Schumpeter, even with the addition of civil liberties, as put forth by Robert Dahl, are no
longer sufficient. A working definition of democracy must incorporate the multifaceted
nature of the government system, yet be concise enough so as to be clearly
comprehended and applied. 1 define democracy as the process by which popularly elected
representatives, legitimate government structures, government recognized civil liberties,
and active civil society combine to form a political system that collectively seeks to
promote public good. This is a purposefully narrow definition to ensure conceptual
clarity.
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Transitologists have focused too much on institutions at the expense of other
important dimensions of democracy. Democracy is not institutionally determined, nor
solely the product of choices made by key actors. As such, the process must not be
thought of as simply building "the right track" and voting on who should drive for awhile.
This ignores important considerations such as desired destination, driving experience,
speed, council, maintenance, obstacles, etc., all of which play an important role in
moving forward. In turn, democracy consists of several components interacting: part
elected office holding, part institutions, part legal protections from government, part
popular organization and civic activity. Together these parts peacefully mediate conflict
and move society forward toward some conception of public good. Without one of these
parts, functioning democracy will be very difficult to attain, as we have seen in Ukraine
and Russia.
If transitions theory w as on target, one would expect development in Ukraine and
Russia to be quite similar given that both countries established democratic elections and
institutions at relatively the same time and transitioned from the same authoritarian
regime. As Alexander Motyl puts it, however, "Ukraine and Russia are especially vivid,
and paradigmatic examples of diametrically opposed paths that the USSR's successor
states can follow."
6 As Andrew Wilson explains, "a decade and a half is not a particularly
long time, but the assumption that post-Soviet politics can be studied within the
framework of some kind of 'transition to democracy' was always doubtful and is now
untenable." This work seeks to move beyond assumptions and engage transitions theory
in its ow n words. To be fair to the transitions approach, the model was tested with
empirical rigor in a region where many other variables, such as timing, geography.
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history, culture, language, and religion are similar. To my knowledge, no critical
evaluation of this nature has yet taken place.
My research question asked: Have elections and institutions been highly effective
in promoting political and economic development in theformer Soviet Union? My thesis
argued that the predominant emphasis on elections and institutions among transition
scholars has been largely ineffective in understanding democratic transitions in the
former Soviet Union and thus, hinders efforts to promote democracy. To evaluate this
thesis I conducted in-depth case studies of Ukraine and Russia, two countries that have a
historical connection that dates back to the 9
1 ' 1
century and over the next 14 centuries
came to share many social commonalities including ethnicity, language, culture, and
religion. If the emphasis on elections and institutions of the transitions approach is
justified, then democratic development in Ukraine and Russia would have been relatively
successful and similar in each case because elections and institutions were established
and functioning early in the transition process. This work, on the other hand, found that
the development experiences in Ukraine and Russia were highly divergent and
ineffective, which strongly suggests that the emphasis on elections and institutions in the
transitions approach such be reconsidered.
1 created ten indicators to measure the effectiveness of elections in promoting
democratic development. When effective, elections fundamentally promote the peaceful
and legitimate transition of power. Indicators of an effective electoral process include
holding frequent elections, high voter turnout, popular candidate selection, effective
oversight procedures to resolve electoral disputes, low levels of fraud, low levels of
violence, wide acceptance of results, low levels of media favoritism, ideological variance
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among candidates, and candidates that represent stable and principled parties. s The
existence of these indicators were measured cumulatively, meaning what prevalent from
1991 to 2006, and currently, meaning what is the dominant trend as of 2006. Such
measurements provided a perspective on both the norm and direction of post Soviet
development in each country.
Ukraine and Russia experienced several indicators of peaceful and legitimate
transition of power from 1991 and 2006: frequent elections, strong levels of voter
turnout, popular selection of candidates, and wide acceptance of results. In both countries
scheduled elections were never postponed or cancelled and the average turnout for
elections was approximately 70% in Ukraine and 67% in Russia. Respective electoral
laws permitted citizens in both systems to popularly candidates. Both systems widely
accepted the results of elections, even fraudulent ones in the case of Ukraine.
Ukraine and Russia also consistently failed to experience certain indicators of
peaceful and legitimate transition of power, including low levels of fraud, low levels of
violence, and candidates that represent stable and principled political parties. In Ukraine,
electoral fraud was blatant throughout much of the first decade of independence. Official
results were manipulated by at the direction of powerful members of the administration,
particularly under President Kuchma. In Russia, the dominant form of fraud was the
illegal use of state resources to further the electoral advantages of politicians in power,
particularly those favorable to the President. Both had a significant and negative impact
on a legitimate electoral process.
Ukraine and Russia have not had stable and principled parties as a norm of post
Soviet development. Parties have been numerous, but fleeting, and are typically centered
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upon candidates, rather than platforms. Given this nature, party members have been
typically held accountable by party leaders, not the other way around. Interestingly, the
dominant ruling coalitions in each country. Our Ukraine under Yushchenko and United
Russia under Putin, pursue very different political objectives with very different levels of
organizational solidarity. This points to the fact that in addition to common trends of
electoral development, both positive and negative, Ukraine and Russia produced
divergent experiences with several indicators as well.
The media in Ukraine, for example, faced strict censorship throughout the 1 990's,
particularly under Kuchma, and now appears to be moving toward greater independence
for journalists, albeit tentatively. Media favoritism certainly exists in Ukraine, but certain
channels predominately support certain candidates, rather than one candidate dominating
the vast majority of media coverage as a whole. In Russia, on the other hand, Yeltsin's
unpopularity during to his bid for reelection led to a massive and illegal proliferation of
pro-Yeltsin content in oligarch-controlled media networks, which laid a foundation for
Putin to slowly abolish independent media.
Ideological variance among candidates, effective oversight procedures to resolve
electoral disputes, and low levels of violence are further examples of variance in
Ukrainian and Russian development. Ukraine did not have genuine ideological variance
until 2002, when opposition and reform candidates formed their own parties to compete
in the Rada elections. Since, there have been genuine and strong policy divisions between
major political figures, such as President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych.
In Russia, on the other hand, there were very strong policy divisions between the
Communists, democratic reformers, and pro-presidential groups throughout the I990's,
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whereas today, substantive policy divisions have faded under Putin and his vast
consolidation of political power. In terms of oversight, Ukraine had electoral oversight
procedures in place since the first election after independence, but these mechanisms
were ineffective until the Orange Revolution. Russia, meanwhile, demonstrated relatively
effective electoral oversight procedures, particularly given their size, even though
democratic norms and behaviors have been significantly restricted under Putin.
Violence surrounding Ukrainian elections has been particularly dramatic by
Western standards. Candidates, supporters, and political figures regularly experienced
physical assault and destruction of property. Consecutive presidential elections witnessed
murder attempts. Natalya Vitrenko was supposedly wounded in 1999 by a grenade
attack, while Yushchenko experienced lethal amounts of the deadly poison dioxin in
2004. To this day, the culprits have not been publicly identified, let alone brought to
justice. The Orange Revolution provides hope for genuine and lasting electoral change,
but this is not yet certain. Though Russia has experienced some violence surrounding
elections, it has not been the same in nature or scale as Ukraine.
As illuminated in the figure 1 and figure 2, elections as a whole were highly
ineffective in promoting democratic development in Ukraine from 1991 to 2006, while
moderately effective in Russia. Currently, the situation in reversed. Elections are now
moderately effective in promoting democratic development in Ukraine and ineffective in
Russia. This suggests that the relationship between elections and democratic development
in Ukraine and Russia has been and continues to be one of great variance in terms of the
trajectory and level of effectiveness.
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Figure 3:
Electoral Indicators in Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine Russia
Holding Frequent Elections yes yes
High Voter Turnout yes yes
Popular Candidate Selection yes yes
Wide Acceptance of Results yes yes
Low Levels of Violence no yes
Low Levels of Fraud no no
Low Levels of Media Favoritism no (until 2005) no
Candidates Represent Stable and
Principled Political Parties
no no
Ideological Variance no (until 2002) yes (until 2003)
Effective Oversight Procedures
to Resolve Electoral Disputes
no (until 2005) yes
Figure 4:
Effectiveness Scale
When all indicators are present in a respective category, the development process is
considered exceptional. Conversely, lower percentages correspond with lower levels of
effectiveness. If a percentage of effectiveness in a case study falls below 60%, the
category will be considered highly ineffective in promoting their respective objectives.
The scale of effectiveness is as follows:
• Scores between 60% and 69% will be considered ineffective.
• Scores between 70% and 79% will be considered moderately effective.
• Scores between 80% and 89% will be considered effective.
• Scores between 90% and 100% will be considered highly effective.
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Figure 5:
Cumulative Electoral Scores in Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine
Cumulative Score
(1991-2006)
Current Score
(As of 2006)
40%
Elections ineffective
70%
Moderately effective
Russia
70%
Moderately effective
60%
Elections ineffective
Let us next see how institutions compare to elections. I created five indicators to
measure the effectiveness of democratic institutions in promoting democratic
development and five indicators to measures the effectiveness of institutions in
promoting capitalist development. When effective, democratic institutions fundamentally
promote stable and representative government in the political realm. Indicators of
effective institutional operation include the establishment of a democratic constitution,
low levels of corruption, low levels of violence, wide acceptance of the political system,
and a meaningful role for the opposition. These indicators consider both formal and
informal aspects of institutional development and operation. When effective, democratic
institutions fundamentally promote stable and sustained economic growth in the
economic realm. Indicators of effective institutional operation include a rising gross
domestic product, a balanced budget, significant privatization of state owned industries,
rising wages, and rising foreign direct investment. These indicators focus on
macroeconomic indicators that measure basic health of a developing economy.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine and Russia have produced and failed
to produce indicators of stable and representative government with relative similarity. For
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example, both countries established democratic constitutions and have experienced wide
acceptance of the political system. The mere establishment of democratic constitutions
ignores however the important role of the implementation process in each country.
Ukraine had the dubious distinction of being last former Soviet republic to adopt a
democratic constitution, while Russia adopted a democratic constitution after a violent
standoff between powerful factions that dominated two different powerful institutions,
the executive and legislature. This suggests that formal measures of democratic
development embraced by transition scholars are limited in their ability to best
understand the deeper dynamics of development in transition countries.
Ukraine and Russia also experienced high levels of corruption and high levels of
violence without a meaningful role for the opposition in government. In a recent visit
w ith the Minister of Agriculture in Ukraine, 1 was astonished that in response to a
question regarding a specific law not being effectively enforced, the Minister simply
stated before a public audience that this was Ukraine and like with many things in
Ukraine it's not hard to get around the law if you want to. This illuminates the well
known fact in both Ukraine and Russia that laws apply differently to different people and
as a result corruption is so woven into these political systems in a way that makes it very
difficult to even figure out where to begin undoing the knot. In such situations, formal
political opposition is very difficult to mount because without legitimacy and
transparency, political forces that control resources exert extraordinary formal and
informal influence.
To the detriment of democratic development, violence w as integral in resolving
the most divisive institutional conflicts in post Soviet Russia and even persisted in day to
day Russian politics. Several Duma members were murdered in while holding office.
Victims have come from different parties, including Communists, liberals, liberal
democrats, and pro-government forces. The murders appeared to be contract killings and
went unsolved. Such violence was emblematic of society as a whole. At the turn of the
century, official statistics of violent crimes in Russia and the prison population were
comparable to the world’s most criminalized countries. Violence in Ukraine was less
epidemic, but no less severe. Episodes have ranged from fist fights in the Rada and to the
secret decapitation of critical journalists by government insiders following orders from
the very top.
As with political measures, Ukraine and Russia shared similar experiences with
economic measures of institutions. Both countries produced significant privatization of
state owned industries and paid a high political and social price in doing so. It would be
disingenuous, however, to categorize this development as a success because of the
negative political, economic, legal, and social consequences that resulted from the
privitization process. As the Orange government in Ukraine quickly realized, rectifying
grossly corrupt transition practices is very difficult to do without serious political and
economic repercussions. At the same time, if genuine reform is truly the goal, it is also
very difficult to turn a blind eye toward such massive injustice. Putin, on the other hand,
was much less concerned about social justice and used the re-privization issue to
consolidate power. Putin simply imprisoned and sought to imprison oligarchs who failed
to adhere to the demands of the administration, stating throughout there would be no re-
privitizations. This approach allowed the President to eliminate political rivals, increase
the resources of the State via seized assets, and maintain a positive public image because
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few Russians cared for wealthy individuals who obtained massive wealth via fraud and
corruption.
National budgets have not been consistently balanced in Ukraine or Russia. This
was a significant problem during the 1 990's, particularly during the economic collapse of
the Russian economy in 1998. Progress has been made in both countries since the turn of
the century, but the sustainability of such progress is uncertain. Ukraine's economic
turnaround w as largely a product of Yushchenko's fiscal policies, the future of which are
uncertain given his falling popularity since 2004. Russia's economic turnaround was and
continues to be largely a product of high oil prices, rather than sound fiscal policies, the
future of which are also uncertain. In both societies, cutting government spending has
been very difficult, but possible, depending on the political climate and the status of
government revenues. Wages dropped throughout much of the 1990’s and then began to
rise as the economic situations in each country improved.
Experiences with foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic production have
varied more than the previous indicators. Ukraine has slowly and steadily garnered FDI
since the fall of the Soviet Union, whereas Russia experienced rising levels of FDI up
until the 1998 collapse, albeit surprisingly small compared to other Eastern European
countries. FDI began to climb once again after the crash, though Putin's centralization
and the uncertainty surrounding the end of his term have been reasons for caution. Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in Ukraine fell for several years after the transition began, but
grew fairly steadily from 1994 to 2004. GDP in Russia plummeted after the transition
began, even worse than Ukraine, worse, in fact, than the Great Depression in the United
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States. After the crash, however, GDP grew on average about 7% each year, providing a
means for greater investment in restructuring and better equipping the military.
As illuminated by the figures 3, figure, 4, and figure 5, institutional experiences
between 1991 and 2006 were more similar in Ukraine and Russia than electoral
experiences over the same period. Importantly, however, institutional experiences were
consistently ineffective in promoting democratic development. This does not mean that
factors such as the establishment of a constitution and the privatization of state owned
industries did not contribute to development, certainly they have. Rather, these findings
point to how the relationship between democratic institutions and democratic
development in each country is more complicated than the mere existence of basic pieces
of democracy (a constitution) and capitalism (private property).
Figure 6:
Political Measures of Institutions in Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine Russia
Establishment of Constitution yes yes
Wide Acceptance of Political System yes yes
Low Levels of Corruption no no
Meaningful Role for Opposition no no
Low Levels of Violence no no
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Figure 7:
Economic Measures oflnstitutions in Ukraine and Russia
Ukraine Russia
Significant Privatization yes yes
Rising Foreign Direct Investment yes (slow, steady) yes (up and down)
Balanced Budget no no
Rising Wages no (up since 2000) no (up since 1999)
Rising Gross Domestic Product yes no (up since 1999)
Figure S :
Cumulative Institutional Scores in Ukraine and Russia
Cumulative Score for
Political Measurements
(1991-2006)
Cumulative Score for
Economic Measurements
(1991-2006)
Combined Score for
Institutions (1991 -2006)
Ukraine
50%
Institutions ineffective
60%
Institutions ineffective
55%
Institutions ineffective
Russia
60%
Institutions ineffective
40%
Institutions ineffective
50%
Institutions ineffective
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As a whole, elections have been ineffective in Ukraine and moderately effective
in Russia between 1991 and 2006, while institutions were consistently ineffective.
Clearly, the predominant focus of transition scholars needs to be rethought. Assuming
that elections and institutions have some merit in promoting development, scholars of
comparative political development need to reorient predominant understandings
transitions away from election-centered, institution-centered models of democratic
development toward a multifaceted approach that incorporates the lessons of the last
fifteen years of post Soviet development. Essentially, we must determine what should be
more seriously considered aside from elections and institutions in understanding how a
country can move toward a functioning democracy. 1 label these considerations
"environments" and develop seven that are worth consideration: 1 ) popular environment;
2) historical-cultural environment; 3) international environment; 4) institutional
environment; 5) legal environment; 6) economic environment; 7) civil environment.
Environments are chosen to distinguish different aspects of democratic development.
Environments are static, yet must be sustainable to be effective, and thus are constantly in
a process of destruction and construction, creation and recreation, similar to the transition
process.
The popular environment concerns the level of desire for democracy within a
given society. Key questions to consider include: What do people think the new regime
should look like ? What do people believe are the key objectives in reaching these goals?
In evaluating the state of a popular environment, one must not assume democracy and
capitalism are universally desired goals and get down to what aspects of a popular
government and a competitive economy are most appealing. If a country is interested in
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Western conceptions of democracy, then Western assistance should be made available. If
democracy is not the desired alternative, then such societies should not be forced on
countries either explicitly or implicitly. Democracy is a form of government where the
populace plays a unique and tremendous role in governance. Thus, public attitudes must
understood and embraced, rather than ignored or assumed.
The historical-cultural environment concerns the level of experiences and values
that tit with democratic norms. Democracy does not develop in a laboratory with all
variables constant, so history will impact the transition process. Key questions to consider
include: Is there a history ofdemocracy? What was the impact on society? Why did
democracy or related components breakdown and/orfail to be effective? In evaluating
the state of historical-cultural environment one must not assume that any history of
democracy is beneficial in considering contemporary development. Democracies can
easily produce undemocratic leadership and trends that may have a strong influence on
the value a society places on popular governance. History and culture does not absolutely
limit or guarantee democratic development; however, history and culture does provide a
context in which contemporary attitudes and reforms can be better understood.
The international environment concerns external influences on development in a
given country. Key questions to consider include: What external groups have a stake in
the new regime? How involved are external groups in the transition process'* What is the
impact of this involvement? Throughout the third wave of democratic transitions external
influences have played a significant role in the nature and process of regime change,
particularly in the former Soviet Union. Given that contemporary politics transpires in
international context of globalization, it is difficult fora society to undergo massive
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transformation without consideration of external incentives or disincentives. In addition
to States, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations may wield
tremendous influence over a given territory, as well as non-state actors, such as terrorist
or criminal organizations. In turn, international relations must be considered alongside
domestic history and culture to ascertain the context in which a transition occurs.
The institutional environment concerns a good part of what transitions theory
addresses. Elections and institutions are an important part of a transition process, but
neither alone, nor together, do these conditions effectively encapsulate the process. Basic
government structures, such as a legislature, and mechanisms, such as national elections,
are necessary for democracy to develop. Key questions to consider include: How were
institutions implemented? How have they operated since implementation? In evaluating
the state of the institutional environment, one must not assume that the very existence of
elections and institutions are solely beneficial to development because the
implementation process is important and may intentionally manipulate or unintentionally
distort institutional operation. This is particularly evident in post Soviet societies.
The legal environment concerns the degree to which a given society is law-based.
Formal mechanisms, such as elections and institutions, will mean very little without
transparency, widespread adherence to established legal procedures, and government
protected civil liberties. Key questions to consider include: How transparent is
government activity? Is there widespread adherence to constitutional and legal
provisions? Are there effective judicial bodies that mediate constitutional and legal
disputes? In evaluating the state of a legal environment one must not assume that
because transition societies have formal documents that establish certain political and
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legal procedures that these procedures are regularly and effectively implemented,
respected, and mediated when there is a dispute.
The economic environment concerns the state of the economy and quality of life
in a given society. If economic conditions are unstable or in steady and prolonged
decline, this will certainly have a negative impact on development objectives and related
public opinion. Key questions to consider include: Are people better offthan when the
transition began? Under the previous regime? Do people believe they are better ojjl In
evaluating the state of an economic environment one must not under appreciate the
potentially devastating impact that rapid economic transformation can have on
individuals and reform objectives. The business perspective of cutting your loses as
quickly as possible or the belief that opportunities must be maximized in some mythical
"window of opportunity" ignores the basic humanity of those involved in dramatic social
change. It is important to not lose sight of the fact that the security and savings of average
people hang in the balance while they try to make sense ofnew obstacles and
opportunities by navigating around wealthy and/or criminal elements that can dominate
chaotic political scenarios. If basic quality of life is not maintained during the
transition process, or at least quickly reestablished, the achievement of long term
development goals will be severely complicated if not compromised.
The civil environment concerns the state of political organization within a given
society. This includes parties, blocs, and coalitions, as well as other forms of collective
organization outside of government, such as interest groups, civic groups, and think
tanks. If there are no sustained forms of collective organization inside or outside of
government, it w ill be very difficult for a system of governance to determine and work
2X0
towards some conception of public good. Key questions to consider are: Does the country
have stable and representative parties? Are there public groups outside ofgovernment
that can effectively communicate their policy goals to society and government? The
concept of civil society has received a lot of attention in recent years as it should.
Democracy scholars must be careful, however, not think of civil society as a magic bullet
of sorts. Collective organization can be very effective in promoting greater accountability
and transparency of systems in transition, but this only one of many important
components.
These seven democratic environments must interact together, not exist separately
or partially, for democracy to develop. The ideas behind the environments are simple
enough to be generally comprehended, yet complicated enough to appreciate how
genuinely difficult it is for democracy to develop. Democratic development takes time, as
we commonly hear in arguments surrounding the state of affairs in Iraq, but more
accurately, development takes an array of political, economic, and social changes that
must effectively complement one another. This is something America must clearly
understand about the dynamics of democratic development in order to effectively
promote it around the world.
Now more than ever, scholars of comparative political development need to think
of new and effective ways to explain the myriad of development scenarios that have
emerged since Rustow and Huntington pioneered the transitions approach over 30 years
ago. The predominant emphasis on elections and institutions which has persisted
throughout this time has silently become core perspectives of many democracy
proponents in and out of academia and government. This research has clearly shown that
such a focus is Hawed and provided some basic suggestions for how to rethink what
democracy is and how it develops. Hopefully, greater dialogue will emerge over the
usefulness and effectiveness of the transitions approach and the counterapproach
presented. Forging new and better perspectives in this very important and timely area of
study is of the utmost importance to comparative political development and the future
American foreign policy making.
' See Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal ofDemocracy. 13.2
(2002), 5-21.
2
Fish ( 1 999), 798
’ This comment was made off the record in Lviv, 2006.
4
Roeder (1999), 855.
'' Ishiyama and Kennedy (2001 ), I 177.
Motyl (1997), 433.
Wilson (2005), 273.
' This research was confined to the study of national elections.
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